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The development and use of technologies that harness the
power of the atom for the production of electricity, as well as for
military purposes, have generated large quantities of radioactive
wastes.1 Yet, during the thirty-seven years since the first con-
trolled nuclear chain reaction, no integrated technology has been
demonstrated that assures the safe, permanent isolation from
the biosphere of the more radiotoxic of these wastes. Conse-
quently, the federal government and the commercial nuclear in-
dustry temporarily store them in facilities scattered across the
country. At the same time, a debate continues between experts
who have concluded that the technology for properly disposing
of the wastes currently exists2 and those who respond that fun-
damental problems remain with proposed waste disposal tech-
nologies.3 The Department of Energy (DOE) currently estimates
that facilities for disposing of commercial high-level waste will
not begin to operate until about the year 2000.'
The absence of a solution to the problem of radioactive
waste disposal could severely reduce the desirability of nuclear
power as an alternative source of energy.5 Indeed, several states
1. See Appendix infra.
2. See, e.g., S. KENNEY, JR., et al., NUCLEAR PoWER ISSUES AND CHOICES: REPORT OF
THE NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP 266 (1977) [hereinafter cited as the FORD/
MITRE STUDY]; Brown & Bergholz, Nuclear Waste-The Case for Confidence in Dispo-
sal, 32 S.C.L. REv. 851 (1981); Axelrad & Bauser, The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
Proposed Rulemaking on the Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste-The Case for
Confidence Concerning Spent Fuel Storage, 32 S.C.L. REv. 893 (1981). See notes 51-54
and accompanying text infra.
3. See, e.g., NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COMM. OF THE CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION,
STATUS OF NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING, SPENT FUEL STORAGE AND HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
DISPOSAL 232 (Draft Report 1978); Hearings on Nuclear Waste Disposal before the Sub-
comm. on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
Part II, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1980) (statement of Emilio E. Varanini, III, Commis-
sioner, California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission [herein-
after cited as Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, Part II]; Lash, Radioactive Waste: Nuclear
Energy's Dilemma, 1 AMICUS 24 (Fall 1979); Sheldon, Nuclear Waste: The Problem Re-
mains Unburied, 32 S.C.L. REv. 911 (1981).
4. DEs'T OF ENERGY, STATEMENT OF POSmON OF THE UNITED STATES DEP'T OF EN-
ERGY IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NU-
CLEAR WASTE 1-4 (DOE/NE-0007, Apr. 15, 1980).
5. Sixty-eight nuclear power plants currently have operating licenses, NRC, OPERAT-
ING UNITS STATUS REPORT 1-2 (NUREG-0029, Nov. 1980), and supply about 13 percent
of the electricity used in the United States. COUNCIL ON ENV'L QUALITY, THE TENTH AN-
NUAL REPORT 361 (1979). Nuclear power, however, accounts for only about three percent
1981]
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have attempted statutorily to condition the construction of new
nuclear power plants upon a successful demonstration of tech-
nology for safely disposing of the wastes." The urgency of resolv-
ing the radioactive waste problem, however, exists indepen-
dently of the debate over the costs and benefits of including
nuclear power in the nation's future energy plan. The federal
government and the commercial nuclear industry already have
generated a substantial inventory of radioactive waste that will
require proper management and disposalJ regardless of any na-
tional policy decision on whether to expand, maintain, or reduce
the current capacity for generating electricity from nuclear
power. Moreover, the federal government will continue to accu-
mulate radioactive waste from its defense research and develop-
ment and weapons production programs.
The problem of managing and disposing of radioactive
waste raises not only scientific and technological issues, but po-
litical, social, and ethical issues as well. In addition, the success
of current and future waste disposal efforts very well may de-
pend on the degree to which the federal government can attract
broad support based on public confidence that the chosen tech-
nology will protect this and future generations from the long-
term health, safety, and environmental hazards of waste dispo-
sal. Nevertheless, prior to President Carter's Statement on Radi-
oactive Waste Management on February 12, 1980,8 the federal
of the total energy consumed domestically. CouNcIL. ON ENV'L QUALrrY, THE ELEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 259 (1980).
An additional eight plants either are under construction or have applications for
construction permits pending before the NRC. No new applications for construction per-
mits have been filed at the NRC since 1978, prior to the accident at the Three Mile
Island Nuclear Station-Unit 2. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, PROGRAM SUMMARY RE-
PORT 2-6 (NUREG-0380, Apr. 25, 1980). Moreover, inflation, reduced growth rates for
electricity demand, and the uncertainties associated with nuclear power have led utili-
ties, since 1977, to place only two, while cancelling twenty-three, orders for new power
plants. THE COUNCIL ON ENV'L QUALITY, THE ELEvENTH ANNUAL REPORT 288 (1980).
Thus, the prospects that nuclear power will contribute significantly as a long-term
alternative source of energy appear less than bright. The Department of Energy (DOE),
however, projects that by the year 2000 nuclear power will supply 10.8 percent of the
total energy consumed domestically and will generate 25.9 percent of the electricity pro-
duced domestically. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., 1980 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
VOLUME THREE: FORECAST 124, 159 (DOE/EIA-0173(80)/3, Mar. 1981).
6. See note 155 and accompanying text infra; Jaksetic, Constitutional Dimensions
of State Efforts to Regulate Nuclear Waste, 32 S.C.L. REv. 789 (1981).
7. See Appendix infra.
8. President's Message to Congress, "Comprehensive Radioactive Waste Manage-
[Vol. 32
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government lacked a coherent, comprehensive program to ad-
dress the many issues associated with the management and ulti-
mate disposal of radioactive waste.9 The failure of the executive
branch to implement such a program, as well as differences in
opinion on what elements the program should contain, led to a
proliferation of legislative proposals during the Ninety-Sixth
Congress that would prescribe a radioactive waste management
program and establish a complementary regulatory framework.
Both the House and Senate passed legislation addressing a vari-
ety of radioactive waste issues, but failed to reconcile differences
between the two bills and achieve subsequent enactment.10
ment Program," 16 WEEKLY Comp. OF Pass. Doc. 7 (Feb. 12, 1980).
9. See notes 78-156 and accompanying text infra. For purposes of this discussion, we
will assume that radioactive waste management includes such interdependent operations
as collection, temporary storage, treatment, packaging, transportation, and permanent
disposal of the wastes.
10. The Senate passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act under the bill number S. 2189.
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S10266-73 (daily ed. July 30, 1980). The House
passed its version of the Act under the bill number H.R. 8378 and then substituted it for
the Senate language in S. 2189. 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H11747-49 (daily
ed. Dec. 3, 1980). Congress subsequently deleted all but a revised version of the low-level
waste title in enacting S. 2189 as the Low-Level Waste Policy Act; see note 12 infra.
The complicated allocation of jurisdictional responsibilities in both houses raised
significant barriers to the enactment of comprehensive radioactive waste legislation. Four
committees in the House of Representatives and four committees in the Senate have
exercised jurisdictional prerogatives over various aspects of radioactive waste legislation.
In the House of Representatives, the Committee on Science and Technology invoked its
jurisdiction over "all energy research and development," H.R. RULE X, cl. 1(r)(11), 96th
Cong., to report the Nuclear Waste Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of
1980 (H.R. 7418), H.R. REP. No. 1156, part I, 96th Cong., 2d Seass. (1980). The Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with jurisdiction over the "regulation of the domestic
nuclear energy industry" and "nonmilitary nuclear energy research and development in-
cluding the disposal of nuclear waste," H.R. RuLE X, cl. 1(k)(17), 96th Cong., and the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, with "the same jurisdiction with re-
spect to regulation of nuclear facilities and of use of nuclear facilities and of use of non-
nuclear energy," H.R. RULE X, cl. 1(1), 96th Cong., reported their own versions. H.R.
REP. No. 1156, part 11, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980); H.R. REP. No. 1156, part III, 96th
Cong., 2d Seass. (1980).
In addition, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee received sequential
referral of the Atomic Energy Act Amendments of 1980, reported by the Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee, H.R. REP. No. 1382, part II, 96th Cong., 2d Seass. (1980),
which included provisions both for a radioactive waste program and for a nuclear safety
board, id. §§ 201-14. The Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee deleted the pro-
visions unrelated to radioactive waste management, and reported a bill with provisions
substantially similar to those in the Interior and Insular Affairs bill. H.R. REP. No. 1382,
part I, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980). These two bills formed the basis of the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act ultimately passed by the House. S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Seass., 126
CONG. REc. S16539-46, H12494-97 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980).
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While failing to pass comprehensive radioactive waste legisla-
tion, however, Congress succeeded in enacting two bills: the Low
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act11 and the West Valley Dem-
onstration Project Act.
12
This Article will discuss the characteristics and hazards of
the various types of radioactive waste. It then will review the
checkered history of federal efforts to establish a program for
disposing of high-level radioactive waste. Next, the Article will
examine the legislative proposals that came before the Ninety-
Sixth Congress. These bills addressed, among other things, insti-
tutional issues arising from high-level waste management, tech-
nological strategies for waste disposal, and interim storage of
commercial spent reactor fuel. Finally, it will discuss problems
of low-level waste management and the legislative response.
II. THE NATURE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES
Radioactive wastes are produced at virtually every stage of
the nuclear fuel cycles associated with the commercial genera-
tion of electricity and with the production of nuclear weapons
The Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate, have invoked their
jurisdictions over the military aspects of nuclear energy, S. RULE X, cl. 1(c)(11); id.
XXV, cl. 1(c)(6), 96th Cong., to establish a separate program within the DOE to manage
and dispose of radioactive waste generated by defense-related activities. See notes 196-98
and accompanying text infra. This program includes construction of a Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP) as a demonstration facility for the disposal of military radioactive
waste, See generally notes 122-29 & 199 and accompanying text infra.
A somewhat clearer division of jurisdictional authority has permitted the Senate to
avoid sequential referral of radioactive waste legislation. The Committee on Environ-
ment and Public Works, invoking its jurisdiction over "nonmilitary environmental regu-
lation and control of nuclear energy," S. RULE XXV(h)(1)10., 96th Cong., reported the
National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control Act of 1980 (S. 2980), S. REP. No. 871,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The Committee, however, failed to obtain a time agreement
for separate consideration of the bill. Consequently, it was forced to offer provisions in
the bill as amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (S. 2189), reported by the Com-
mittee on Energy and Natural Resources, S. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980),
pursuant to its jurisdiction over "nonmilitary development of nuclear energy." S. RULE
XXV(g)(1)12., 96th Cong. The Committee on Governmental Affairs, with jurisdiction
over "intergovernmental relations," S. RuLE XXV(k)(1)7., 96th Cong., considered legisla-
tion to establish an institutional structure for radioactive waste management and to pro-
vide for state participation in the decisionmaking process. See note 192 infra. The Com-
mittee, however, failed to report a bill.
11, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980). See notes 574-85 and accompanying
text infra.
12. Pub. L. No. 96-368; 94 Stat. 1347 (1980). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (Supp.
1980).
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material.13  Because of their intense and long-lived radioactiv-
13. See generally FoRD/MITRE STUDY, supra note 2, at 246 et seq.; R. LiPSCHUTZ,
RADIOAcTrmV WASTE: POLITICS, TECHNOLOGY AND RISK 29-46 (1980). Nuclear fuel materi-
als undergo a number of processes before and after their use in nuclear reactors. These
activities are known collectively as the nuclear fuel cycle and vary for different types of
reactors. The following diagram shows the major activities in the traditional fuel cycle,
which include the mining and milling of uranium ore; the conversion of uranium ore to
uranium hexafluoride; enrichment of the uranium hexafluroide to increase the concentra-
tion of fissionable U-235; fabrication of fuel from the enriched uranium; reactor opera-
tion; storage of the spent reactor fuel withdrawn from the reactor core; reprocessing of
the spent fuel; and recycling of the uranium and plutonium extracted by reprocessing
into new reactor fuel. An alternative fuel cycle currently used in the United States com-
mercial nuclear power program omits reprocessing and treats spent fuel as the waste
material requiring permanent disposal.





: € -Spent Fuel Reprocessing a
Plutonium
Enriching n F




Exploration Mining Federal Final Disposition
> Fuel cycle as it operates currently.
r-4> Sectors requiring further policy resolution. Under alternative waste disposal
schemes, spent fuel may be stored for possible reprocessing in the future or
placed in repositories for final disposition.
*Primarily at individual power plant sites.
Source: U.S. ENERGY INFoRmAmON ADmiNsTzAON, 1980 ANNuAL Rzpor ro CONGRESS
(DOE/EIA-0173(80)/3) Vol. 3, at 176.
In addition to electricity generation and weapons production, nuclear reactors are
used for naval propulsion and research activities.
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ity,14 many of these wastes require unprecedented care and man-
agement to minimize their potentially grave effects upon health,
safety, and the environment.
1 5
Nuclear power reactors, or power plants, produce electricity
by using heat from the controlled splitting, or fission, of certain
uranium isotopes."" Slow-moving neutrons bombard the nucleii
of uranium-235, splitting the nucleii and releasing energy in the
form of heat and molecular motion. The fission process also re-
leases additional neutrons, which bombard other U-235 nucleii,
creating a chain reaction that will continue until the U-235 sup-
ply is exhausted or until the fuel has become sufficiently con-
taminated with reaction-inhibiting "fission products.'"17 In addi-
tion, plutonium-239, created by the neutron absorption and
transmutation of U-238,18 splits, releasing energy and neutrons
like U-235. Plutonium fission accounts for one-third of the reac-
14. Radioactivity is the emission of energy from the unstable nucleii of radioactive
atoms. The energy takes the form of high-speed, subatomic particles, such as alpha par-
ticles (two protons and two neutrons), beta particles (electrons or positrons), and neu-
trons, and of electromagnetic radiation such as gamma rays or x-rays. Emission of these
particles-a process known as radioactive decay-alters the ratio of neutrons to protons
in the nucleus, making the atoms less stable. FORD/MITRE STUDY, supra note 2, at 160;
M. WILLRICH & R. LESTER, RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION 1 (1977).
15. Massive doses of radiation over short periods of time may cause immediate
physiological damage or death. Prolonged or repeated low dose rates may produce ge-
netic alterations in the offspring of the exposed individual. The health effects of radia-
tion vary with the type of radiation, the total dose, the dose-rate (dose per unit time),
the area of the body exposed, and the distribution of the dose within the body. R.
BERKOW, THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 1729 (1977).
Human beings routinely receive exposures to "background" radiation from outer
space and from naturally occurring radioactive materials in the earth's crust and in their
own bodies. Exposure to background radiation varies with, among other things, altitude,
geologic features, and the type of dwelling. Because without instrumentation human be-
ings cannot readily detect radiation and because cancers and genetic defects occur ran-
domly among a normal population, it is often difficult to link radiation exposure to a
specific health problem. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 14.
16. Certain heavy elements such as uranium and plutonium are fissionable. A bom-
barding neutron can split the atoms of these elements into two or more lighter atoms.
Each of these elements occur as several isotopes-atoms with the same number of pro-
tons in their nucleii but different numbers of neutrons. Fission occurs when a neutron
strikes the nucleus of an atom in its "fissile" isotope. Fissile materials include uranium-
235, uranium-223, and plutonium-239. Conversely, "fertile" isotopes such as uranium-
238 and thorium-232 tend to capture neutrons without splitting. FORD/MITRE STUDY,
supra note 2, at 289-90; R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 9.
17. See note 24 and accompanying text infra.
18. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 7 n.2.
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tor's total energy output over the useful life of the fuel. '
In a nuclear weapon, the chain reaction occurs very rapidly,
releasing vast amounts of energy in an extremely short period of
time.2 0 In a nuclear power reactor, however, various devices con-
trol the fission process to maintain the chain reaction in an equi-
librium condition.21 The heat produced turns water into steam
that drives a turbine to produce electricity.22 Nuclear production
reactors, used in the United States defense program, also bom-
bard uranium with neutrons. Unlike nuclear power plants that
generate electricity through heat production, however, military
reactors produce plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.23
The fission process creates two broad categories of radioac-
tive atoms: fission products, which are lighter than uranium and
result directly from the fission process, and transuranic ele-
ments, which are heavier than uranium but not direct products
of the fission process. Fission products are produced during the
chain reaction when a neutron splits apart the unstable uranium
isotopes into a smaller, lighter, and usually highly radioactive el-
ement such as strontium-90, cesium-137, or iodine-131.24 Trans-
19. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMM'N, FINAL GENERIC ENV'L IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE
USE OF RECYCLED PLUTONIUM IN MIXED OXIDE FUELS IN LIGHT WATER COOLED REACTORS
vol. 1, at ES-1 (NUREG-0002, 1976) [hereinafter cited as GESMO]. Extremely radi-
otoxic, plutonium has a half-life of about 24,000 years. FoRD/MITRE STUDY, supra note
2, at 179. The concentration and configuration of uranium-235 determine the speed of
the chain reaction. With small amounts of dilute concentrations of U-235, more neutrons
escape to the surrounding environment or are absorbed by other materials in the fuel
than continue to split other nucleii. A self-sustaining chain reaction occurs when, for
each neutron-producing fission event, sufficient new neutrons are released to insure that
at least one will produce another fission event.
20. A nuclear explosion requires sufficient quantity or "critical mass" of pure, or
"weapons-grade" (greater than 90 percent uranium-235) fissile material to produce more
neutrons than are lost to the surrounding environment. R. DICKERSON, H. GRAY & G.
HAIGHT, CHEMICAL PRmNCIPLS 57 (1974).
21. Three principle devices can control the fission process in a nuclear power
plant-fuel composition, control rods, and the coolant. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON NUCLEAR
REGULATION, NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AND RECOVERY AT THREE MILE ISLAND: A SPECIAL INVES-
TIGATION 29 (June 1980) [hereinafter cited as TMI REPORT].
22. TM! REPORT, supra note 21, at 25.
23. The irradiated fuel elements from production reactors must pass through several
processes that extract the plutonium and prepare it for use in nuclear weapons. See gen-
erally H. MoRLAND, THE SECRET THAT EXPLODED (soon to be published by Random
House); 0. WICK, PLUTONIUM HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO THE TECHNOLOGY (1967).
24. FoRD/MITRE STUDY, supra note 2, at 246. Uranium fission produces over 100
different isotopes of more than 20 elements. R. DICKERSON, H. GRAY & G. HAIGHT, supra
note 20, at 571.
1981]
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uranic elements form when fertile isotopes such as uranium-238
absorb neutrons and transmute into new, heavy radioactive ele-
ments. These new isotopes may themselves be fissile.25
Most fission products have relatively short. half-lives, often
less than one hundred years, and emit penetrating beta and
gamma radiation.26 They produce most of the intense radioactiv-
ity and heat associated with waste during the first few hundred
years after generation. Transuranics, on the other hand, tend to
have longer half-lives, many ranging from thousands to hun-
dreds of thousands of years, but usually emit alpha particles,
which are less penetrating than beta or gamma radiation. These
transuranic isotopes may present serious health risks, particu-
larly if inhaled.
The build-up of new nonfissionable atoms and the depletion
of uranium-235 ultimately will inhibit the efficiency of the chain
reaction in a nuclear power reactor.28 Consequently, one-quarter
to one-third of the fuel, depending on the type of reactor, is re-
moved and replaced with fresh fuel each year, resulting in the
discharge of about thirty tons of spent fuel, which is stored ini-
tially in water-filled pools adjacent to the reactor. 9 At this
point, the highly radioactive spent fuel contains virtually all of
the fission products produced during reactor operation, all of the
nonfissioned heavy isotopes built up by neutron absorption, and
ninety-six percent, by weight, of the original uranium in the
fuel.30
In the United States weapons production program, the
spent fuel from plutonium production reactors is chemically
"reprocessed" to recover the residual plutonium used for manu-
facturing nuclear weapons.8 1 Similarly, because the residual ura-
25. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 9.
26. See note 14 supra.
27. FoRD/MITRE STUDY, supra note 2, at 246-47.
28. GESMO, supra note 19, at ES-1; R. LpSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 38.
29. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, OPERATING UNITS STATUS REPORT, vol. 4, No. 8 at
3-2 (NUREG-0025 Nov. 1980); R. LIPscHTrrz, supra note 13, at 38; FORD/MITRE STUDY,
supra note 2, at 246.
30. INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP, DRAFT SUBGROUP REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE TECH-
NOLOGY STRATEGIES FOR THE ISOLATION OF NUcLEAR WASTE, app. A, at 3-4 (TID-28818,
1978) [hereinafter cited as IRG DRAFT REPORT].
31. The process leaves behind an acidic liquid stream containing the fission prod-
ucts, approximately one-half of one percent of the uranium and plutonium originally
present in the spent fuel, and other transuranic elements.
648 [Vol. 32
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nium and plutonium in spent power reactor fuel can serve as a
substitute fuel in light water reactors or as the fuel for future
breeder reactors, it has been assumed that the commercial fuel
cycle also would include the reprocessing of spent fuel to extract
these fuel resources.2 The recovered uranium and plutonium
would reenter the fuel fabrication process to produce "mixed-
oxide" fuel for light water reactors or plutonium fuel for breeder
reactors.33
Reprocessing and the subsequent disposal of the resulting
waste products constitute the "back-end" of the nuclear fuel cy-
cle. Reprocessing wastes include highly radioactive acidic li-
quids, contaminated cladding and other fuel assembly materials,
solid processing materials, containers, filters, tools and other
equipment, and a large volume of liquids with low concentra-
tions of fission products." Because it is not clear that commer-
cial reprocessing ever will occur on a large scale in the United
States,35 spent fuel ultimately may become the waste material
from the back-end of the commercial fuel cycle that requires
permanent disposal.3 6
32. See generally FoRD/MITRE STuDY, supra note 2, at 247; GESMO, supra note
19. On April 7, 1977, President Carter indefinitely deferred commercial reprocessing in
the United States. See note 139 infra. It seems likely that the Reagan Administration
will permit, if not promote, the resumption of commercial reprocessing.
33. See FoRo/MITRE STnY, supra note 2, at 247.
34. Id. at 248.
35. See notes 133-37 and accompanying text infra.
36. There is a continuing debate over whether the disposal of post reprocessing
high-level waste offers sufficient benefits in comparison with the disposal of spent fuel so
as to make fuel reprocessing an essential component of a radioactive waste management
program. Disposal of spent fuel necessarily means the disposal of all the plutonium dis-
charged from a reactor. Therefore, once the fission products in the spent fuel have de-
cayed to safe levels in 500 to 1000 years, considerably greater quantities of long-lived
alpha emitting materials would remain in the repository than if post reprocessing high-
level waste were disposed of. Hearings on Nuclear Waste Management Before the
House Subcomm. on Fossil and Nuclear Energy Research, Development and Demon-
stration of the Comm. on Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 5, 11 (1978).
Moreover, the overall volume of solidified post reprocessing high-level waste is considera-
bly less than the spent fuel from which it is extracted.
On the other hand, rather than reducing the total volume of radioactive waste re-
quiring disposal, reprocessing produces transuranic contaminated wastes one to three
times the volume of the original spent fuel, which require permanent disposal compara-
ble to that required for high-level waste. FoRDJMITRE STUDY, supra note 2, at 248. See
text accompanying note 33 supra. Further, the higher heat per unit volume emitted by
solidified high-level waste necessitates wider spacing in a permanent repository of con-
tainers holding this material than of containers holding spent fuel. Finally, the near-term
11
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The radioactive wastes generated by the commercial and
military fuel cycles fall into four principal categories: (1) high-
level waste, (2) transuranic waste, (3) low-level waste, and (4)
wastes and tailings from uranium mining activities. High-level
waste includes the liquid waste stream that emerges in the
course of reprocessing and spent fuel assemblies discarded with-
out reprocessing.37 Transuranic waste is material possessing low
levels of radiation, but contaminated with transuranic elements,
including plutonium, which have very long half-lives. 8
Low-level waste generally refers to all types of waste that do
not come within the previous two categories. This category con-
sists primarily of material contaminated by other radioactive
material. It requires little or no shielding and contains low but
potentially hazardous concentrations of radionuclides.5 9 Gener-
ated in large amounts by medical and research activities and by
virtually all steps of the nuclear fuel cycle, low-level waste in-
risks resulting from handling the extracted plutonium and the reprocessed high-level liq-
uid waste may exceed those associated with spent fuel management. Id. at 34.
Several reports have concluded that reprocessing is not essential to assure safe man-
agement and disposal of radioactive wastes. See, e.g., id. at 248-49. AM. PHYSICAL Soc'Y,
REPORT BY THE STUDY GROUP ON NucLEAR FUEL CYCLES AND WASTE MANAGEMENT S8
(1977). But see NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY GROUP OF EXPERTS, OBJEcrIvEs, CONCEPTS AND
STRATEGIES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE ARISING FROM NuCLEAR PoWER
PROGRAMMES 66, 69 (Sept. 1977). Thus, it seems preferable for radioactive waste manage-
ment policy to remain neutral on the possible resumption of commercial spent fuel
reprocessing.
37. INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON NUCLEAR WASTE
MANAGEMENT (March 1979) [hereinafter cited as the IRG REPORT]. The NRC defines
"high-level liquid radioactive waste" as "those aqueous wastes resulting from the opera-
tion of the first cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, and the concentrated
wastes from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reprocessing
irradiated reactor fuels." 10 C.F.R. part 50, app. F (1980). The DOE has adopted a virtu-
ally identical definition for its "high-level liquid waste." In addition, it defines "high-
level waste" as: "(a) high-level liquid waste, or (b) the products from solidification of
high-level waste, or (c) irradiated fuel elements if discarded without reprocessing."
ATOM. ENERGY COMM'N MANUAL CHAPTER 0511: RADIOACIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT (part
I) 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL CHAPTER 0511].
Subsuming spent fuel under the category of "high-level waste" has evoked strong
objection from those who view spent fuel, not as waste, but as a valuable energy source
should commercial reprocessing ever resume. Nevertheless, if commercial reprocessing
does not resume, spent fuel necessarily will become the ultimate waste form. For simplic-
ity of discussion, therefore, this Article will use the term "high-level waste" to refer to
both post reprocessing high-level waste and spent fuel, unless otherwise indicated.
38. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 9; FoRD/MITRE STUDY, supra note 2, at 27. For
amounts, see Appendix infra.
39. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 10. For amounts, see Appendix infra.
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cludes: (1) decontamination solutions, some of which are immo-
bilized in absorbent materials such as vermiculite, plaster, or
clay; (2) combustible items such as protective clothing, rags,
plastic, paper trash, and packing material; and (3) noncombus-
tible material such as glassware, some radioactive nuclear reac-
tor equipment, and concrete.40 Mill tailings are generated in
large volumes and contain low concentrations of naturally occur-
ring radioactive material.41 These categories have tended to de-
termine the way specific types of wastes are managed and shape
the division of waste management responsibilities among federal
and state agencies and the private sector.
A. High-Level Waste
Management plans for high-level liquid wastes from com-
mercial or federal reprocessing activities typically have contem-
plated an initial period of storage in steel tanks at the reproces-
sing plant site, followed by solidification of the liquids in glass or
another enduring substance,42 encapsulation in a protective can-
ister to reduce further the likelihood of radionuclide migration
into the biosphere, and disposal of the solidified, high-level
waste either by emplacement in cavities mined deep into stable
geologic formations or by some other method."' Other proposed
40. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, A CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM FOR RADIOACTIVE
WASTE DISPOSAL-WHAT WASTE GOES WaIFn? 4-5 (NUREG-0456, June 1978).
41. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 10. There are currently 19 active and 25 inactive
uranium mills in the United States, which have produced over 300 thousand tons of
uranium and 144.5 million tons of mill tailings between 1947 and 1977. About 82 percent
of those tailings, or 119 million tons, are located at active mills. GEN'L ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, CLEANING UP COMMINGLED URANIUM MILL TAILINGS: Is FEDERAL ASSISTANCE NECES-
SARY? (EMD-79-29, 1979).
42. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FINAL ENV'L IMPACT STATEMENT: MANAGEMENT OF COMMER-
CIALLY GENERATED RAIOAcTrvE WASTE 4.22-4.25, vol. 1 (DOE/EIS-0046F, Oct. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as DOE FEIS]; M. WILLRICH & R. LESTER, supra note 14, at 10-11.
The NRC requires the solidification of commercial high-level liquid wastes within five
years after generation. 10 C.F.R. part 50, app. F (1977).
43. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 66. The geologic environment would serve as one
of several barriers to radionuclide migration. Other barriers include the waste form, the
waste package, and the repository structure. DOE FEIS, supra note 42, at 5.6-5.12. See
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Technical Criteria for Regulating Geologic Disposal of
High-Level Radioactive Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. 31,393 (1980) (notice of proposed rulemak-
ing for rule to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 60). The criteria for selecting a geologic environ-
ment would include its tectonic stability, predictability of change, ability to isolate es-
caping radionuclides from groundwater or other potential pathways to the biosphere, and
the lack of nearby economic mineral resources creating an incentive for future explora-
1981]
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but less developed methods for waste disposal include deep
ocean dumping," burial of the waste in thick stable sediments
beneath the deep ocean," placement of the waste in holes drilled
several miles into geologic formations,46 burial of the waste in
the polar ice caps, 47 and ejection into outer space of the most
tion that could breach the integrity of the repository. See generally DOE FEIS, supra
note 42, at 5.2-5.3. The engineered barriers would comport with the geologic environment
and provide a high degree of independent protection against migration.
The DOE has begun to evaluate several geologic media as possible hosts for reposi-
tories, including bedded salt, domed salt, granite, basalt, and shale. Id. at 5.3. For a
discussion of these potential storage mediums and the NRC rulemaking proceeding, see
Brown & Bergholz, supra note 2; Axelrad & Bauser, supra note 2; Sheldon, supra note 3.
44. The deep ocean dumping concept involves placing waste canisters on the surface
of the seabed to be cooled by circulating seawater. Given the corrosiveness of seawater,
however, the technology currently cannot guarantee container integrity. Although dilu-
tion of the wastes in seawater could sufficiently disperse any escaped radionuclides,
many radionuclides would tend to become concentrated in the marine food chain. In
addition, because the residence time of deep ocean waters is only 100 to 1000 years, long-
lived radionuclides found in high-level waste would mix with biologically active upper
layers. FoRD/MITRE STuDy, supra note 2, at 255.
45. Similar in concept to deep geologic disposal, subseabed disposal would require
the burial of waste-filled canisters in deep sea sediments rather than in geologic forma-
tions on land. Among the most stable formations on earth, the deep sea sediments are
plastic (self-healing), have low permeabilities, contain minerals that absorb radionuclides
thus retarding their movement, are highly uniform and predictable, occur in areas of low
biological activity, and essentially are devoid of valuable resources. In addition, much of
the necessary technology for subseabed disposal already exists. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SuB-
SEABED DIsPosAL PROGRAM PLAN, VOLUME I: OvRviEw 8-9 (SAND 0007/1], Jan. 1980).
DEP'T OF ENERGY, NucLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL IN SUBSEABED GEOLOGIC FORMATIONS: THE
SEABED DISPOSAL PROGRAM 8-9 (May 1979). See also D. DEESE, NUCLEAR POWER AND
RADIOACTIwE WASTE: A SUBSEABED DISPOSAL OPTION? (1978).
46. This approach consists of drilling holes 10 to 20 kilometers deep, and filling
them with waste. Eventually, the waste should melt and become part of the earth's man-
tle. This method may prove prohibitively expensive and exceed present technical capa-
bility as well as preclude retrieval of the waste. On the other hand, it may serve as a
back-up method for waste disposal should current plans fail. FORD/MITRE STUDY, supra
note 2, at 256. See also DOE FEIS supra note 42, at 6.68.
47. Placing wastes in the polar ice caps has been proposed for two reasons. First,
solidified waste in canisters, if placed on the surface of the ice, would melt the ice to
create its own emplacement shaft, which then would reseal by freezing and plastic flow.
Second, the vast ice-cap area would permit wide spacing of canisters to minimize the
effects of melt water on ice movement. Because many countries share the waste disposal
problem, Anarctica, an international land territory, could offer a less controversial loca-
tion for an international waste repository. See Zeller, Saunders & Angino, Putting Radi-
oactive Wastes on Ice-A Proposal for an International Radionuclide Depository in
Antarctica, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 4 (1973).
Several difficulties lie in the way of waste disposal in Anarctica. First, the Anarctic
Treaty of 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, prohibits radioactive waste disposal
within that continent even for research and development purposes. In addition, ques-
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hazardous elements in the waste.' s Although DOE has consid-
ered these disposal methods, it has rejected them in favor of de-
veloping mined geological depositories for its initial effort to dis-
pose of high-level waste.4
9
The DOE temporarily stores its high-level liquid wastes in
carbon steel or stainless steel underground tanks at three federal
sites: the Hanford Reservation near Richland, Washington; the
Savannah River Weapons Facility near Aiken, South Carolina;
and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory near Idaho
Falls, Idaho. The DOE has -solidified some of these wastes within
the storage tanks, but it has not immobilized them further in
glass or ceramic.50 In several instances, the past management of
these wastes by the DOE and its predecessors has proven less
than satisfactory. For example, several tanks have leaked sub-
stantial quantities of their radioactive contents.51 Moreover, the
DOE's methods for evaporating and solidifying the liquids in the
waste may have rendered some of the resulting solids virtually
impossible to remove for permanent disposal.5 2 The only com-
mercial high-level wastes generated to date are temporarily
stored, under DOE management, in one of two tanks at the
closed West Valley reprocessing plant.
5 3
Utilities currently store virtually all of their spent fuel in
pools of circulating water at nuclear power plant sites, pending
either the resumption of reprocessing, the availability of a fed-
tions remain about the evolutionary processes and long-term stability of ice sheets. DOE
FEIS, supra note 42, at 6.82. Finally, disposal in the Anarctic ice cap would entail high
transportation and operational costs. Id. at 6.97-6.98; FoRD/MITRE STUDY, supra note 2,
at 255-56. Thus, the ice disposal concept requires much additional study before it can
become a viable option.
48. Having investigated space disposal since the early 1970s, the DOE and the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have identified a number of possi-
ble options for extraterrestrial disposal. The basic reference concept proposes to use an
updated space shuttle and a transfer vehicle to place the waste into a solar orbit. DOE
FEIS, supra note 42, at 6.136. Although the DOE concluded that "space disposal offers
the option of permanently removing part of the nuclear wastes from the earth's environ-
ment," id., the costs of implementation and the risk of space vehicle failure either on the
launch pad or in low earth orbit make this option less attractive than others under re-
view. FORD/MITRE STUDy, supra note 2, at 256.
49. See generally DOE FEIS, supra note 42.
50. FoRD/MITRE STUDy, supra note 2 at 250-51.
51. See note 274 infra.
52. See note 176 and accompanying text infra.
53. See note 131 and accompanying text infra.
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eral facility for storing spent fuel away-from-reactor (AFR), or
the opening of a permanent repository for spent fuel." Before
President Carter announced his nuclear nonproliferation policy
and indefinitely deferred commercial reprocessing," the nuclear
industry and the federal government had anticipated the
reprocessing of commercial spent fuel. Consequently, little con-
sideration was given to the long-term storage or permanent dis-
posal of spent fuel itself.5 6 Nevertheless, because spent fuel
poses similar hazards to public health and safety and the envi-
ronment as high-level reprocessing waste, it requires similar
long-term isolation from the biosphere either in geologic reposi-
tories or by one of the other disposal options.57
B. Transuranic Contaminated Waste
The weapons production program has generated the bulk of
the existing transuranic waste.58 Until 1970, the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) did not distinguish between transuranic
waste and low-level waste; it buried both types of waste in shal-
low trenches.59 At that time, however, the AEC issued a new pol-
icy requiring the packaging and retrievable storage of transura-
nic wastes, pending the availability of a permanent disposal
facility.0°
Prior to January 1980, when the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC) halted the practice, commercial transuranic
wastes similarly were buried at commercial, low-level waste bur-
ial sites.61 In 1974, the AEC proposed to treat commercial, trans-
64. See generally notes 463-573 and accompanying text infra.
55. See note 137 and accompanying text infra.
56. FORD/MITRE STUDY, supra note 2, at 249.
57. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 9. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
58. See Appendix infra.
59. M. WILLRICH & R. LESTER, supra note 14, at 16. The defense transuranic wastes
are stored at six DOE sites: the Hanford Reservation, Washington State; Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, Idaho; Los Alamos Laboratory, New Mexico; Oak Ridge Na-
tional Laboratory, Tennessee; Savannah River Plant, South Carolina; and the Nevada
Test Site, Nevada. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, REGULATION OF FEDERAL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE ACTIVITIES A-9 (NUREG-0527, Sept. 1979). Of the 14.72 million cubic feet of
transuranic wastes stored at DOE sites as of January 1977, only 1.72 million cubic feet
are retrievable. IRG REPORT, supia note 37, at D-17.
60. GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE LAND DISPOSAL OF RA-
DIOACTIVE WASTEs-A PROBLEM OF CENTURIES 4-5 (RED-76-54, Jan. 1976).
61. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF Low-LEvEL WASTE
GENERATED FOR COMMERCIAL DISPOSAL IN TM UNITED STATES (Oct. 30, 1979)(memoran-
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uranic wastes similarly to high-level wastes by prohibiting their
disposal by shallow-land burial and by requiring generators of
the wastes to transfer them to the AEC for storage, treatment,
and ultimate disposal within five years after generation.62 The
rule has not yet been adopted. The Interagency Review Group,
however, implicitly endorsed the AEC proposal when it noted
that the permanent disposal of transuranic waste presents
hazards comparable to those encountered in the disposal of
high-level waste and recommended that similar strategies for
permanent disposal apply to both types of wastes.63
C. Low-Level Waste
Low-level wastes exist as gases, liquids, and solids. Gases
and liquids usually are treated by filtration or demineralization,
diluted or stored briefly until they decay.6 Solid low-level
wastes currently are disposed of primarily by burial in shallow
trenches, called "cribs," with unsealed bottoms and mounded
earth "caps," which are intended to cause water to run off to the
sides. This method of disposal relies upon soil geochemistry to
minimize the dispersal of potentially hazardous radionuclides
into the ground.65 For low-level wastes containing significant
concentrations of radionucides, however, the soil may not al-
ways prove to be an effective barrier against the migration of
radioactivity.6
Since 1978, three commercial sites have accepted low-level
wastes for disposal. The temporary closing, in 1979, of two of the
sites and new restrictions on use of the third, however, have
raised the spectre of a serious shortage of capacity for disposing
of commercially generated low-level wastes.67
dum from Charles Bishop, Low-Level Waste Licensing Branch, on file with author)
[hereinafter cited as BISHOP MEMoRANDUM]. The volumes of commercial transuranics
buried at commercial low-level waste burial grounds prior to 1977 are unknown. IRG
REPORT, supra note 37, at D-16.
62. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Development of a Radioactive Waste Disposal
Classification System, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,722-23 (1978).
63. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 31, 69.
64. GEN'L AccOUNTING OFFICE, NEED FOR GREATER REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF COM-
mERcuL Low-LEvEL RADiOACTVE WASTE 1 (EMD-78-101, Aug. 16, 1978).
65. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 131.
66. Id.
67. See generally notes 534-585 and accompanying text infra.
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D. Uranium Mill Tailings
Uranium mill tailings, the sand-like residue from the ura-
nium milling process, are the most voluminous wastes produced
in the nuclear fuel cycle. Every ton of uranium oxide recovered
requires the mining of about five hundred tons of uranium ore.68
Because the milling process does not extract radium and tho-
rium, the most radioactive elements in the ore, mill tailings con-
tain about eighty-five percent of the radioactivity originally pre-
sent in the ore." Although the radioactivity level of tailings is
relatively low, their volumes, dispersibility, and proximity to
human population centers make them potentially hazardous to
public health.y
The potential hazard from mill tailings has increased sub-
stantially because of inadequate management and regulation.
The tailings have been left in unstabilized piles where they are
leached by rainwater, blown by the wind, and subject to few reg-
ulations for identification or control. As a result, large quantities
of tailings have been dispersed into the environment and used in
the construction of homes and public and commercial buildings
in several western states.71 Solving the mill-tailings problem,
therefore, requires not only removing or stabilizing existing piles
and developing better techniques for managing new piles, but
also cleaning up dispersed tailings and taking remedial action to
reduce to safe levels the concentration of radon in structures
that contain tailings. 2 In 1978, Congress enacted the Uranium
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act to establish a program,
under the DOE, for cleaning up and securing mill tailings at in-
active sites and to improve regulation by the NRC of tailings
68. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 34. Ten to fifteen million tons of tailings are
produced each year in the United States. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 80.
69. GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE URANIUM MILL TAILINGS CLEAN UP: FEDERAL
LEADERSHIP AT LAST? 5 (1978).
70. R. LIPsCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 54.
71. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 81. See also Sullivan, Radiation Danger Seen in
Seepage of Radon in Homes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1980, at C1, cols. 1-2; C4, cols. 3-4. Free
public access to mill tailings was not restricted until 1972. See generally Hollocher &
Mackenzie, Radiation Hazards Associated with Uranium Mill Operations in NUCLEAR
FUEL CYCLE 41 (rev. ed. 1975); R. LIPSCHUTz, supra note 13, at 135-37.
72. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 81. Two methods have been proposed for con-
taining old and new tailings piles: (1) covering the tailings with some material that would
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management at active sites.73
Because each waste category tends to determine the choice
of methods for managing and disposing of the wastes within that
category, it seems logical that the category should include only
those types of waste requiring the application of the chosen
management and disposal methods to protect the public and the
environment. Concern that the current categorization of radioac-
tive wastes does not accurately reflect their varying potential
hazards or the methods required for safe management and dis-
posal has led the NRC to begin developing an alternative system
for classifying wastes based not on their general level of radioac-
tivity, but on the type or duration of the containment necessary
for their safe disposal. 4 Premised on the notion that radioactive
wastes posing similar health, safety, and environmental risks
should receive similar regulatory and technological treatment,
the proposed alternative classification system could significantly
reduce any inconsistent or inappropriate waste management
practices.
The sheer quantities of radioactive wastes, their inherent
toxicity, and the extraordinary longevity of some radioactive ele-
ments require that a successful program for protecting this and
many future generations from the dangers they pose must in-
clude exhaustive scientific analysis and high levels of technologi-
cal competence, rooted in an institutional framework that pro-
motes public confidence in the necessary policy decisions. Many
experts agree, for example, that because the hazards of radioac-
tive wastes will exist for time periods that make pale, by com-
parison, the life span of human institutions, any program for
disposal ultimately should provide for a high degree of protec-
tion without active managing or monitoring of waste reposito-
ries.7 5 Consequently, the siting, designing, and construction of
radioactive waste repositories and the development of waste
form and packaging technologies must anticipate a wide range of
events that could breach isolation mechanisms including floods,
73. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-604, § 2(b), 92 Stat. 3021 (1978).
74. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, supra note 62. See also Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, supra note 40.
75. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 15-16. But see Nuclear Waste and Facility Sit-
ing Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Regulation of the Senate Comm.
on Energy and Natural Resources, part 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 296-98 (testimony of R.
Philip Hammond) [hereinafter cited as Johnston Nuclear Waste Hearings, part 2].
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volcanoes, seismic activity, glaciation, changes in sea and water
table levels, inadvertent intrusion by man as a result of mining
or resource exploration, and leaching by underground water of
radioactive substances that result in their subsequent transport
to the human environment. 76
These technological and institutional challenges raise con-
cerns about whether even the most developed technology for dis-
posing of radioactive wastes-emplacement of high-level wastes
in geologic mined repositories-is politically feasible and techno-
logically capable of limiting the risk of public exposure to ac-
ceptable levels. Recent studies of the problem stress that a num-
ber of significant, but not necessarily unbridgeable, gaps remain
in the current knowledge about the behavior of geologic reposi-
tories, requiring expanded research and development
programs.7
HI. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES RADIOACTIVE
WASTE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL PROGRAM
A series of policy reversals, false starts, and uncoordinated
agency activity has characterized past attempts by the federal
government to implement an integrated program for managing
and disposing of the burgeoning amounts of radioactive wastes.
A brief examination of this checkered history will disclose the
problems that have shaped recent legislative attempts to estab-
lish a comprehensive national radioactive waste management
program.
At the end of World War II, the United States hoped to
protect from disclosure its atomic secrets and to prevent the
widespread dissemination of weapons-grade nuclear material.
Accordingly, Congress in 1946 enacted the Atomic Energy Act 75
76. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DRAFT ENv'L IMPACT STATEMENT. MANAGEMENT OF COMMER-
CIALLY GENERATED RADIOACTnV WASTE, vol 1, at 3.1.69 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DOE
DEIS].
77. See generally U.S. GEOLOGIC SURVEY, GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIO-
ACTIVE WASTES-EARTH SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES (Circular No. 779, 1978); ENV'L PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, STATE OF GEOLOGIC KNOWLEDGE REGARDING POTENTIAL TRANSPORT OF
HIGH-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM DEEP CONTINENTAL REPOSITORIES: REPORT OF AN
AD Hoc PANEL OF EARTH SCIENTISTS, (EPA/520/4-78-004, 1978). But see NAT'L ACAD. OF
SCIENCES, THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOAcTrvE WASTE ON LAND (Sept. 1957) [hereinafter cited
as NAS, DISPOSAL ON LAND].
78. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755.
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establishing the AEC and reserving to the federal government a
virtual monopoly over the possession and use of nuclear materi-
als. Without express authority under the Act, the Commission
assumed an implied responsibility to manage and ultimately dis-
pose of the radioactive wastes generated by the federal govern-
ment in its research and development and weapons production
programs.79
In 1954, after the proliferation of atomic secrets and weap-
ons capabilities had begun, Congress extensively revised the
Atomic Energy Act to promote the peaceful use of nuclear power
by granting private firms, under strict federal control, the right
to own, possess, and use nonstrategic nuclear materials, prima-
rily for the generation of electricity.80 Under the direction of
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, the AEC began to com-
mercialize the entire civilian nuclear power fuel cycle, with the
exception of the fuel enrichment stage.81
79. Nuclear Waste Disposal: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation
of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, part I, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
85-88 (Sept. 11, Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Hart, Nuclear Waste Hearings, part
1].
80. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (current version
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976, Supp. H 1978 & Supp. HI 1979)). The Act, in
large part, grew out of President Eisenhower's proposal to Congress for an "Atoms for
Peace" program, which still forms the basis of current United States policy toward the
development and control of nuclear energy. See President Eisenhower's Message to Con-
gress of February 17, 1954, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3461 (1954). The Eisenhower
program sought to demonstrate that the awesome power of the atom could serve to ad-
vance, as well as destroy, civilization.
The 1954 Act gave the AEC a mandate to "encourage widespread participation in
the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum
extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and safety
of the public. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1976). The Act created an inherent conflict of
interest, however, by combining within a single agency the responsibilities for promoting
and regulating nuclear power. In an attempt to eliminate this conflict, Congress in 1974
enacted the Energy Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974) (cur-
rent version codified at 42 U.S.C., §§ 5801-5821, 5841-5891 (1976, Supp. H 1978 & Supp.
1I 1979)), which abolished the AEC and created two new agencies-the Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA), subsequently incorporated into the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) by the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-
91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (1976, Supp. Il
1978 & Supp. I1 1979)), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The ERDA
succeeded to the AEC's promotional and developmental functions while the NRC as-
sumed responsibility for regulating nuclear facility and material licensees. For a discus-
sion of the waste management responsibilities of the two agencies, see notes 161-190 &
218-294 and accompanying text infra.
81. Metlay & Rochlin, Radioactive Waste Management in the United States: An
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Several firms explored the possibility of commercializing the
reprocessing stage of the fuel cycle. The construction at West
Valley, New York, of the Western New York Nuclear Service
Center, the first commercial reprocessing plant, raised a funda-
mental question: Should the federal government or the private
sector bear responsibility for the long-term management of high-
level waste generated by commercial reprocessing of spent fuel?
Although the federal government retained responsibility for
storing wastes generated by its own nuclear activities, the AEC
expected private industry to assume responsibility for both the
short-term storage of its spent reactor fuel and the long-term
storage of post-reprocessing wastes. The industry, however, re-
fused to accept this responsibility.8 In 1970, the AEC reversed
its policy and required the disposal of high-level waste in a fed-
eral repository.88 Thus, the ultimate responsibility has reverted
Interpretive History of Efforts to Gain Wider Social Consensus, reprinted in RESOLVE,
NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT PROCESS REvIEw FoRuM: FINAL REPORT (June 1980). The
AEC provided technical assistance and funded demonstration projects to encourage pri-
vate industry to develop and commercialize the various stages of the fuel cycle. The
General Accounting Office (GAO) has estimated that, through 1978, federal subsidies to
the nuclear industry since 1950 totaled $12.1 billion. GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR
POWER COSTS AND SuBsIIES 12 (EMD-79-52, June 13, 1979).
82. Rochlin, Held, Kaplan, & Kruger, West Valley: Remnant of the AEC, 34 BULL.
ATOM. SCIENTSTS 18 (Jan. 1978).
The problem of allocating the responsibility for radioactive waste management be-
tween the federal government and the nuclear industry first arose in 1959, during negoti-
ations between the AEC and Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), the first company to
show interest in building and operating a commercial reprocessing facility. (NFS eventu-
ally built the now-closed reprocessing plant at West Valley, New York.). The AEC
agreed to make available to NFS the tank storage technology it was using to store the
high-level liquid wastes generated by weapons production and research and development
activities. NFS adopted the technology but, because tank storage requires perpetual
monitoring and care, declined responsibility for managing the wastes in the tanks beyond
the life of the plant. NFS cited the inappropriateness for private industry to assume the
physical responsibility for long-term waste management, since that responsibility pre-
supposes that corporate activities would continue for an extended or indefinite period of
time. Id. Instead, NFS preferred that the responsibility vest in a governmental entity,
which presumably would have greater long-term stability. At that time, however, the
AEC refused to accept responsibility for permanent waste management or disposal. Con-
sequently, NFS obtained a commitment from the state agency charged with promoting
the construction of nuclear facilities in New York, the New York Atomic Research and
Development Authority, to care perpetually for the wastes. NFS did agree, however, to
accept the financial responsibility for the long-term storage of the wastes. Id. at 20-21.
83. The AEC codified this policy stating:. "Disposal of high-level liquid radioactive
fission product waste material will not be permitted on any land other than that owned
and controlled by the Federal Government." 10 C.F.R. part 50, app. F(3) (1980). Al-
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to the federal government for disposing not only of the wastes it
generates but also of commercial high-level waste and spent fuel.
Until recently, federal agencies largely assumed that dispos-
ing of radioactive waste poses merely a technical problem and
that the technology for disposal already exists but awaits dem-
onstration to assure its availability when needed." Yet, twenty-
six years after Congress authorized the commercial development
of nuclear power, no permanent repository for high-level radio-
active waste has been built and no approved plan for such a fa-
cility exists. On the contrary, one proposal after another has
been explored and abandoned. Indeed, the NRC admits that up
to about 1970, whatever waste management policy existed "had
been more or less ad hoc."85
During the early years of the United States' nuclear weap-
ons program, the AEC emphasized the rapid, cost-efficient pro-
duction of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, but gave com-
paratively little attention to the ultimate disposition of the
resulting wastes.8 6 Primarily between 1943 and 1955, the AEC
constructed at the Hanford Reservation a system of tanks, still
used today, for storing high-level liquid wastes. 87 It ignored
though the policy statement does not specifically require disposal of all high-level wastes
in a federal repository, it plainly assumes that the responsibility for disposal lies exclu-
sively with the federal government. Although federal responsibility for disposal of com-
mercially generated high-level waste or spent reactor fuel has never been statutorily es-
tablished, the AEC policy expressed in 10 C.F.R. part 50, app. F(3) (1980) has become
the premise underlying efforts to develop a comprehensive waste management program.
84. Metlay, History and Interpretation of Radioactive Waste Management, re-
printed in NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, ESSAYS ON ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE REGULA-
TION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 8-9 (NUREG-0412, 1978); NUCLEAR REGULA-
TORY COMM'N, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF THE REpRoCEesSNG AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
PORTIONS OF THE LWR FUs. CYCLE D-5 (NUREG-0116, Oct. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY]. The assumption that a technology for disposing of radio-
active waste currently exists is traceable to a study of the waste disposal problem by the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 1957. Although it emphasized that further re-
search on the technology of waste disposal was required, the NAS study concluded that
"the committee is convinced that radioactive waste can be disposed of safely in a variety
of ways and in a large number of sites in the United States." NAS, DISPOSAL ON LAND,
supra note 77, at 3.
85. NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY, supra note 84, at D-3.
86. GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISOLATING IIIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM THE
ENVIRONMENT: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, AND UNCERTAINTIES 8, 14 (RED-75-309, Dec.
18, 1974); Metlay & Rochlin, supra note 81, at 6.88; NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY,
supra note 84, at D-1.
87. The AEC and its successor agencies also later constructed 31 tanks at the Sa-
vannah River Plant, with additional tanks under construction or planned, and 15 tanks
19811
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warnings that the tanks probably would not contain the wastes
for "decades," as originally predicted.88 Thus, after the first in a
series of eighteen separate leaks began in 1958, the AEC merely
transferred the wastes from the leaking tanks into new tanks.89
In addition, rather than establish an expensive regular program
of periodically transferring the wastes from tank to tank to
avoid leaks, pending the availability of a technology for perma-
nent disposal, the AEC and its successor agencies chose the less
expensive alternative of solidifying the wastes in their tanks.'
This decision may have made some of the wastes virtually irre-
trievable for subsequent transfer to a permanent disposal facil-
ity.91 Moreover, the AEC also seemed to assume that if a leak
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR EN-
ERGY'S DILEMMA: DISPOSING OF HAZARDOUS RADIOACTIVE WASTE SAELY 42-43 (EMD-77-
41, Sept. 9, 1977) [hereinafter cited as GAO, NUCLEAR ENERGY'S DLEMMA]. For a de-
tailed discussion of the federal radioactive waste management program, see: at the Han-
ford Reservation, ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEV. ADMIN., FINAL ENIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT. WASTE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS, HANFORD RESERVATION (ERDA-1538, Oct.
1975); at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, ENERGY RESOURCES DEV. ADMIN.,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT WASTE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS, IDAHO NA-
TIONAL ENGINEERING LABORATORY (ERDA-1536, 1977); and at the Savannah River Plant,
ENERGY RESOURCES DEV. ADMIN., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT. WASTE
MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS, SAVANNAH RIVER PLANT (ERDA-1537, 1977).
88. Gillette, Radiation Spill at Hanford: The Anatomy of an Accident 181 SCIENCE
728, 730 (1973).
89. NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY, supra note 84, at E-1. See note 274 infra.
90. M. WILLRICH & R. LESTER, supra note 14, at 45.
91. High-level reprocessing wastes are acidic. The AEC had constructed the tanks at
the Hanford Reservation and the Savannah River Plant out of less expensive, but more
readily available, carbon steel. Because carbon steel is susceptible to corrosion, however,
the AEC had to neutralize the acidic wastes to permit storage in the carbon steel tanks.
Metlay & Rochlin, supra note 82, at 6. At the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
the AEC built stainless steel tanks to store high-level waste. Although stainless steel
tanks can contain unneutralized wastes without corrosion, they were considered prohibi-
tively expensive during the early years of the atomic energy program when maximizing
plutonium production while minimizing costs dominated other considerations. M. Wm-
LRICH & R. LESTER, supra note 14, at 45.
Solidification of acidic wastes in the stainless steel tanks produces "calcine," a dry,
granular material, which can be retrievably stored in underground stainless steel bins.
GAO, NUCLEAR ENERGY's DILEMMA, supra note 88, at 43. By contrast, solidification of
neutralized wastes in the carbon steel tanks produces a damp "salt cake" along with
residual sludge.
Questions remain whether the DOE can safely remove the salt cake and sludge from
the carbon steel tanks to dispose of them in a permanent facility. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra
note 13, at 116. Use of high-pressure water jets to sluice and flush out the partially dis-
solved solids, while successful for some tanks, might prove unsuitable for many of the
cracked tanks, since the dissolution of salt would reopen the previously blocked cracks
662 [Vol. 32
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did occur, the arid soil surrounding the tanks would provide
safe, natural containment to prevent the leaked wastes from en-
tering the biosphere.'2 Although undoubtedly a product of lim-
ited resources, severe time pressures, and competing priorities,
the AEC's generally ad hoc approach toward managing its high-
level waste also enabled it to postpone indefinitely the need to
demonstrate a technology for its permanent disposal.
In the early 1960s, the AEC began investigating a longer
term waste management option: the emplacemeni of solidified
radioactive wastes in deep, underground salt formations. The
concept originated in a 1957 National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) report which described the concept as "the most promis-
ing method of disposal of high-level waste at the present time."' 3
and cause still more leakage. GAO, NucLEAR ENERGY'S DILEMMA, supra note 87, at 43-44.
Alternatively, efforts to dig the solid salt cake out of the tanks could risk the release of
airborne radioactivity. M. WILLRCH & R. LESTER, supra note 14, at 46.
Given that the federal government "has not demonstrated an acceptable alternative
for retrieving" the solidified, neutralized wastes from their tanks, the GAO has con-
cluded that the federal government "may be faced with the perpetual storage of some or
all of its high-level waste in tanks at Hanford and Savannah River." GAO, NUCLEAR
ENERGY'S DILEMMA, supra note 87, at 44, 46. Such a prospect would leave the DOE with
little choice but to develop methods for making the solidified wastes in the tanks less
susceptible to leaching and for protecting the biosphere from the leaks that inevitably
would result from additional corroding of the tanks. M. WILLRICH & R. LESTER, supra
note 14, at 46. Proposals to leave the solidified high-level wastes in their storage tanks,
however, undoubtedly will encounter strong public criticism.
92. FoRA/MITRE STUDY, supra note 2, at 251. The AEC discharged 31 million gal-
lons of waste directly into the ground between 1956 and 1958. Id. The AEC has since
revised its waste management requirements and DOE now stores these wastes in tanks.
93. NAS, DisPosAL ON LAND, supra note 77, at 4. For a discussion of deep geologic
disposal, see note 43 and accompanying text supra. The qualities that make salt attrac-
tive as a disposal medium include: (1) abundance in the United States and other areas in
the world, thus reducing its value as a natural resource and facilitating regional distribu-
tion of repositories; (2) high thermal conductivity that would reduce temperatures
around the heat generating wastes; and (3) a tendency to flow when stressed and self-
heal when fractured. In addition, because it is water soluble, the very presence of salt
indicates long-term isolation from circulating groundwater. DOE DEIS, supra note 76, at
3.1.8-3.1.9.
Since the 1957 NAS report, however, a number of disadvantages of salt as a disposal
medium have been identified. These include: (1) high solubility when in contact with
water; (2) strong corrosive properties; (3) reduced mechanical strength from the presence
of fluid inclusions within crystals and brine pockets in deposits; and (4) migration of
brine pockets toward the hot waste (since solubility increases with temperature) and cor-
rosion or movement of the waste canisters. In addition, salt deposits often occur near
valuable natural resources such as oil, gas, potash, and gypsum. Even if such resources
are not present near a selected salt deposit, future generations searching for valuable
resources may nevertheless intrude into a repository and breach the containment before
25
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The resulting AEC waste management program focused on the
disposal of wastes in salt formations, a concept that did not re-
ceive serious reevaluation until 1976.94 For a variety of reasons,
including the continuing low priority placed by the AEC upon
waste management and the public's apparent willingness to per-
mit further development of commercial nuclear power without a
demonstrated waste disposal method, the AEC's waste disposal
program was inadequately funded and progressed much more
slowly than concurrent efforts to develop and commercialize
other stages of the nuclear power fuel cycle.95
In 1963, the AEC initiated Project Salt Vault to demon-
strate the technical feasibility of waste disposal in a bedded salt
medium. Presumably, once the AEC had developed and demon-
strated the technology, private industry would enter the field
and apply the capability to dispose of wastes generated by com-
mercial reprocessing. As part of this project, the Oak Ridge Na-
tional Laboratory (ORNL) conducted experiments in an aban-
doned salt mine near the town of Lyons, Kansas, to test the
effects on bedded salt of heat generated by real and simulated
radioactive wastes. The ORNL staff sought to conduct their ex-
periments in full view of local residents and officials. Conse-
quently, their efforts met with a generally favorable public re-
ception. The AEC, however, did not place a high priority on the
project, and, as a result, the ORNL had to transfer funds from
other projects to continue the experiments."6
The AEC's approach to waste management shifted radically
in the late 1960s and early 1970s following two events. First, a
major fire in 1969 at the AEC's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons
facility in Golden, Colorado, generated large volumes of debris
contaminated with low levels of plutonium that required dispo-
sal . 7 The AEC shipped the wastes to the National Reactor Test-
they discover the absence of valuable resources. ENV'L PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note
77, at 17-19; U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 77, at 5; R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13,
at 75.
94. See note 111-15 and accompanying text infra.
95. For a summary of federal radioactive waste management budgets, which indicate
dramatic increases in funding within the last few years, see IRG REPORT, supra note 37,
at 4. See also Metlay, supra note 84, at 16-17.
96. Metlay, supra note 84, at 4.
97. ENERGY RESEARCH AN DRv. ADMIN., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEmENr.
ROCKY FLATS PLANT SITE voL 1, 3-4 to 3-52 (ERDA-1545-D, Sept. 1977). Rockwell Inter-
national Division currently operates the Rocky Flats plant under contract with DOE.
664 [Vol. 32
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ing Station, in Idaho Falls, Idaho, for burial at the federal site it
regularly used for disposing of similar wastes. In response, how-
ever, Idaho's congressional delegation, led by Senator Frank
Church, vehemently objected to the disposal in Idaho of federal
wastes generated in Colorado.98 The Idahoans extracted a prom-
ise from AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg that the AEC by 1980
would remove all transuranic-contaminated wastes from Idaho. 
9
Second, during the same period, the AEC began to develop a
systematic regulatory policy for managing commercial radioac-
tive wastes.100 In addition to departing from the previous as-
sumption that responsibility for disposing of commercial radio-
active wastes would lie with private industry,101 it required the
transfer of solidified wastes to a federal repository within ten
years after reprocessing.
10 2
Both the AEC's new regulations and its commitment to
Idaho heightened the need to establish a federal radioactive
waste repository. Consequently, the AEC began evaluating salt
deposits in Kansas, Michigan, and New York to find a suitable
location for the first repository. It selected the Lyons, Kansas,
site in June 1970.103 Within the following two years, however, a
series of political and technical difficulties developed, which led
The plant is part of a nationwide nuclear weapons production complex under DOE juris-
diction. Id. at 2-3. Parts made at the plant are shipped to other DOE facilities around
the country for final assembly. In addition, DOE conducts chemical processing at the
plant to recover plutonium from scrap material. Id.
The 1969 fire was the second one at the plant to cause major damage to production
buildings. An earlier fire occurred in 1957. Both fires resulted in significant releases of
plutonium into the environment. In addition, three other isolated fires in 1965, 1969, and
1972, also caused detectable releases of plutonium. Accidental fires at Rocky Flats raise
major concerns both because plutonium in the air is pyrophoric and because ignited plu-
tonium reacts violently with many common solvents. See generally id. at 3-49.
98. Metlay, supra note 84, at 4.
99. Id.; Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy: AEC Authorizing
Legislation, Fiscal Year 1972, part III, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1582 (Mar. 9, 16, and 17,
1971)(testimony of Glenn Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Actomic Energy Commission).
100. 10 C.F.R. part 50, app. F. (1970). For history leading to adoption of this policy
by the AEC, see notes 83 & 84, and accompanying text supra.
101. See note 83 supra.
102. 10 C.F.R. part 50 app. F(2). See generally Metlay, supra note 84, at 5.
103. Metlay, supra note 84, at 5. The AEC chose the site because it had already
gathered detailed information about it through Project Salt Vault, because the local re-
sidents and officials had responded favorably to the project, and because conducting the
investigations necessary to acquire comparable knowledge about the other potential sites
would have delayed development of a federal repository by an estimated two years. Id.
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the AEC to abandon the proposed repository in February
1972.104 The failure of the program, brought on primarily by a
lack of sensitivity to public concerns, represented a key setback
to' AEC attempts to establish a repository and severely damaged
its credibility. Nevertheless, the AEC contended that the Lyons
experiments did not disprove the feasibility of disposal in salt.105
The failure of the Lyons project caused the AEC to aban-
don the development of deep geologic disposal of wastes in favor
of alternative concepts. In May 1972, the AEC announced plans
to build a "retrievable surface storage facility" (RSSF)-a tem-
porary, engineered facility or series of facilities constructed near
the surface of the earth that could store radioactive wastes for
104. Both the AEC's optimism about the project and the confused signals it sent to
local residents about its ultimate plans for the site led many persons in the area to be-
lieve that the AEC's ostensibly "tentative" selection of the site was, in fact, final. In
addition, members of the Kansas Geological Survey were particularly concerned about
the technical adequacy of the site to isolate radioactive wastes from the biosphere. Dr.
William Hambleton, director of the Survey and a member of the National Academy of
Sciences panel convened to assess the Lyons project, felt that insufficient information
had been gathered about the behavior of hot, radioactive canisters in salt and about the
particular site to justify any statements on the ability of the proposed repository to pro-
tect public health and safety. The AEC largely disregarded Hambleton's concerns and
reasserted its confidence that it could solve any unresolved technical problems. Metlay,
supra note 85, at 5-6.
Kansas political leaders, however, seized upon these scientific objections as a basis
for generating political opposition to the project. Their efforts culminated in an amend-
ment to the Atomic Energy Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-84, 85 Stat. 304 (1971), sponsored by members of the Kansas congressional dele-
gation. The amendment directed the President to appoint a nine-member advisory coun-
cil, three members of which were to come from Kansas. The amendment further prohib-
ited the AEC from burying or using radioactive materials at the site except for limited
research and development activities until the advisory council had reported to Congress
that the construction and operation of the proposed facility "can be carried out in a
manner which assures the safety of the project, the protection of public health, and the
preservation of the quality of the environment of the region." Id. § 101(b)(3). The AEC
could proceed with waste disposal sixty days after submission of the council's report to
the Congress.
A report by a commercial mining company, published in September 1971, revealed
that hydraulic fracturing operations conducted in a salt mine a few miles south of the
proposed repository site had resulted in an unexplained loss of water. The report raised
questions about the possibility of voids in the rock and dissolution of the salt in and
around the AEC facility that potentially could compromise the integrity of the site.
NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL SuRVEY, supra note 84, at D-3. In February 1972, the AEC offi-
cially cancelled the Lyons project, following a request from the Nixon White House to
minimize politically disadvantageous controversy prior to the upcoming election. Metlay,
supra note 84, at 5-6. See Pub. L. No. 93-276, § 108(b), 88 Stat. 115 (1974).
105. Metlay, supra note 84, at 9.
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an indefinite period of time and permit ready retrieval. 10 6 At the
same time, however, the federal government intended to study
several geologic formations for an acceptable, safe site for a
repository.
10 7
The AEC pursued only briefly its proposal for building
RSSFs. In its review of the AEC's draft environmental state-
ment on the project, the EPA gave RSSF the lowest possible
rating.10 8 It cautioned that the proposed facility could become
an inexpensive substitute for more permanent disposal and
could create a bureaucratic disincentive for further development
of alternative disposal technologies. 09 In April 1975, the Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA), the succes-
sor to the AEC program, withdrew its request for funds to build
the RSSF.110
The repudiation of the RSSF program forced the ERDA to
reevaluate and to expand its radioactive waste management pro-
gram and to renew its emphasis on developing a deep geologic
repository."" In May 1976, the ERDA for the first time raised
106. ATomic ENERGY COMM'N, DRAFT ENv'L IMPACT STATEMENT: MANAGEMENT OF
COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEvEL AND TRANSURANIUM-CoNT INATED RADIOACTIVE WASTE 1.2-13
(WASH-1539, Sept. 1974) [hereinafter cited as AEC DRAFT EIS]. The RSSF design con-
templated a large field of concrete mausolea, with each structure containing one canister
of high-level waste. A temporary facility, the RSSF could provide storage of both com-
mercial and military waste for up to one hundred years. R. Li'scHTz, supra note 13, at
120.
107. AEC DRAFT EIS, supra note 106, at 1.2-18.
108. Env' Protection Agency, Response to Draft WASH-1539 (Nov. 21, 1974) (un-
published letter from Sheldon Meyers, Director, EPA Office of Federal Activities, to
James L. Liverman, Assistant General Manager for Biomedical and Environmental Re-
search and Safety Programs, AEC).
109. Id. The EPA made the following criticism:
A major concern with the employment of the RSSF concept is the possibil-
ity that economic factors could later dictate utilization of the facility as a per-
manent repository, contrary to the stated intent to make the RSSF interim in
nature.... Since there are controlling environmental factors that must be
considered before final disposition of the RSSF, it is important that these fac-
tors never be allowed to become secondary to economic factors in the decision-
making process.
Id.
110. Letter from R.C. Seamans, Jr., ERDA Administrator, to Senator John 0. Pas-
tore, Chariman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Apr. 9, 1975).
111. Along with substantial programmatic changes, the ERDA's waste management
budget increased from $61 million in fiscal year 1974 to $94 million in fiscal year 1975.
By 1977, the budget had more than doubled to $230 million. IRG REPORT, supra note 37,
at 4.
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the possibility that it would analyze rock types other than salt
for possible geologic disposal media."' Six months later, ERDA
announced its plan for siting a geologic repository under which
it would study sites in thirty-six states during fiscal year 1977.113
It intended to construct up to six repositories, with the first two
built in salt, to begin receiving wastes by 1985.114
Its policy statement implied that ERDA would conduct
broad surveys before choosing specific sites for detailed study
and repository development. ERDA's activities in subsequent
yeais, however, may have led state and local officials to believe
that ERDA already had selected its sites, and that detailed site
investigations and negotiations with the states on site selection
would result merely in pro forma justifications for its deci-
sions.115 For example, ERDA, in late 1975, began investigating
salt formations in Michigan without proper notification of state
or local authorities."'1 ERDA representatives issued several con-
flicting statements about the purpose of ERDA's activities in
Michigan. The growing distrust of ERDA by state officials
prompted the Governor, in 1976, to direct state agencies to cease
negotiating with ERDA over site selection.1 7 Two years later,
the state enacted legislation banning the storage or disposal of
112. See generally ENERGY RESEARCH AND DaV. ADMIN., ALTERNATIVES FOR MANAG-
ING WASTES FROM REACTORS AND POST-FISSION OPERATIONS IN THE LWR FUEL CYCLE
(ERDA-76-43, May 1976).
113. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEv. ADMIN., ERDA STUDIES GEOLOGIC FORMATIONS
THROUGHOUT NATION FOR DATA ON POTENTIAL SITES FOR COMMERCIAL NucLEAR WASTE
DISPOSAL, Press Release No. 76-355 (Dec. 2, 1976). This announcement followed Presi-
dent Ford's Nuclear Policy Statement, 12 WEEKLY Comp. OF PREs. Doc. 1624 (Oct. 27,
1976), in which he directed ERDA to demonstrate all components of radioactive waste
management technology by 1978 and to have a complete repository operating by 1985.
The directive was part of a larger effort to preserve the benefits of peaceful uses of nu-
clear energy while preventing nuclear proliferation. See note 136 and accompanying text
infra.
114. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEV. ADMN., supra note 112.
115. Id.
116. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 142.
117. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 440 (testimony of Wil-
liam C. Taylor, Executive Science Advisor for the State of Michigan). See generally Nu-
clear Waste Disposal in Michigan: Oversight Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (July 6, 1976); L. Worby, The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes: Technological
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radioactive waste within its borders.11
ERDA encountered a similar reception in the state of Loui-
siana, where the agency planned to explore for potential reposi-
tory sites in the Gulf Coast salt domes. The Governor of Louisi-
ana permitted ERDA to continue exploration only after ERDA
agreed to allow the state to veto any site selection.11 ' Afraid that
the agreement would not bind ERDA legally, the Louisiana Leg-
islature, in July 1978, enacted legislation prohibiting the use of
salt domes within the state to store or dispose of radioactive
waste.1 20 By June 1980, at least twenty-five states had enacted
bans or restrictions on storage, disposal, or transportation of ra-
dioactive waste within their boundaries.
12 1
After abandoning the Lyons site, the AEC, still under pres-
sure to remove the defense transuranic contaminated wastes
from Idaho, searched for and found an alternative site for a fa-
cility to dispose of the wastes. Consequently, while the federal
government was trying to develop a commercial waste disposal
program, it also was planning a defense transuranic waste repos-
itory in a bedded salt formation near Carlsbad, New Mexico.
12 2
ERDA, in 1977, received congressional authorization to acquire
land for the project, known as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP). 23 As originally conceived, the WIPP would have pro-
118. MICH. Comnp. LAWS ANN. § 325.491 (Supp. 1980). The law exempts facilities at
educational institutions, spent fuel and low-level waste storage at a power plant site,
uranium mill tailings generated within the state, wastes from medical activities, and
wastes stored in the state prior to 1970.
119. Memorandum of Understanding between Edwin Edwards, Governor of Louisi-
ana, and John O'Leary, Deputy Secretary of the DOE, (Feb. 22, 1978) reprinted in 96th
Cong. 2d Sess., 126 CONG. Rac. S10002 (daily ed. July 28, 1980). The ERDA (which soon
became the DOE) agreed that it would not store or dispose of wastes in Louisiana with-
out state approval in return for a number of concessions by Louisiana that permitted the
ERDA to use Louisiana's salt domes for the federal strategic petroleum reserve program.
120. LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 30:1115 (West Supp. 1981).
121. For a full discussion of state attempts to regulate various aspects of nuclear
waste, see Jaksetic, supra note 6, at 824-49.
122. Consideration of the New Mexico salt formations for a repository site began in
1971 when representatives of the New Mexico potash industry, seeking uses for salt de-
posits from which potash had been mined, urged the AEC to investigate areas in two
counties for potential repository sites. STAFF REPORT TO THE SUBCOMM. ON OvEnsRIGT
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE Housa Comm. ON INTERIOR AND INsuLAR AFFAIRS, NUCLEAR
WASTE: THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (WIPP) PROPOSAL 4 (Oct. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as WIPP PROPOSAL].
123. Energy Research and Dev. Admin. Authorization Act of 1977 and 1978 §
203(11), Pub. L. No. 95-183, 89 Stat. 1063 (1976).
1981] 669
31
Hart and Glaser: A Failure to Enact: A eview of Radioactive Waste Issues and Legi
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw [Vol. 32
vided for the disposal of transuranic waste generated by de-
fense-related activities.124 Thus constituted, it would have been
exempt from NRC licensing authority.
125
DOE, in 1978, proposed expanding the scope of the WIPP
project to provide for the disposal not only of defense transura-
nic wastes but also of 1000 commercial spent fuel assemblies.12
In addition, it recommended enactment of legislation granting
the NRC authority to license the disposal of all transuranic
wastes, including disposal at the WIPP.127 Both the House and
the. Senate Armed Services Committees-the only committees
that have shown an interest in funding the WIPP-rejected the
proposal on grounds that the required NRC licensing would
compromise national security interests.12 Instead, they suc-
ceeded in authorizing the WIPP as a research and development
facility to demonstrate the disposal of radioactive waste from
defense activities. 29 Under this statutory mandate, the DOE
proposed that the WIPP provide for disposal of defense transu-
ranic waste and for a research and development program to test
the effects of defense high-level waste on bedded salt.130 This
124. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: WASTE ISOLATION
PILOT PLANT Col. 1, 1-1 (DOE/EIS-0026-D, Apr. 1979) [hereinafter cited as DOE DEIS
WIPP].
125. For a discussion of the NRC's statutory authority to license DOE waste man-
agement activities, see notes 219-21, 226-27 & 235 and accompanying text infra.
126. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DRAFT REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF NUCLEAR
WASTE MANAGEMENT 17 (DOE/ER-004-D, Feb. 1978) [hereinafter cited as DOE REVIEW]
(No final version of this document was prepared because the responsibilities of the DOE
Task Force were assigned to the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Manage-
ment. See note 161 and accompanying text infra.).
127. DOE REVIEW, supra note 126, at 16. The NRC currently does not have author-
ity to license the disposal of transuranic waste from either defense or civilian nuclear
activities. See notes 219-21, 226-27 & 235 and accompanying text infra.
128. For an analysis of the arguments against NRC licensing of the WIPP and other
DOE defense waste management activities, see notes 250-51 and accompanying text
infra.
129. The Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nu-
clear Energy Authorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-164, 93 Stat. 1259 (1979); H.R.
REP. No. 96-702, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
130. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: WASTE ISOLATION
PILOT PLANT vol. 1, 2-1 (DOE/EIS-0026, Oct. 1980).
In addition to the controversy over whether the NRC should license the WIPP, a
dispute developed between President Carter and the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees over the role the WIPP should play in the Administration's developing nu-
clear waste management plan. The IRG Report did not endorse the WIPP, as proposed
by the DOE. Instead, it found that neither a separate transuranic waste repository nor
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decision foreshadowed subsequent attempts to establish and
treat differently separate programs for managing commercial
and defense radioactive wastes, attempts that ultimately led to
the failure of the Ninety-Sixth Congress to enact comprehensive
nuclear waste legislation.
an intermediate scale facility (ISF) for disposing of 1000 spent fuel assemblies was "an
essential component" of a national nuclear waste disposal plan. IRG REPORT, supra note
37, at 57-58, 69-70. At the same time, however, the IRG Report did not reject the idea
that DOE should construct such facilities if the opportunity presented itself. Id. Faced
with this lack of agreement on the need for the WIPP, President Carter, in his radioac-
tive waste policy statement, see note 8 supra, proposed rescinding the funds appropri-
ated for constructing the WIPP and banking the site as one of several potential sites for
a full-scale respository to contain both commercial and defense wastes. Congress did not
act upon the proposed rescission but, instead, reauthorized the project for fiscal year
1981. Dep't of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy
Authorization Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-540, § 102(4), project 77-13-f (1980).
Consistent with the Armed Services Committee's resistance to any outside participa-
tion in decisionmaking on DOE defense related projects, the DOE act authorizing funds
for fiscal year 1980 for the WIPP provided for a more limited participatory role for the
host state than either the House or the Senate version of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
See note 12 and accompanying text supra. In particular, the Act required the DOE to
"consult and cooperate" with the appropriate state officials on the public health and
safety concerns of the state. Pub. L. No. 96-164, § 210(b), 93 Stat. 1259 (1979). To estab-
lish this relationship, the Act directed the DOE, by September 30, 1980, to enter into a
written agreement with state officials setting forth procedures for consultation and coop-
eration, subject to disapproval by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Id.
The agreement must include: (1) the right of the state to comment and make recommen-
dations on the public health and safety aspects of the project before the occurrences of
key events identified in the agreement; (2) procedures, including specific time frames, for
the DOE to receive, consider, resolve, and act upon comments and recommendations by
the state; and (3) procedures for DOE and the state periodically to review, amend, or
modify the agreement. Id. The Act, however, did not prohibit the DOE from proceeding
with the project in the event that the state and the DOE failed to conclude an
agreement.
DOE and the State of New Mexico did, in fact, fail to reach an agreement. The
negotiations fell apart when DOE refused to acknowledge that a final decision of the
Secretary of Energy carrying out a provision of the agreement was subject to judicial
review. Telephone conversation with Bruce Throne, Assistant Attorney General of New
Mexico (Apr. 20, 1981). Without an agreement on how DOE would proceed with the
project, the relationship between the state and the DOE has seriously deteriorated. Id.
"The conduct of the DOE in this case indicates an utter unwillingness-at all levels-to
satisfactorily resolve state concerns before proceeding with the project .... It's going to
be the Lyons thing all over again." Id. For a discussion of the federal government's un-
successful attempt to establish a radioactive waste repository in salt deposits near Lyons,
Kansas, see notes 103-105 and accompanying text supra.
Because the WIPP project, had developed independent of a national plan to dispose
of radioactive waste, despite President Carter's recommendation, there was strong pres-
sure in the Congress not to subject the WIPP to the state participation requirements of
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. See notes 183-85 and accompanying text infra.
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At the same time that the federal government sought a
method to dispose of defense-related and commercial reproces-
sing wastes, the fledgling commercial reprocessing industry en-
countered serious political, economic, and technical problems.
The technical problems first appeared when Nuclear Fuel Ser-
vices, Inc. (NFS) closed the Western New York Nuclear Service
Center, the reprocessing plant it had operated from 1966 until
1972 at West Valley, New York. Although NFS cited the need to
decontaminate, modify, and expand the plant, it appeared that
the-plant had experienced serious technical difficulties and un-
anticipated costs, some the result of improved federal safety
standards, that made its continued operation unprofitable. 131
The plant never reopened.
131. R. Severo, Too Hot to Handle, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1977. See generally Roch-
lin, et al., supra note 81.
While it operated, the plant reprocessed about 640 metric tons of spent fuel, gener-
ating about 600,000 gallons of liquid high-level waste. Dep't of Energy, Western New
York Nuclear Service Center Study 1-6, 3-7 (TID-28905-2, Nov. 1978).
Although it owned the reprocessing plant and supporting facilties, the NFS negoti-
ated an agreement to lease from the State of New York the land on which the facilities
were built. Upon expiration of the lease on December 31, 1980, if not renewed, the state
could assume title to the facilities and to any high-level waste stored on site. In April
1976, the NFS notified the state that it intended to exercise its right under the agree-
ment to surrender responsibility for all wastes at the Western New York Nuclear Service
Center to the state. Although it had assured the AEC in 1963 that it would assume
perpetual responsibility for the wastes, the state in 1976 argued that ownership of the
West Valley facilities and the waste should be transferred to the ERDA. Id. at 1-6.
Subsequently, the DOE refused to consider assuming responsibility for the wastes or
assist in their disposal. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 123. More recently, the DOE and
the state reached a preliminary agreement that provided for expansion and reracking of
the plant's spent fuel storage pool, for use as an away-from-reactor spent fuel storage
facility, in return for federal financial and technical assistance in solidifying and dispos-
ing of the waste. The agreement encountered intense opposition and, after the Three
Mile Island accident, was disavowed by New York Governor Hugh Carey. Id.
Finally, in 1980, the Congress enacted the West Valley Demonstration Project Act,
supra note 11, which directed the DOE to carry out "a high-level waste management
demonstration project" at the West Valley facility. R. LuPscHUtrz, supra note 13, at 123.
The Act requires the DOE to enter into a cooperative agreement with the state under
which the state retains title to the facilities and waste but makes them available to the
DOE to carry out the project and pays ten percent of the project costs. Id. § 2(b)(4). The
Act also provides for informal NRC review of the DOE's plans for solidifying, preparing,
and removing the wastes for disposal, and for decontaminating the solidification facilties.
Unlike the NRC's traditional licensing authority, however, the authority provided in the
Act would not permit the NRC to prohibit DOE activities that it considered hazardous
to public health and safety. Although the Act authorized $5 million for the project for
fiscal year 1980, estimates of the total costs of the project range from $600 million to $1
billion. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13.
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Two additional commercial reprocessing plants were built,
but never operated. The Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant, built by
General Electric at Morris, Illinois, suffered from serious engi-
neering defects that General Electric found too expensive to
remedy.132 A reprocessing plant built by Allied-General Nuclear
Services (AGNS) at Barnwell, South Carolina, was substantially
completed in 1975 at a cost of $250 million but has not received
a license to operate from the NRC. 33 AGNS has requested the
federal government to subsidize parts of the plant as a demon-
stration project.13 4 The technical problems, regulatory uncertain-
ties, and substantial costs associated with commercial reproces-
sing of spent fuel have raised serious questions about when, if
ever, it will prove economically feasible. 3 5
Notwithstanding these technical and economic problems,
the nuclear industry blames political decisions for preventing
the successful establishment of commercial reprocessing as a via-
ble enterprise. On October 27, 1976, President Ford announced
that because of concerns over the possible misuse of separated
plutonium and the concomitant proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons, "the United States should no longer regard reprocessing of
used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevi-
table step in the nuclear fuel cycle."13 President Carter, in an
April 7, 1977, policy statement on nuclear weapons proliferation,
reaffirmed and extended the Ford initiative when he indefinitely
deferred commercial reprocessing of spent fuel in the United
States.137 By deferring the commercial reprocessing of spent fuel
in the United States, President Carter sought to discourage
reprocessing activities in other nations and the resulting ac-
cumulation of separated plutonium with its attendant risk of
132. GEN'L ELECTRIC, MIDWEST FUEL RECOVERY PLANT TECHNICAL STUDY REPORT 1
(July 5, 1974); R. LipSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 124.
133. R. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 124. Revised NRC regulations for licensing
reprocessing facilities would require the AGNS, in order to comply, to invest an addi-
tional $500 to $650 million in the plant. Id.
134. FoRD/MITRE STUDY, supra note 2, at 322.
135. See generally id. at 322-28; Minutes of April 23, 1981, Meeting on Nuclear Fuel
Reprocessing, chaired by Acting Dep't of Energy Undersecretary Raymond G. Romatow-
ski (on file with author).
136. See note 113 supra.
137. 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. DoC. 502-03 (Apr. 7, 1977). See also DONNELLY &
KRAMER, NUCLEAR ENERGY: CARRYING OUT U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 3 (Library of
Congress Issue Brief 1B78001, Jan. 26, 1979).
1981] 673
35
Hart and Glaser: A Failure to Enact: A eview of Radioactive Waste Issues and Legi
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
theft or diversion for building nuclear weapons." s
Consistent with this policy, the Carter Administration pro-
moted the concept of direct permanent disposal of un-
reprocessed spent fuel as well as the high-level wastes produced
by reprocessing.1 3 9 An alternative to the traditional fuel cycle,
this concept requires the interim storage of spent fuel at the re-
actor site or at an away-from-reactor surface storage facility,
special packaging of the spent fuel in metal canisters to protect
against future radiation leakage, and disposal by emplacement
in a repository similar to that envisioned for disposal of post-
reprocessing, high-level waste or by other yet undeveloped meth-
ods. Indeed, the current federal program contemplates develop-
ing a repository, which could dispose safely of either spent fuel
or high-level waste. 40 Uncertainty about when, if at all,
reprocessing of spent fuel will resume has colored the debate
over what constitutes an appropriate nuclear waste management
and disposal strategy.
1 41
The de facto and de jure deferral of commercial reproces-
sing and the strong likelihood that a full-scale geologic reposi-
tory for spent fuel will not open for at least twenty years have
required operators of nuclear power plants to store the dis-
charged spent fuel in pools at plant sites. The possibility of a
shortage in storage capacity for spent reactor fuel has produced
two significant changes in the federal government's radioactive
waste policy. First, the Carter Administration, on October 18,
1977, announced a program for the United States Government
(through DOE) to accept spent reactor fuel from domestic utili-
ties, and in some cases from foreign nations, in return for the
payment of a one-time charge to cover the costs of both contin-
ued interim storage at federal away-from-reactor spent fuel stor-
138. The plutonium produced in a nuclear power reactor is relatively inaccessible
while contained in the spent reactor fueL By separating it from the other elements in the
spent fuel, however, reprocessing makes plutonium readily available to those persons
waiting to construct crude nuclear weapons. Remarks by V. Gilinsky, NRC Commis-
sioner, before the League of Women Voters Education Fund, 5 NRC News Releases No.
43 (Nov. 17, 1980). For a general discussion of the potential energy contribution of pluto-
nium in conventional or breeder reactors and the countervailing nuclear proliferation
concerns, see FORD/MITRE STUDY, supra note 2, at ch. 11, 12 & 14; S. ScHR, et aL,
ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FuTURE: THE CHOICES BEFORE Us, 31-32, 389-94, 492-512 (1979).
139. President Carter's Message to Congress, supra note 8.
140. DOE FEIS, supra note 42, at 16.
141. See generally notes 414-17 & 446 and accompanying text infra.
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age facilities and permanent disposal of the spent fuel once a
geologic repository goes into operation.142 This policy repre-
sented a significant departure from the conventional radioactive
waste policy, which would leave the commercial industry with
the responsibility for managing spent reactor fuel until the fed-
eral government implements a method for permanent disposal.
Second, the Carter Administration began to pick through
the ruins of the federal government's earlier unsuccessful efforts
to establish a radioactive waste disposal program for clues on
how to prevent the obvious problems from recurring. A DOE
task force report on nuclear waste management 143 concluded
that: (1) the federal government's previous target deadline of
1985 for opening a national waste repository would slip to at
least 1988;144 (2) the federal government had not "formally
reached a conclusion on ultimate disposal of high-level wastes,"
pending completion of needed environmental studies;14" (3)
"there is an independent technical consensus that [radioactive]
wastes can be safely placed in geologic media for ultimate dispo-
sal," but stressed the importance of validating the specific tech-
nical choices, including selection of the medium, of the specific
site, and of the repository design;146 (4) rather than acquiring
more scientific data on the salt medium, stepping up the pro-
gram for acquiring data on other media, comparing the best salt
design with the best design in other media, and then choosing
the preferred medium and more than one location in that me-
dium, the federal program should proceed with a repository in
salt, (thus providing an earlier operational date), maintain re-
trievability of the waste for about fifteen years, and then decide
whether to remove the waste to another medium or to seal the
repository;147 and (5) "satisfactory site selection will require
both technical suitability and a good working relationship with
the state and local governments representing the people of the
state."14
8
142. Dep't of Energy, DOE Announces New Spent Fuel Policy, News Release (DOE/
SR-77-30, Oct. 18, 1977).
143. DOE REviEw, supra note 126.
144. Id. at 12.
145. Id. at 7.
146. Id. at 9.
147. Id. at 12-13.
148. Id. at 11.
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The DOE report was criticized within the Carter Adminis-
tration as too parochial to serve as a basis for making decisions
on nuclear waste policy.149 Thus, President Carter, on March 15,
1978, established an interagency review group (IRG) to review
the nuclear waste management issues, in general, and the federal
program in particular.150 The IRG recommended several ele-
ments for what it considered a proper radioactive waste manage-
ment program.151 Perhaps most significantly, the IRG found that
gaps exist in current scientific and technological knowledge
about geologic waste disposal. Consequently, it recommended
that United States' efforts to develop geologic repositories pro-
ceed with caution and follow a scientifically conservative, step-
by-step approach.152 President Carter endorsed this and the
other recommendations of the IRG in his policy statement on
radioactive waste management, February 12, 1980.153
From this history of federal efforts to manage radioactive
wastes, several themes emerge. First, it seems clear that as long
as there was little political pressure to solve the technological
problems of radioactive waste disposal, the federal government
and the nuclear industry gave it far less attention and far fewer
resources than it deserved. Recent efforts, including the enact-
ment of an amendment to the Warren-Alquist Act in Califor-
nia,11 4 to condition the continued development and use of nu-clear power upon a successful demonstration of a disposal
149. Metlay & Rochlin, supra note 81, at 27.
150. Memorandum from President Carter to the Secretary of State, et al., on Inter-
agency Nuclear Waste Management Task Force, March 13, 1978, reprinted in IRG RE-
PORT, supra note 37, at app. A.
151. See generally IRG REPORT, supra note 37.
152. Id. at 38, 42. The IRG concluded that "overall scientific and technological
knowledge is adequate to proceed with region selection and site characterization, despite
the limitations in our current knowledge and modeling capability." Id. at 38.
153. See note 8.
154. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977). For a discussion of this statute, see
Jaksetic, supra note 6, at 847-49.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California struck down
the nuclear provisions amended to the Warren-Alquist Act on the grounds that they
were preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954, see note 80 supra. Pacific
Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 472 F.
Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
heard the case on appeal but has not yet handed down its decision. See generally Tribe,
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technology have heightened the felt need to solve the waste dis-
posal problem. Second, a waste disposal technology is not self-
implementing. Yet, the repeated expressions of confidence that
the technology exists to dispose of nuclear waste 55 have led ex-
perts to ignore the more complex institutional questions that re-
main, particularly the need to ensure, at least, effective partici-
pation in waste management decisions by those states that may
eventually host waste repositories. Third, no amount of demon-
stration will remove entirely the uncertainty about whether .a
specific technology for waste disposal can isolate the ra-
dionuclides from the biosphere for the long periods of time re-
quired.156 Thus, to succeed, a waste disposal program must de-
velop a broad consensus, based on scientific understandings,
that the chosen technology will perform as expected. Finally, the
federal government must restore credibility to its waste manage-
ment program by consistently applying whatever nuclear waste
policy it adopts while, at the same time, not making claims
about the expected performance of a proposed technology that
are unsupported by the facts. The history of the federal govern-
ment's radioactive waste management activities, and the over-
arching themes, formed the backdrop against which the Ninety-
Sixth Congress considered comprehensive nuclear waste
legislation.
IV. HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
A. Institutional Issues Relating to High-Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal
For so long as the public generally accepted the representa-
tions of the experts that a disposal technology already exists157
and had faith in the federal government's commitment and abil-
ity to protect fully health, safety, and the environment from the
hazards of radioactive waste, scientists and government officials
largely could disregard the social and political aspects of a fed-
eral radioactive waste policy and still assert its legitimacy. Con-
sequently, the institutional framework within which a national
radioactive waste disposal program eventually would operate re-
155. Metlay, supra note 84, at 8-9.
156. See, e.g., DOE RE iEw, supra note 126, at 10.
157. See generally Metlay, supra note 84; IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 5.
19811
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ceived only cursory attention.158 The series of unsuccessful ef-
forts to implement a consistent waste disposal plan, however,
has contributed to an increase in public concern over the federal
government's ability to manage and dispose of radioactive
wastes safely.159 It seems clear, therefore, that a successful na-
tional radioactive waste management program must include an
institutional framework that will restore public confidence in the
federal government's efforts to dispose of the waste. The IRG
report states: "The resolution of institutional issues required to
permit the orderly development and effective implementation of
a nuclear waste management program is equally important as
the resolution of outstanding technical issues and problems."100
Indeed, resolving of institutional issues may prove more difficult
than finding solutions to the remaining technical problems. A
discussion of the institutional problems confronting the federal
radioactive waste program and legislative approaches to these
problems concern two primary areas: (1) the allocation of re-
sponsibilities among federal agencies; and (2) the appropriate re-
lationship between the federal government and the states, the
local governments, and the affected Indian tribes.
1. Federal Institutional Structure for Radioactive Waste
Management.-The various interdependent regulatory and
programmatic components of the federal responsibility for radi-
oactive waste management currently reside primarily within four
agencies: DOE, EPA, NRC, and the Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT).
(a) The Department of Energy.-The DOE inherited from
its predecessor agencies, ERDA and AEC, general statutory au-
158. Metlay, supra note 84, at 9-10; NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY, supra note 84,
at D-4.
159. See notes 77-154 and accompanying text supra. A recent study of public atti-
tudes toward nuclear power indicates that public concern regarding nuclear waste man-
agement has increased from 1975 through 1979, making waste management the most
serious perceived problem associated with nuclear power. Nuclear Waste Management:
Hearings on S. 2761, S. 2804, and S. 3146 before the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation
of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 664
(1978) (Statement of James B. Edwards, Governor of South Carolina: "[Iun short, the
public is questioning the credibility and competence of government."); B. Melber, Nu-
clear Power and the Public: Update of Collected Survey Research prepared by the Bat-
telle Memorial Institute under contract with the DOE, B-HARC-411-020 (to be
published).
160. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 87.
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thority to store and dispose of wastes generated by the federal
government, to dispose of commercial wastes, ' and to conduct
research and development of technologies for the management
of radioactive waste.1 62
(i) The current waste management program.-The failure
of Congress to enact legislation outlining the specific structure of
a comprehensive radioactive waste management program has not
deterred DOE from undertaking the directives of both President
Carter's radioactive waste policy statement and of Congress. ' s
First, DOE has announced that it will conduct a preliminary re-
view of twenty-seven states to find potentially suitable reposi-
tory sites for detailed characterization. ' " Second, the DOE has
161. The Carter administration sought statutory authority for the DOE to assume
responsibility for the storage of limited amounts of commercial spent reactor fuel. See
note 471 and accompanying text infra.
162. The Department of Energy Organization Act, supra note 80, vests DOE with
the following nuclear waste management responsibilities:
(A) the establishment of control over existing Government facilities for the
treatment and storage of nuclear wastes, including all containers, casks, build-
ings, vehicles, equipment, and all other materials associated with such
facilities;
(B) the establishment of control over all existing nuclear waste in the posses-
sion or control of the Government and all commercial nuclear waste presently
stored on other than the site of a licensed nuclear power electric generating
facility... ;
(C) the establishment of temporary and permanent facilities for storage, man-
agement, and ultimate disposal of nuclear wastes;
(D) the establishment of facilities for the treatment of nuclear wastes;
(E) the establishment of fees or user charges for nuclear waste treatment or
storage facilities, including fees to be charged Government agencies.
Id. § 7133(a)(8). The Act seeks to provide "a comprehensive statement of the responsi-
bilities relating to nuclear waste management that the committee wants centralized at a
high level in the Department." S. REP. No. 164, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1977). The Act
also transfers to DOE responsibility for the management of the nuclear weapons produc-
tion program and related research and development activities. 42 U.S.C. § 7133(a)(5)
(Supp. II 1978 & Supp. II 1979).
The broad authority in the Act arguably permits DOE to proceed with a nuclear
waste management program even without enactment of comprehensive nuclear waste
legislation. Such a result, however, risks continuing the federal government's ad hoc ap-
proach to nuclear waste management. Specific nuclear waste legislation, on the other
hand, could resolve such controversial issues as licensing requirements, general techno-
logical strategies for waste disposal, state participation in waste management decisions,
and the proper relationship of federal agencies with waste management responsibilities.
163. See President's Message on Radioactive Waste Management, supra note 8.
164. The states are Arizona, Caifornia, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode
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embarked upon expanded research and development programs
focused on the component technologies for geologic disposal in-
cluding on-site testing of waste disposal in basalt at the Hanford
Reservation and in granite at the Nevada Nuclear Weapons Test
Site.16 5 Third, it is proceeding with plans to construct the
WIPP.1 e Finally, DOE has begun to prepare a national nuclear
waste management plan for publication in mid-1981.
In pursuing its waste management activities, DOE must
comply with the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).167 The Act requires a federal agency
to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) to accom-
pany a proposal for "major Federal actions affecting the quality
of the human environment."16 8 The EIS must comment on the
unavoidable adverse environmental effects of the proposed ac-
tion, the alternatives to the proposed action, and any potential
irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources in the pro-
posed action.1 69 The agency must first publish a draft EIS, so-
licit public comments on the draft EIS, and then publish a final
EIS with its response to the comments.17 0 Consequently, regard-
less of whether Congress enacts legislation to define their precise
role in radioactive waste planning, potential host states, affected
Indian tribes, and the general public may participate through
the NEPA process in decisions on waste management.
The DOE has already published final EIS's for several as-
pects of its radioactive waste management program including a
final generic environmental impact statement on the manage-
Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
DOE memorandum of June 11, 1981 (on file with author).
165. DEP'T OF ENERGY NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM SUMMARY DOCUMENT
FY 1981 107-32 (DOE. NE-0008) (March 1980) [hereinafter cited as DOE PROGRAM SUM-
MARY FY 1981]. The DOE's activities include developing the technology for packaging
and storing high-level waste in preparation for emplacement in a repository; generating
the physical, thermal, and chemical properties of materials in and around the repository;
generation of data on the effects of radiation on host rocks, waste retrieval, and moisture
migration in various geologies; developing the technology required to plug exploratory
boreholes and to seal the shafts of the decommissioned repository; and developing of
safety assessment models for a repository. Id. at 111-12, 115-19.
166. See notes 122-130 and accompanying text supra.
167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. m1 1979).
168. Id. § 4332 (2)(C).
169. Id.
170. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (1980).
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ment of commercially generated wastes. 711 In addition, DOE in-
tends to develop a schedule of proposed activities for siting, de-
velopment, operation, and decommissioning of a radioactive
waste repository that will include a plan for fulfilling the NEPA
requirements that attach at each major decision point in the
waste disposal program.172 Close adherence by the DOE to the
NEPA requirements follows both the recommendations of the
IRG and the directives of President Carter's radioactive waste
policy statement.173
As did AEC and ERDA, DOE develops and produces nu-
clear weapons, and engages in other defense-related activities for
the Department of Defense. 17 ' These activities have generated
and continue to generate substantial quantities of low-level,
high-level, and transuranic contaminated waste,175 all of which
DOE must manage until it can dispose of them. The near-term
DOE program for managing its high-level waste concentrates on
reducing the volume of waste by converting liquids to bulk
solids; removing the resulting salt cake and sludge from old stor-
age tanks, either for transfer to new interim storage facilities or
for further processing prior to disposal; and developing the
proper technology for immobilizing, packaging, and transporting
the waste.
176
The DOE also stores transuranic contaminated waste in re-
trievable form at several DOE facilities and laboratories, pend-
ing permanent disposal.17 7 As with high-level waste, DOE has
begun to reduce the volume of transuranic waste through incin-
eration, smelting, and electropolishing, and to develop packing
and processing technology.
178
(ii) The debate over treatment of defense wastes and civil-
ian wastes.-The DOE has proposed to commingle in a single
repository high-level waste from defense-related and federal re-
search and development activities and high-level waste from
171. DOE FEIS, supra note 42.
172. See generally DOE FEIS, supra note 42, at 2.10-2.14.
173. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 21. President's Message on Radioactive Waste
Management, supra note 8.
174. See note 162 supra.
175. See Appendix infra.
176. DOE PROGRAM SUMmARY FY 1981, supra note 165, at 90.
177. See note 52 supra.
178. DOE PROGRAM SUMMARY FY 1981 supra note 165, at 90.
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commercial power plants.179 As a result, the same NRC licensing
requirements and state participation procedures necessarily
would apply to disposal of both defense-related and commercial
wastes. Until recently, DOE had consolidated into a single office
its programs for managing and disposing of both types of wastes.
The lack of any institutional distinction between defense-related
and commercial high-level waste recognized that these types of
wastes have similar characteristics, pose similar hazards to pub-
lic health and safety, and require the use of similar technologies
to ensure their isolation from the biosphere. This view is consis-
tent with IRG's conclusion that "[t]he extent of the public's ex-
posure to nuclear waste materials does not vary by ownership of
the facility or origin of the material. Thus, the public must be
assured equivalent protection from material from both govern-
ment and nongovernment sources."180
Notwithstanding the similarity between defense-related and
commercial high-level wastes, several legislative efforts have suc-
ceeded in separating the two types of wastes into discrete cate-
gories. First, the House Armed Services Committee reported a
fiscal 1981 authorization bill for the DOE defense programs,
concurred in by the Senate and subsequently enacted, that es-
tablished a separate program for the management and disposal
of DOE defense-related waste.181 Second, the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees have insisted that the WIPP re-
main a research and development facility to demonstrate the
disposal of exclusively defense-related waste.
1 2
Finally, proposals to give a potential host state the same
rights to participate in decisions on the disposal of defense high-
level wastes as in decisions on the disposal of commercial high-
level wastes have met strong resistance. For example, the pri-
mary sponsors of the state participation provision in the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act recently passed by the Senate were forced to
include a separate mechanism for state participation in siting
and development of any repository designated as primarily for
179. DOE FEIS, supra note 42, at 1.5, 3.46.
180. IRG REPoRT, supra note 37, at 30.
181. Department of Energy National Defense Programs Authorization Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 96-540, 94 Stat. 3197 (1980).
182. See note 126 supra.
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defense-related wastes.183 When the Senate and House at-
tempted to negotiate the differences in their bills, several Senate
sponsors, led by Senator Henry M. Jackson, abandoned the
compromise state participation provision in the Senate bill'
8'
and insisted that any final bill apply exclusively to commercial
waste disposal.185 The dissolution of the Senate compromise on
state participation primarily was responsible for the failure of
the Ninety-Sixth Congress to enact a comprehensive bill.186
The arguments for distinguishing between defense-related
and commercial radioactive wastes in establishing the institu-
tional structure for a waste management program rest on two
grounds. First, some fear that the commingling of defense and
civilian radioactive wastes in a single program could compromise
national security by introducing into defense waste management
institutional procedures allowing NRC licensing or public, state,
and Indian participation in planning. This could impede weap-
ons production or permit the release of sensitive defense infor-
mation. Second, some fear that even if introduction of such in-
stitutional procedures would not compromise any national
security interest that may attach to defense waste management,
it could set a precedent for the application of similar procedures
to other military projects and, thus, compromise national
security.1
7
These grounds are unpersuasive for several reasons. First,
183. S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 903(f)-(h), 126 CONG. REC. S10266, S10271
(daily ed. July 30, 1980).
184. Id.
185. Senator Henry M. Jackson proposed an amendment to S. 2189 that would both
exempt facilities exclusively for disposal of defense-related wastes from the state partici-
pation provisions of S. 2189, see notes 367-70 & 374-81 and accompanying text infra, and
prohibit the disposal of defense-related wastes in a facility subject to the provisions of S.
2189. Amend. 2912, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (amending S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
126 CONG. REC. S10266 (daily ed. July 30, 1980)). Thus, the Jackson amendment would
have precluded DOE from exercising its discretion on whether to dispose of defense re-
lated wastes in a repository otherwise intended for commercial waste disposal. The
amendment would not, however, have altered the existing statutory authority of the
NRC to license DOE facilities for the long-term storage or disposal of its wastes. See
notes 220-21 and accompanying text infra.
186. See generally Plattner, Compromise Effort Fails: Congress Passes Low-Level
Waste Bill, Leaves Broader Solution for Future, 38 CONG. Q. 51, at 3624 (1980).
187. See Hearing on the Proposed Nomination of Governor James B. Edwards for
Secretary of Energy Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1981).
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fears about possible impediments to weapons production are
more relevant to the storage of defense wastes than to proposals
for their ultimate disposal. Because storage of defense wastes
immediately follows weapons production, an institutional ar-
rangement that would preclude DOE from storing the wastes
generated by its current weapons projects conceivably could
force temporary suspension of weapons production. It is un-
likely, however, that attempts to involve potential host states,
affected Indian tribes, and the public in planning a repository
for the permanent disposal of defense wastes, some of which
have been stored for several decades, could block the weapons
production pipeline. Second, state, local, and Indian officials, in-
dependent experts, and the public do not need information from
which defense secrets could be extrapolated to reach informed
conclusions about the health, safety, and environmental risks of
a particular proposed repository. Third, it seems logical that ra-
dioactive wastes requiring similar methods of disposal should
come within a single program if only to avoid unnecessary ex-
pense and duplication of effort.18 8 Finally, considering the un-
distinguished history of past efforts of the federal government to
provide disposal for high-level wastes, 189 it may prove unwise to
restrict public participation in decisions on disposing of defense-
related wastes-which account for ninety percent by volume of
all high-level wastes-simply to avoid setting a precedent for an
institutional arrangement that could interfere with other mili-
tary programs. As with civilian wastes, if proposals to dispose of
defense wastes are to succeed, they must achieve a political ac-
ceptability that only broad-based participation in their develop-
ment can assure.
The siting and constructing of 'one or two waste repositories
will represent a significant political accomplishment. Congress
should not force DOE to run additional political guantlets by
requiring it to construct additional repositories merely to main-
tain the distinction between defense-related and commercial
188. A preliminary DOE analysis indicates that the separation into two programs of
civilian and defense waste management activities will result in some duplication of effort
but probably not in a complete duplication of effort. Telephone conversation with Earl J.
Wahlquist, Acting Director, Office of Resource Management and Development, DOE
(April 28, 1981).
189. See notes 78-152 and accompanying text supra.
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wastes. Programs for radioactive waste disposal are readily dis-
tinguishable from other military projects and, thus, can justify
special institutional procedures that encourage greater state, In-
dian, and public participation. 190
(iii) Proposals for centralizing overall responsibility for the
federal radioactive waste management program.-Because of
the fragmentation of responsibility among several agencies, the
federal radioactive waste program has lacked direction and suf-
fered from interagency conflicts, which underscore the need for
greater central coordination of the program.
Although the institutional momentum that had gathered
behind DOE's radioactive waste program virtually guaranteed
DOE's position as lead dgency in any federal program,191 several
alternative institutional arrangements have been proposed. The
IRG report identified these alternative arrangements as: (1) us-
ing ad hoc or formal interagency committees to coordinate inde-
pendent agency programs (in effect perpetuating the IRG con-
190. Other military projects offer surrounding communities significant economic
benefits, including employment and a sense of contribution to the national interest.
Thus, residents may accept the health and safety hazards that accompany such projects.
Radioactive waste repositories, on the other hand, probably will not offer the same de-
gree of economic benefit and, because waste disposal seems so far removed from defense
efforts and energy production, will appeal less to the public's willingness to accept per-
ceived burdens in furtherance of the national interest. Indeed, the siting of a repository
may engender public resentment over the state's becoming the nation's nuclear waste
dumping ground. Moreover, radioactive waste disposal presents risks of adverse health
and safety consequences-for example from groundwater contamination-less easily de-
tectable or quantifiable by the public than the risks associated with other military
projects.
The increasing intensity of state demands for direct involvement in decisions on
siting and developing federal radioactive waste facilities and other federal projects de-
rives from a growing public skepticism that the federal government, in pursuing these
projects, adequately protects the public health and safety. For example, former Governor
Mike O'Callaghan of Nevada, a state that historically has accepted a variety of federal
defense projects within its borders, including nuclear weapons testing, testified that his
state
now resents not being told all of the truth about the dangers our citizens and
the citizens of neighboring states were subjected to during the time of atmo-
spheric testing of nuclear weapons. You may say that our people have been
more than cooperative with the federal government in meeting the needs of our
nation. However, we have reached the point where we are feeling used rather
than needed.
Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 436, 438.
191. In his message on radioactive waste management, supra note 8, at 7, President
Carter designated DOE as the lead agency in the proposed radioactive waste manage-
ment program.
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cept); (2) vesting primary responsibility for planning and
managing nonregulatory aspects of the program in a single ex-
isting agency; and (3) creating a new independent authority with
responsibility for planning and managing the nonregulatory as-
pects of the program. 192
As originally introduced by Senators Charles Percy and
John Glenn, the Nuclear Waste Management Reorganization
Act of 1979193 incorporated an approach similar to the first alter-
native proposed by the IRG. The bill established a Nuclear
Waste Coordinating Committee, an interagency group composed
of representatives of DOE, the NRC, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality, the EPA, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, the Department of the Interior, the Department of
Transportation, the Department of State, and the Nuclear
Waste Management Planning Council, another nationally based
entity consisting of fifteen state, local, Indian, and public repre-
sentatives."9 The Committee had a dual mission of coordinating
nuclear waste disposal activities among federal agencies and de-
partments to minimize duplication and delay and of making rec-
ommendations to the President for resolving jurisdictional dis-
192. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 117. These three alternatives assume a continu-
ing, if not increased, federal role in managing both government wastes and wastes from
the commercial nuclear power program. There are two conceivable arrangements under
which private industry could relieve the federal government of its responsibility for man-
agement and disposal of commercial wastes, subject to NRC health and safety regula-
tions. A private entity, either an independent corporation or a cooperative venture by
utilities, could obtain monopoly control over commercial waste management. Federal ec-
onomic regulation would ensure against the private entity's realization of monopoly prof-
its. Alternatively, a competitive commercial waste management industry could develop.
This seems a less likely alternative, however, because of the large initial capital invest-
ment required, the high technological risks, the inability to achieve economies of scale,
and the difficulty of locating more than a few acceptable repository sites. In addition,
competing firms would have an incentive to minimize expensive safety measures to trim
costs and maintain sufficient profits.
193. S. 742, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. S3200 (daily ed. March 22, 1979).
194. Id. §§ 301-02. The Nuclear Waste Management Planning Council, proposed
under § 201, did not include any federal representatives and thus maintained indepen-
dence from the Interagency Coordinating Committee. The Planning Council had a gen-
eral mandate to comment on the annual Nuclear Waste Management Plan, prepared by
the Coordinating Committee for the President; advise the appropriate federal agencies
on nuclear waste management policy; and comment on proposed federal regulations, cri-
teria, and standards. Id. § 203. The State Planning Council established by President
Carter, see notes 329-31 and accompanying text infra, represents an amalgam of the
Coordinating Committee and the Planning Council provided for in the Percy-Glenn Bill.
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putes and schedule conflicts.195 In addition, the committee was
directed to prepare annually a nuclear waste management plan
for the ensuing five years, which would include the views of all
committee members, and indicate any significant differences of
opinion.19 Finally, the bill required the committee to write a re-
pository development report in cooperation with the potential
host state's Nuclear Waste Repository Review Panel.
e97
195. S. 742, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a), (b), 125 CONG. REC. S3200 (daily ed.
March 22, 1979).
196. Id. § 303(c). The plan was to include:
(A) a description of the location, amount, and disposition of all high-level and
transuranic contaminated nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel currently in ex-
istence in the United States, including estimates of the amounts of such nu-
clear wastes and spent nuclear fuel expected to be produced or received in the
United States in the next 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30 years;
(B) a program (including schedules and estimated costs) for research, develop-
ment, and demonstration needed to determine appropriate methods for dispo-
sal of high-level nuclear waste, transuranic contaminated waste and spent nu-
clear fuel, specifically identifying any technological uncertainties which it is
necessary to resolve prior to the construction and operation of facilities for the
permanent disposal of such wastes and spent nuclear fuel, and setting forth
how the proposed program will resolve such uncertainties;
(C) a program (including schedules and estimated costs) for siting, construc-
tion, and operation of intermediate-scale repositories;
(D) a program (including schedules and estimated costs) for siting, construc-
tion, and operation of full-scale repositories;
(E) an estimate of existing and projected spent fuel storage capacity at existing
and projected privately owned facilities and the potential for the expansion of
such capacity to meet expected demand over the next 5, 10, 15, 20, and 30
years;
(F) a program (including schedules and estimated costs) for the siting, con-
struction and operation of interim storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel, if
the Secretary finds that such facilities are needed; such programs shall include
plans for introduction of interim storage technology not requiring liquid im-
mersion of spent nuclear fuel if technically, environmentally and economically
feasible;
(G) an identification of all generic and site-specific Environmental Impact
Statements required by the National Environmental Policy Act to be issued by
the Secretary with regard to the activities described in the Plan, and schedules
for their issuance;
(H) an identification of the States in which the Department plans to conduct
activities during the next fiscal year relating to the programs described in the
Plan, and a description of such anticipated activities.
Id.
197. Id. § 303(e)(1). The repository development report would have preceded sub-
mission to the NRC of an application for authorization to construct a repository and
contained: (1) a detailed description of (a) the repository design; (b) proposed operating
procedures for emplacement of the wastes including amounts and types of wastes, load-
ing factors, waste form, and packaging; (c) procedures for maintaining retrievability of
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The Percy-Glenn proposal attempted to unify the frag-
mented nuclear waste jurisdictions by centralizing the program
in a single interagency group that could monitor the program
and help to minimize conflicts among federal agencies. In its
original form, however, the proposal failed to gain support be-
cause of a fear that a committee whose decisions would result
from interagency negotiation and compromise would often lack a
clear direction. A newly constituted federal radioactive waste
program requires the precise definition of policy and specific
planning objectives that an interagency committee might not
provide.
The third approach proposed by the IRG was anticipated
by two bills that would have removed primary responsibility for
nuclear waste management and disposal from DOE altogether
and transferred it to a new independent agency. The Nuclear
Waste Management Reorganization Act of 1979,198 introduced
by Senator Charles Mathias, would have established a Nuclear
Waste Management Authority to assume all of DOE's nuclear
waste functions. The bill gave the new Authority responsibility
for existing federal waste facilities; for treatment, transporta-
tion, and storage of wastes; for the design, construction, opera-
tion, and management of all new temporary and permanent
waste facilities; and for the development of a nuclear waste
treatment and disposal plan to outline schedules for research
and development activities, to estimate costs, and to identify
any unresolved technical problems. 199 A similar bill was intro-
duced in the House. 0 °
Proposals to remove DOE from its central role in nuclear
the waste and subsequently sealing the shaft and tunnel; and (d) plans for perpetual care
and monitoring; (2) an analysis of the anticipated environmental, health, and safety im-
pacts of the proposed facility including a discussion of any remaining areas of scientific
and technological uncertainties and plans for their resolution; (3) a plan for transporting
high-level waste to the repository including an assessment of anticipated environmental,
health, and safety impacts and a description of emergency planning procedures; and (4)
any plan to provide financial assistance to state or local governments or Indian tribes for
any impact arising from the proposed repository. Id.
For a discussion of the role of the Nuclear Waste Repository Review Panel, see note
357 and accompanying text infra.
198. S. 1821, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 13413 (1979).
199. Id. § 201(b).
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waste planning appealed to groups that held the DOE responsi-
ble for the failure of the federal government to implement a
technically feasible and politically acceptable solution to the
problem of nuclear waste disposal.20 1 The legislative findings
supporting the Mathias bill stated that "the Department of En-
ergy and its predecessor agencies have been ineffective in pro-
viding the necessary leadership on the nuclear waste manage-
ment issue. ' 20 2 This ineffectiveness derived from the growing
lack of confidence in DOE because of its combined responsibility
for the promotion of nuclear power and for the disposal of the
resulting radioactive waste, a problem that, if unsolved, could
lead ultimately to the rejection of nuclear power as an alterna-
tive energy source. Many feared that DOE's natural desire to
preserve its own promotional interests could cause it to adopt an
expedient but ill-considered technology for waste disposal, which
would not protect adequately the public health and safety or the
environment. 0 3 Moreover, the federal government's policy rever-
sals and indelicate methods of dealing with potential host states
further increased this skepticism. Thus, a transfer of the entire
nuclear waste management program to a new agency would offer
a tabula rasa for addressing the radioactive waste problem and
would confirm the federal government's commitment to finding
a safe, politically acceptable solution independent of its interest
in promoting nuclear power.
On the other hand, creation of a new nuclear waste agency
seemed both politically and practically unfeasible. Politically,
the public generally would view any new agency merely as an-
other layer of bureaucracy created to hide a problem rather than
to solve it. Practically, the transfer of responsibility for waste
management to a new agency could nullify the progress DOE
already had made toward solving the disposal problem by dis-
rupting the current program.2 0 As a result, a consensus devel-
201. See, e.g., Nuclear Waste Management Reorganization Act of 1979: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services of the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 216 (1979-80)(testimony
of Peter Franchot, Union of Concerned Scientists).
202. S. 1821, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(5), 125 CoNo. REC. 13413 (1979).
203. See Nuclear Waste Management Reorganization Act of 1979: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 216 (1979-80).
204. For a discussion of the current DOE waste management program, see notes
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oped that DOE should retain its lead role in radioactive waste
management. The Mathias bill received little consideration and
the Percy-Glenn bill was revised to eliminate the National Nu-
clear Waste Coordinating Committee and reinstate DOE as the
lead agency.205 Similarly, the Atomic Energy Act Amendments
of 1980208 and the National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Con-
trol Act of 1980207 assumed continued DOE responsibility for
carrying out programmatic requirements for waste management.
(b) Environmental Protection Agency.-With its creation
in 1970, EPA received authority to establish "generally applica-
ble environmental standards for the protection of the general
environment from radioactive material. 2 0 8 It derives additional
authority over the release of radiation into the environment
from a number of other statutes.2 09 This matrix of statutory au-
thority gives EPA the responsibility to regulate the general
levels of radioactive materials introduced into the environment
163-78 and accompanying text supra. See generally DOE PROGRAM SUMMARY FY 1981,
supra note 165.
205. S. 742, Comm. Print, Senate Comm. on Government Affairs (April 24, 1980)
(on file with author).
206. H.R. 6390, supra note 10.
207. S. 2980, supra note 10.
208. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. § 1072 (1966-70 compilation) re-
printed in 5 U.S.C. app., at 609 (1976). Standards are defined as "limits on radiation
exposures or levels, or concentrations or quantities of radioactive materials, in the gen-
eral environment outside the boundaries of locations under the control of persons pos-
sessing or using radioactive material" Id.
209. The Clean Air Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1979), authorizes
EPA to regulate releases into air, provided that the NRC is consulted about regulation of
source, byproduct, and special nuclear material Id. § 7422. The Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979) authorizes EPA to
enforce a statutory ban on releases of high-level radioactive materials into the United
States' navigable waters. Id. §§ 1311(f), 1319. The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
201, 300f-300j-9 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979), directs EPA to regulate the release of any ra-
diological substance or matter into ground water or public drinking water systems. Id.
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444
(1976 & Supp. 1I 1979), bans release of high-level waste into oceans. Id. §§ 1402, 1411.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 &
Supp. 1I 1979), authorizes EPA to regulate generation, use, storage, or disposal of radio-
active materials excluding source, byproduct, or special nuclear materials. Id. The Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. II 1979), authorizes EPA
to regulate the manufacture and distribution of hazardous chemicals except those includ-
ing source, byproduct, or special nuclear material. Id. 8 2602(2)(B)(iv). The Uranium
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2021, 2022, 2111, 2113,
2114, 2201, 7901, 7911-7925, 7941, 7942 (Supp. I1 1979), directs EPA to issue standards
for tailings at active and inactive mill sites. Id. § 2022.
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by radioactive waste management and other operations in the
nuclear fuel cycle.
The NRC has acknowledged EPA's authority to set "gener-
ally applicable environmental radiation standards outside the
boundaries of nuclear facilities" and has accepted NRC's "re-
sponsibility to assure that repositories meet the requirements set
by EPA."210 Consequently, EPA standards logically precede and
should serve as a guide for promulgation by the NRC of regula-
tions regarding geologic disposal of high-level waste.
The EPA, however, has failed to fulfill in a timely manner
its responsibility for issuing the generic radiation standards that
should provide the basis for NRC high-level waste disposal regu-
lations. 211 Although not under explicit statutory direction, EPA
had promised to promulgate final standards for high-level wastes
in 1979.212 Not only has EPA missed its deadline for final stan-
dards, it has not yet published draft standards for public com-
ment.213 Rather than wait for final EPA standards to guide its
decision, NRC elected to publish proposed technical criteria for
a high-level waste repository,21 4 and the DOE has continued its
site investigation and research development efforts.215 It now
seems likely that the NRC will promulgate its final technical
regulations before the EPA has published the generic standards
that should precede them. This reversal of the logical progres-
sion for developing waste disposal standards and regulations
may further undermine public confidence in the federal govern-
ment's commitment to protect public health and safety and to
pursue waste disposal activities on a reasonable schedule.
(c) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.-The NRC can
210. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND TASK FORCE RESPONSES
REGARDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF THE REPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
PORTIONS OF THE LWR FUEL CYCLE 13-15 (NUREG-0216, 1977).
211. See generally Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 79, at 8-16
(testimony of David G. Hawkins, Assistant Administrator for Air, Noise, and Radiation,
EPA).
212. Nuclear Waste Management: Hearings on S. 2761, S. 2804, and S. 3146 Before
the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1978).
213. The EPA, however, has issued proposed criteria for radioactive waste manage-
ment for public comment. 43 Fed. Reg. 53, 261 (1978).
214. 45 Fed. Reg. 31393 (1980). The NRC has not published its proposed technical
criteria rule for public comment, but intends to do so by mid-1981.
215. See notes 164-66 and accompanying text supra.
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influence the federal radioactive waste management program di-
rectly through its statutory authority to license certain DOE fa-
cilities2 18 and indirectly through its statutory authority to license
construction and operation of commercial nuclear power
plants.2
17
(i) Regulation of radioactive waste management.-The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 grants the NRC the authority to li-
cense and regulate the commercial possession or use of source,
by-product, and special nuclear materials.218 The NRC may ex-
ercise this authority by establishing such rules, regulations, or
orders as it deems "necessary or desirable to promote the com-
mon defense and security or to protect health or to minimize
danger to life or property."21' In addition, section 202 of the En-
ergy Reorganization Act of 1974 gives the NRC licensing and
regulatory authority that extends to DOE facilities if used pri-
marily for the receipt and storage of high-level radioactive
wastes resulting from licensed (commercial) nuclear activities
2 20
and authorized expressly for long-term storage of high-level
waste from any source.
Under this authority the NRC has promulgated regulations
for licensing high-level wasfe disposal in geologic repositories
giving it a more direct and continuous involvement in the devel-
opment of repositories than under a two-step licensing proce-
dure used for construction and operation of commercial nuclear
power plants. 2 ' The regulations establish four points at which
216. 42 U.S.C. § 5842 (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
217. Id. §§ 2131-2134.
218. Id. §§ 2073, 2093, 2111. Source material is defined as uranium, thorium, other
materials as classified by the NRC, or ores containing one or more of such materials. Id.
§ 2014(z). Special nuclear material is defined as plutonium, uranium-233, uranium en-
riched in the isotope 233 or 235, any other material so classified by the NRC other than
source material, or any material artificially enriched by the foregoing material. Id. § 2014
(aa). Byproduct material is defined as any radioactive material (except source material)
yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the process of producing or utilizing spe-
cial nuclear material and the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentra-
tion of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source material con-
tent. Id. § 2014(e).
219. Id. § 2201(b).
220. Id. § 5842(3).
221. Id. § 5842(4). This subsection expressly exempts from NRC regulatory author-
ity any DOE waste facilities "which are ... used for, or part of, research and develop-
ment activities." Id.
222. 46 Fed. Reg. 13971 (1981). The NRC plans to promulgate in two parts its rule
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the NRC must review and approve plans for specific activi-
ties-characterization of the site,2 28 construction of the reposi-
tory, emplacement of the waste, and decommissioning of the re-
pository-before each activity is initiated.224 Because geologic
for disposal of high-level radioactive wastes in geologic repositories. The first part,
promulgated on February 25, 1981, establishes procedures for licensing the repository,
id., while the second part will specify the technical criteria a repository must satisfy to
obtain NRC approval. 45 Fed. Reg. 31393 (1980). See note 214 supra.
The two-step licensing process provided by the Act requires a utility company seek-
ing to construct and operate a nuclear power plant to obtain from NRC a separate per-
mit or license prior to both construction and operation of the plant. See 42 U.S.C. §§
2133, 2232, 2235, 2239 (1976). To receive the construction permit, the utility must file as
part of its application a safety analysis report and an environmental report. 10 C.F.R. §
50.35 (1980). Both the NRC and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards review
the application. 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1976). The NRC also writes an environmental impact
statement, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4361 (1976). Finally, the three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
conducts public hearings and makes a decision subject to appeal before the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Appeals Board. 42 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
223. Site characterization refers to the series of experiments that the DOE plans to
conduct upon a potential site to determine its suitability for a geologic repository. The
site characterization activities include surface excavations, borings, sinking of explora-
tory shafts, and onsite testing of the geologic medium at depth, perhaps using radioac-
tive materials. 10 C.F.R. § 60.2(P) (1980). Such activities must be carefully planned,
however, to avoid breaching the integrity of the site and rendering it unacceptable for
subsequent use as a repository.
224. See note 222 supra. The requirement that the NRC review DOE's proposed
site characterization program as the first stage of the regulatory process should serve
three major purposes. First, it will help to guard against improper characterization activ-
ities that could render a site unusable for a repository. Second, it will ensure that the site
characterization generates data suitable to support an NRC licensing decision and thus
avoid later delay to obtain the necessary data. Finally, it will provide an early opportu-
nity for state officials and federal agencies other than DOE to become involved in the
decisionmaking process leading to development of the repository. The NRC estimates
that the expenses for characterization of a hypothetical site, including testing at depth,
could range from $20 million to $30 million. 46 Fed. Reg. 13971 (1981).
The rule requires DOE to submit to NRC its site characterization program in a sep-
arate characterization report for each site. 10 C.F.R. § 60.11 (1980). The report must also
contain a discussion of the process and criteria used for choosing the site for characteri-
zation, a conceptual design of the repository proposed for the site, a description of the
research and development activities dealing with the waste form and packaging proposed
for the site, and identification of alternative media and sites the DOE intends to charac-
terize. Id. The NRC considers the characterization of three sites in two geologic media,
at least one of which is not salt, as the minimum number necessary to satisfy the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. MI 1979).
The second stage of NRC regulatory review begins when the DOE submits an appli-
cation for authorization to construct a repository at one or several of the characterized
sites. The application must include an environmental report and a safety analysis report.
10 C.F.R. § 60.21(a) (1980). The NRC will conduct a formal review of the application,
including preparation of an environmental impact statement. If the NRC determines
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disposal has not yet been demonstrated sufficiently to dispel the
technical uncertainties that surround it, the four-stage NRC re-
view of repository planning seeks to increase progressively the
knowledge about a specific repository site to enable the NRC to
make informed licensing decisions.225
The generally recognized need for the NRC to participate in
DOE research and development on geologic* disposal could be
frustrated, however, by an existing exception in the NRC's stat-
utory authority, which prohibits it from licensing or regulating
DOE facilities "used for, or part of, research and development
activities" related to radioactive waste management.226 The ex-
ception apparently was meant to avoid a potential circularity
that could arise whenever DOE sought a license from the NRC
to pursue a research and development project intended to re-
solve uncertainties about the health, safety, or environmental
consequences of a particular waste management technology. Be-
cause of those same uncertainties, however, the NRC could re-
fuse to license the project. Narrowly interpreted, however, the
exception could bar the NRC from participating in and ob-
taining useful data from DOE research and development activi-
ties. A DOE freed from the requirement of obtaining formal
NRC approval to construct or operate a repository may have less
incentive to involve the NRC in all stages of its planning and
development. Such a result is undesirable for several reasons.
First, the data generated by the demonstration repository used
for research and development purposes could aid the NRC as it
refines its requirements for licensing full-scale repositories. Sec-
that the types and amounts of radioactive materials described in the application can be
disposed of in the proposed repository without "unreasonable risk to the health and
safety of the public," and will not be inimical to the common defense and security, it
may authorize construction of the repository. Id. § 60.31.
In stage three, the NRC further reviews the DOE application and additional infor-
mation acquired during construction to determine whether emplacement of the wastes in
the constructed repository will not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and
safety or "be inimical to the common defense and security." Id. § 60.41(c). If it makes a
negative determination, a license will issue, with appropriate conditions. Id. § 60.41. The
fourth, and final stage begins when the DOE submits an application to amend the license
prior to decommissioning the repository, presumably by backfilling and sealing the shaft.
Id. § 60.51. Following decommissioning, the DOE may apply for an amendment to termi-
nate the license. Id, § 60.52.
225. See note 224 supra.
226. See note 221 supra. This exception seems to apply, however, only to-research
and development facilities using DOE generated waste. Id. § 5842 (4).
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ond, the NRC would have the opportunity to test its administra-
tive procedures for licensing high-level waste disposal. Third, if
DOE elects to expand a demonstration repository into a full-
scale facility, absence of early NRC involvement in the demon-
stration repository could result in DOE's unintentionally com-
promising the site and, thus, lessen the likelihood that the NRC
could approve the development of the site for a full-scale facil-
ity. Finally, a facility intended for research and development
purposes poses health and safety hazards potentially as great as,
if not greater than, a full-scale repository. Arguably, therefore,
NRC should have some degree of regulatory authority to assure
that those hazards have been minimized. If not given plenary
licensing authority, NRC should at least have authority to re-
view informally a research and development project and to make
health and safety findings for consideration by DOE and, if ap-
propriate, Congress.227
This exception has heightened the controversy surrounding
the WIPP project.228 Although New Mexico officials,229 DOE,230
and IRG231 recommended that NRC license WIPP as it would a
full-scale repository, the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees have consistently rejected that proposal.232 The pro-
posed legislation addressing the issue of NRC licensing of DOE
facilities intended for research and development on radioactive
wastes has either required formal NRC licensing or retained the
227. The National Nuclear Regulation and Control Act of 1980, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 4(a) (1980), retained the exception to NRC licensing authority. The Nuclear Waste
Regulation Act of 1979, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. § 2 (1980), would have given NRC the
authority to license DOE research and development facilities, but permitted it, in its
discretion, not to make the health and safety determinations required for licensing full-
scale waste facilities. The National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control Act of 1979
Amend. 646, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)(amending S. 1521, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)),
provided no similar exception to the NRC's licensing authority. The two reported ver-
sions of The Atomic Energy Act of 1980, H.R. 6390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), did not
address this question.
228. See notes 124-30 and accompanying text supra.
229. See Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 428 (statement of
John H. Gervers, Coordinator, Radioactive Waste Task Force, New Mexico).
230. DOE REviEw, supra note 126, at 16.
231. IRG REPORT, supra note 37;at 58, 76. The IRG considered NRC licensing of an
"intermediate scale facility," such as WIPP, "extremely useful preparation for the later
licensing proceeding of the first full-scale repository." Id. at 55.
232. See notes 126-30 and accompanying text supra.
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current exemption.2 8 None has provided for a less formal regu-
latory procedure to ensure a continuing NRC role in research
and development activities.
A narrow construction of section 202 of the Energy Reor-
ganization Act of 19742 could open two major loopholes in the
NRC's statutory authority to license a permanent repository.
First, the provision refers only to "high-level" radioactive waste.
The definition of "high-level" waste currently adopted by the
NRC does not include spent fuel rods or transuranic contami-
nated waste. 3 5 Consequently, a restrictive interpretation of this
term would exempt from NRC licensing authority a DOE facil-
ity intended to store or dispose of these two types of wastes even
if generated by licensed activities. Such a narrow definition
makes no sense under current conditions. The definition was de-
veloped at a time when federal policy contemplated the
reprocessing of spent fuel to separate the fission products and
transuranic nuclides from usable uranium and plutonium. Now,
however, both the indefinite deferral and the unfavorable eco-
nomics of commercial reprocessing raise the possibility that
spent fuel will become the ultimate waste form requiring
disposal. 36
Similarly, it is not practical to require different regulatory
treatments of high-level wastes, spent fuel, and transuranic con-
taminated wastes. Although having dissimilar properties, these
wastes require long-term isolation from the biosphere. 3 7 A nar-
row interpretation of the NRC's licensing authority over perma-
nent waste repositories would undercut the fundamental pur-
poses of the NRC regulatory scheme to ensure that the
potentially hazardous products resulting from the development
of nuclear power do not endanger public health and safety.2 "
The NRC has taken a position in favor of a more expansive
reading of section 202, which would vest the Commission with
authority to license DOE facilities used for primarily the storage
of commercial spent fuel or for the disposal of high-level waste
233. See note 227 supra.
234. See note 80 supra.
235. See note 37 supra.
236. See notes 137-41 and accompanying text supra.
237. DOE FEIS, supra note 42, at 1.3-1.5.
238. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1976).
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and spent fuel from any source. 3 It is less certain, however,
whether an expansive reading of this section also would bring
disposal of transuranic contaminated wastes within NRC's li-
censing jurisdiction. The IRG report recommended enactment of
legislation that would extend NRC licensing authority to DOE
facilities used for the storage and disposal of commercial spent
fuel and the disposal of all commercial and federal transuranic
waste.24 In response, several bills have been introduced in Con-
gress to fill these gaps in the NRC regulatory structure.4 1
A second, more troublesome potential loophole in section
202 has opened because the provision permits NRC to license
only DOE facilities expressly authorized for the "long-term stor-
age" of federal high-level waste and prohibits NRC from licens-
ing "short-term" storage of federal high-level waste. 2 The NRC
has defined short-term storage as storage intended to last for no
longer than twenty years.243 The DOE currently manages sub-
stantial quantities of federal high-level waste that it and its
predecessor agencies have stored for more than twenty years.
2 "
Because the federal government originally intended to store the
wastes for fewer than twenty years, however, and then presuma-
bly to dispose of them, these wastes have escaped NRC licensing
or regulatory authority. As a result, should DOE prove unsuc-
cessful in its efforts to implement an acceptable waste disposal
technology, DOE short-term storage facilities could become in
effect permanent, yet unlicensed, disposal facilities.
This definition of "long-term storage" also provides another
ground for excluding the proposed WIPP facility from NRC li-
censing. Since current plans call for the WIPP to demonstrate
disposal of DOE transuranic waste,2 " it can be argued that
239. Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)(testimony
of Dr. Clifford V. Smith, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings].
240. IRG REPORT,.supra note 37, at 31.
241. S. 2980, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (1980); H.R. 6390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §
5(a) (1980) (requires NRC to license disposal of high-level waste and spent fuel); S. 1521,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979); Amend. 646, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. (1979)(amending S.
1521, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979)).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 5842(4) (1976).
243. Oversight Hearings, supra note 239, at 208. But see Hart Nuclear Waste Hear-
ings, part I, supra note 79, at 127.
244. See generally Appendix infra and note 87 and accompanying text supra.
245. See notes 129-30 and accompanying text supra.
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WIPP would not constitute a long-term storage facility pending
a decision to leave the wastes there permanently. Meanwhile,
the licensing issue would become moot. A bill introduced in the
Ninety-Sixth Congress suggested alternatives to close this sec-
ond potential gap in NRC's licensing jurisdiction.24
The current exclusion of the NRC from regulating new or
existing DOE facilities for storing federal high-level and transu-
ranic waste247 leaves the DOE with sole responsibility for pro-
tecting the public health and safety from the storage of wastes
produced by its weapons production and research and develop-
ment programs. This result disregards the legislative purpose for
abolishing the AEC under the Energy Reorganization
Act-ensuring effective protection of health and safety by sepa-
rating programmatic and regulatory resonsibility into different
agencies, independent of each other.248
Extension of NRC regulatory authority to this category of
DOE waste facility, however, has been opposed on national se-
curity grounds similar to those raised in opposition to broad
state, Indian, or public participation in the management of de-
fense-related wastes or the consolidation of the DOE's responsi-
bilities for managing and disposing of civilian and defense-re-
246. S. 1521, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. § 2 (1979); Amend. 646, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979)(amending S. 1521, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. § 2 (1979)). A possible alternative ap-
proach to extending NRC regulatory authority over DOE facilities initially intended for
short-term storage would require the definition of long-term storage to turn on proof
that the wastes are retrievable. A determination of retrievability would depend on tech-
nical evidence regarding the form and quantity of the wastes, the technology available
for removing and transferring them from existing storage, and the risks and environmen-
tal impacts of such operations. This approach would unhinge the scope of the NRC's
jurisdiction from the DOE's stated intentions for use of its facilities. Hart Nuclear
Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 79, at 128.
A second alternative approach would consider a short-term storage facility automat-
ically to become a long-term storage facility and subject to NRC licensing after a specific
number of years, regardless of DOE's original intent or the authorized mission of the
facility. Retroactive NRC licensing of DOE facilities, however, would give limited protec-
tion to public health and safety since any improper decision in constructing or operating
the facility would likely prove irreversible. See Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I,
supra note 79, at 45-46.
247. See notes 235, 242-43 and accompanying text supra.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 5801(c)(1976). DOE maintains that NRC regulation of DOE's cur-
rently unregulated waste management activities would not enhance protection of public
health and safety. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 72; letter from
John C. Sawhill, Deputy Secretary of Energy, to Senators Hart, Randolph, Simpson, and
Domenici (June 24, 1980) (on file with author).
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lated wastes into a single program.' 49 The DOE and the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees have argued that NRC
licensing or regulation of DOE defense waste activities other
than disposal of the wastes could compormise the national se-
curity by impeding the weapons production process, should the
NRC refuse to approve a proposed DOE waste project, or by in-
creasing the chances for disclosure of sensitive information.25 0 In
addition, DOE maintains that its internal program for regulating
its waste management activities has adequately protected public
health and safety.251
The argument that NRC regulation of DOE facilities for
storing federal high-level and transuranic wastes could stall the
weapons production process carries some weight. There are sev-
eral ways, however, to circumscribe the NRC's regulatory au-
thority to avoid this inimical result. For example, instead of ple-
nary licensing authority, which would permit the NRC
unilaterally to prevent the DOE from proceeding on a noncom-
plying project, NRC could be given lesser regulatory authority
that would allow it to review and, if appropriate, object to a pro-
posed DOE project, but would leave the ultimate decision
whether to proceed with DOE or Congress. 252 Alternatively, leg-
249. See notes 187-90 and accompanying text supra.
250. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 79, 95-96 (DOE responses to
questions from the Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Nuclear
Regulation); letter from John C. Sawhill, supra note 248.
251. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 79, at 94.
252. Amend. 646, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (amending S. 1521, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979)), would have granted the NRC such lesser regulatory authority. It provided
for consultation and concurrence between the NRC and DOE on the health, safety, and
environmental aspects of DOE short-term waste storage facilities. In particular, for a
new facility, it required DOE to submit a plan to NRC for constructing and operating
the facility. Within a year, NRC, in consultation with DOE, would have to order any
modifications to the plan that it deemed necessary to assure that the facility presented
no significant hazard to public health and safety. If DOE did not concur in the required
modification, NRC and DOE were required to submit all relevant documents to the Con-
gress. Unless Congress acted within ninety days to disapprove or amend the plan as
modified by the NRC order, the order would become effective. Id. § 2(f).
For each facility already in use or under construction, § 2(d) required DOE to file
with the NRC a report setting forth: (1) data on public health, safety, and environmental
impacts of past storage or disposal including evidence of waste migration, containment
failure, and contamination of surface or ground waters, and (2) a plan for remedial mea-
sures to assure that the facility presents no significant hazard to public health and safety
or to the environment.
Section 2(e) provided that within one year the NRC, in consultation with DOE, shall
order such modifications as it deems necessary to assure that the facility poses no signifi-
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islation could specify a certain number of new storage facilities
that would remain exempt from NRC regulatory authority, thus
"decoupling" waste storage from weapons production activities
until DOE has prepared itself for NRC regulation.
The argument that NRC regulation of currently unlicensed
DOE waste facilities would lead to the release of sensitive infor-
mation is less persuasive. It is unclear whether the NRC would
have to receive restricted data or national security information
to regulate these facilities properly.253 In the event that it would,
however, extensive regulations currently protect against the re-
lease of the information.2" Even if sensitive information, such as
the composition of the wastes produced years ago, were acciden-
tally released, it seems unlikely that extrapolation from that in-
formation could produce any valuable military secrets. 55
Despite these concerns, the NRC currently regulates DOE
activities with more significant consequences for national secur-
ity than the management or disposal of defense-related wastes.
For example, the NRC licenses the fuel fabrication facility at
Erwin, Tennessee, which is operated by a private firm under
contract with DOE and produces fuel for the nation's nuclear-
powered submarines. When, in August 1979, the facility suffered
an "inventory difference," or unexplained loss of weapons-grade
nuclear material exceeding regulatory limits, the NRC sus-
pended its operating license, thus preventing further fuel pro-
cant hazards to the public health and safety or to the environment. If the NRC deems
remedial measures impracticable, it shall order measures necessary to minimize risks to
the public health and safety or to the environment while the facility is decontaminated
and decommissioned. If DOE does not concur in the NRC order, the NRC and DOE
must submit all relevant documents to Congress, including cost estimates. Unless Con-
gress disapproves or amends the order by concurrent resolution within ninety days, the
order immediately shall take effect. Id. § 2(f).
253. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, REGULATION OF FEDERAL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
ACTIVITIES 6-2 (NUREG-0527, Sept. 1979).
254. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161, 2162. See also 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-.913 (1980); Id. §§ 9.1 - .109;
Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979); and Directive No. 1 of the Information
Security Oversight Office, 32 C.F.R. § 20001.1 (1980). Significantly, NRC regulations pro-
hibit the release of classified information received from another agency if the originating
agency objects. 10 C.F.R. § 2.905(h)(2) (1980).
"The NRC believes these procedures would effectively prevent the disclosure of sen-
sitive information, that is, National Security Information and Restricted Data." Hart
Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 79, at 126.
255. M. WILLICH & R. LESTER, supra note 14, at 100.
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duction.256  Contending that the shutdown of the plant
threatened national security, DOE persuaded the NRC to rein-
state the operating license, subject to upgraded material ac-
counting and control and physical security requirements, and to
raise the regulatory limit on inventory differences so that it
more properly reflected the operating experience of the plant.' 57
In a report analyzing options for extending its licensing of
regulatory authority to federal radioactive waste storage and dis-
posal activities, rather than proposing a blanket extension of its
regulatory authority to such activities, the NRC recommended
establishing a pilot program to test the feasibility and cost effec-
tiveness of such an extension.'" The report concluded that a
blanket extension of regulatory authority should occur only after
it can be established that: (a) a process for applying further
regulatory authority, satisfactory to both NRC and DOE, can
be developed; (b) benefits would result that outweigh the costs;
(c) workable procedures can be established which both allow
the public to be fully informed about the regulatory process
and provide an effective severing of any link between regula-
tion of the storage or disposal of waste and any classified infor-
mation about its generation; and (d) there will be no significant
delay of, or other negative impact on, sensitive defense-related
production programs.25'
To avoid potential adverse national security consequences,
three commissioners recommended a pilot program focused on a
few DOE nondefense waste management activities.260 The other
two commissioners, however, recommended that the pilot pro-
gram include "as an absolute minimum" one of the storage facil-
ities for defense high-level waste either at the Hanford or Savan-
256. In the matter of Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., NRC Order No. 70-143 (January
21, 1980).
257. Id.
258. See generally NucLEAR REGULATORY Co'N, REGULATION OF FZnEmR RADIo-
ACTIVE WASTE Aciavrrs, (NUREG-0527, Sept. 1979).
259. Id. at x. In addition, the NRC endorsed the IRG recommendation to extend
NRC licensing authority over new DOE facilities for the disposal of transuranic contami-
nated waste and nondefense low-level waste. Id. at ix.
260. Id. at xi. After balancing the potential benefits of increased protection of public
health and safety and the environment against the potential adverse consequences for
the national security, the three commissioners concluded that extension of NRC regula-
tory authority "is philosophically desirable but not demonstrably necessary." Id. at 4.
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nah River Reservations. 26 1 They concluded: "So far as we can
tell, there is no serious possibility that the national security
would thereby be affected.)
26 2
In attempting to weigh the costs and benefits of extending
NRC licensing authority to these facilities, the report identified
the major benefit as increased protection of public health,
safety, and environment, which could result from four factors:
independence of review, increased depth of review, public partic-
ipation, and independent inspection.26 3 At the same time, it
identified three types of potential costs: resource costs, costs at-
tributable to delay, and detrimental impacts upon national se-
curity.2 4 The NRC report stressed, however, that "the con-
straints of the study did not permit the staff to assess in detail
the adequacy of the DOE's health, safety, and environmental
programs.
'2 5
261. Id. at 10.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1-4.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 3.
The NRC identified four options for extending its licensing authority over currently
unlicensed DOE waste facilities. Option A would require full NRC licensing and review
of the DOE facility similar to the NRC's licensing process for commercial reactors and
fuel cycle facilities. The NRC's licensing decision would bind DOE, and the NRC would
exercise continuing regulatory oversight through inspections to assure compliance with
license conditions. Option B would require NRC to review DOE plans on a consultative
basis and to submit the results of its review including any deficiences identified and
suggested remedial actions to Congress and DOE. The NRC's recommendations would
not bind DOE. This is the option for which NRC recommended establishing a pilot pro-
gram. Option C would require NRC to review and approve a regulatory program estab-
lished by DOE, a procedure similar to that used by the NRC to fulfill its responsibilities
under the Agreement States Program. See note 540 infra. The DOE would continue its
current self-regulation of waste management activities. Finally, Option D would require
the NRC to promulgate activity-specific regulations with which DOE would have to com-
ply. The NRC would not conduct activity or facility reviews, but could conduct audits
and compliance inspections. Id. at 4-2 to -4.
The IRG, in recommending the extension of NRC licensing authority to new DOE
facilities for disposal of transuranic contaminated wastes and nondefense low-level
wastes, identified three principles that should govern a decision on licensing DOE waste
facilities: (1) national security guarantee: No DOE facility should be regulated by an
outside authority if such regulation potentially would inhibit the disclosure of materials
for national defense or lead to the disclosure of national security information; (2)
equivalent protection: The extent of the public's exposure to nuclear waste materials
does not vary by ownership of the facility or origin of the material; thus, the public must
be assured equivalent protection from material from both government and nongovern-
ment sources; (3) independent regulation: In the area of nuclear regulation, the public is
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The National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control Act of
1980,266 proposed in the Senate but not passed, adopted the mi-
nority recommendation of the Commission and provided for a
three-year pilot program to determine the costs and benefits of
extending NRC regulatory authority to nonlicensed DOE waste
activities. 267 The provision directed DOE and the NRC to enter
into a "memorandum of understanding" delineating the respec-
tive responsibilities of the two agencies under the program and
to agree upon between five and ten unlicensed DOE waste stor-
age facilities for inclusion within the program. The provision
specified that the selected facilities should include "representa-
tive examples from three different categories of radioactive
waste storage or disposal facilities," including one high-level
waste storage facility.268 The stipulation sought to prevent the
DOE from selecting only those facilities that presented the least
hazard to public health and safety, and, therefore, the least jus-
tification for an extension of NRC's regulatory authority. Al-
though the provision did not attempt to specify the regulatory
mechanism for NRC participation in DOE waste management
activities, it adopted a form of consultation and concurrence
under which DOE would report to the NRC on the extent to
which each facility under the program complied with DOE's
health, safety, and environmental requirements or required re-
best served by independent regulation consistent with national security guarantees. IRG
REPORT, supra note 37, at 30-31. The apparent conflict posed by these three principles
requires balancing the latter two against the first.
A wide-ranging report by GAO recommended the extension of NRC regulatory au-
thority over all DOE (then ERDA) facilities, including research and development facili-
ties intended for the temporary storage and long-term storage of commercial and DOE-
produced transurance wastes, the temporary storage of DOE high-level waste, and the
temporary storage and long-term storage or disposal of commercial spent fuel. GENEa.
AcCOUNTING OFFICE, NucLEAR ENERGY'S Dinmmm DIsposiNG OF HAZARDOUS RAnIOAc'rr
WAsTS SAELY 35 (EMD-77-41, Sept. 1977) [hereinafter cited as GAO, NucI.ER EN-
EEGY'S DLEMMA]. The GAO offered two less preferred alternatives to its recommenda-
tion: (1) to retain the regulatory responsibilities within DOE, subject to statutory provi-
sions insulating the oversight activities to maintain their independence from
programmatic activities; and (2) to authorize the NRC to assess periodically DOE's waste
facilities and annually report on its assessments to DOE and Congress. Id. The DOE
strongly objected to the GAO recommendation for extending NRC regulatory authority,
but endorsed the alternative recommendation that would retain within DOE the respon-
sibility for independently assessing the waste facilities. Id. at 67-69.
266. S. 2980, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980).
267. Id. § 5.
268. Id. § 5(d).
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medial action to protect public health and safety and the envi-
ronment.2 69 Having been granted under the provision necessary
access to inspect the facilities and to examine the relevant docu-
ments, NRC independently would have verified DOE's determi-
nation and submitted to Congress a written assessment of the
DOE report.
270
The provision tailored the pilot program to protect national
security by requiring that audits under the program "be carried
out in a manner consistent with the common defense and secur-
ity" and that the NRC promulgate regulations to prevent unau-
thorized disclosure of restricted data or other national security
information.71 In addition, the provision authorized the Presi-
dent to order the immediate suspension of any activity under
the program if he determined that the activity would jeopardize
the common defense and security by interrupting the production
of atomic weapons or by disrupting research and development
work on the military application of atomic energy. Congress
could override the President's order only by joint resolution.7 2
Neither the Senate nor the House has considered this or
any other legislative proposal either for a pilot program or for
extending NRC's regulatory authority to currently unlicensed
waste management facilities and activities. If the past perform-
ance of DOE and its predecessor agencies in managing federal
radioactive wastes does not establish conclusively the need for a
blanket extension of NRC regulatory authority over these activi-
ties, it nevertheless raises concerns sufficient to justify a pilot
program to test the need for a subsequent extension of NRC reg-
ulatory authority. First, in neutralizing and solidifying the liquid
high-level wastes in storage tanks, DOE may have rendered the
wastes virtually irretrievable for permanent disposal, particu-
larly at the Hanford Reservation.273 Second, the storage tanks
both at the Hanford Reservation and at the Savannah River
Plant have leaked substantial quantities of highly radioactive
269. Id. § 5(c)(2), (g).
270. Id. § 5(c)(3), (h). The provision also requires the NRC to assess whether DOE's
procedures and requirements for constructing, operating, and decommissioning its waste
facilities adequately protect the public health and safety and the environment. Id. §
5(c)(3).
271. Id. § 5(a), (e)(1).
272. Id. § 5(i). Like a bill, a joint resolution is subject to veto by the President.
273. See notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra.
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liquid waste into the ground.2 4 Third, irregularities in waste
management practices at the Hanford Reservation may have re-
sulted in offsite releases of radiation.27 5 Finally, after reviewing
the waste management program at Hanford, the DOE Inspector
General concluded that although he found no intentional cover-
up of information about tank leakage, "Hanford's existing waste
management policies and practices have themselves sufficed to
keep publicity about possible tank leaks to a minimum. 2 76 In
addition, the Inspector General found that "in some cases writ-
ten policies and procedures relating to many important waste
management practices either do not exist or else employees do
not know they exist.
'2 77
(ii) Waste confidence proceeding.-The Atomic Energy Act
requires the NRC to review an application for a license to con-
struct or operate a nuclear power plant ls and to make an explic-
274. GAO, NucLEAR ENERGY'S DILE MA, supra note 265, at 41-43. From 1958 to
1975, 20 of the 149 older single-wall tanks at Hanford leaked about 430,000 gallons of
high-level waste into the soil. Id. In 1973, a tank leaked 115,000 gallons for 51 days
before the leak was discovered. R. LpSCHUTZ, supra note 13, at 116. At the Savannah
River production facility, stress corrosion cracks have appeared in eight double-wall
tanks with only partial secondary liners. GAO, NucLEAR ENERGY'S DILEMMA, supra note
265, at 42. As a result, 100 gallons of liquid high-level waste have leaked into the soil. Id.
275. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 79, at 195-216 (testimony of
Stephen Stalos and Allen Wegele). The NRC reviewed the Stalos and Wegele allegations
and commented:
If the allegations prove to be true, it would cause concern. It is not clear
whether any one of the problems cited would be a major threat to the public
health and safety; but, in the aggregate, the pattern may indicate a significant
problem in the making. If a situation such as that alleged to exist at Hanford
existed at an NRC fuel cycle or waste facility, it would not be tolerated.
Id. at 281 (testimony of William J. Dircks, Director, NRC Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards).
276. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REPORT ON ALLEGED COVER-UPs OF LEAKS OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS AT HANFORD 23 (I6V-79-22-2-231, Jan. 1980).
277. Id. at 27. The report recommended "greater use of, and more attention paid to,
written policies and procedures." Id. See also DEP'T OF ENERGY, ASSESSMENT OF THE SUR-
VEILLANCE PROGRAM OF THE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE STORAGE TANKS AT HANFORD 2 (March
1980) (concluding that "there has not been in the past, and is not at present, any signifi-
cant radiation hazard to public health and safety from waste management operation at
Hanford.").
278. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133, 2134(b) (1976). Section 103(b) requires NRC to issue power
plant licenses only to those persons who will "observe such safety standards to protect
health and to minimize danger to life or property as the Commission may by rule estab-
lish." Id. § 2133(b). Section 103(d) prohibits the NRC from issuing a license for the
production or utilization of nuclear materials if "such issuance ... would be inimical to
the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public." Id. §
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it finding that the activities authorized by the license "will pro-
vide adequate protection to the health and safety of the
public. 27 9 In its license application review, the NRC considers a
full range of risks associated with the operation of a power plant.
It has interpreted its statutory mandate, however, as not requir-
ing it to consider explicitly the potential health and safety con-
sequences of the lack of a demonstrated method to dispose per-
manently of radioactive wastes. 280 Instead, the NRC maintains
that it has made an implicit finding of confidence that a waste
disposal facility will be available when needed and that this
finding justifies the continued licensing of nuclear power
plants. 281 At the same time, the NRC has committed itself to
reassessing its basis for confidence "as new data are developed
and progress is made in the Federal waste management pro-
gram. 2 8 2 The NRC thus avoids creating a regulatory link be-
tween the health and safety consequences of licensing nuclear
power plants and the problem of disposing of the radioactive
wastes they generate.
The NRC similarly has avoided considering the lack of a
feasible waste disposal method in analyzing, under NEPA, the
environmental impacts of issuing a power plant license. The
NRC has found that issuance of a construction permit or operat-
ing license constitutes a "major Federal action significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment," which must
comply with NEPA requirements for a full environmental im-
pact statement.83 To fulfill its NEPA responsibilities, however,
the NRC has promulgated by rule the "Table S-3," which sum-
marizes in numerical values the environmental effects of various
2133(d).
279. Id. § 2232(a).
280. The NRC does, however, consider the adequacy of interim storage of radioac-
tive wastes at the power plant site. 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(b)(2)(i), 50.34(b)(3), 50.34a(a),
50.34a(c)(1) (1980).
281. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,391, petition for review dismissed sub nom., NRDC v. NRC,
582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978). The NRC based its confidence not on the results of a formal
rulemaking or adjudicatory hearing, but on an analysis by the NRC staff. NucLEAR REG-
ULATORY COMM'N, ONMSS ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION'S BASIS FOR CONFIDENCE THAT
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE CAN BE DISPOSED OF SAFELY (SECY-77-48A, Attachment 3, Mar. 30,
1977).
282. Letter from Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairman of the NRC, to Senator John Glenn
(Mar. 9, 1979).
283. 10 C.F.R. § 51.5 (1980).
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aspects of the uranium fuel cycle.2 "' The NRC factors the nu-
merical values in Table S-3 into the cost-benefit analysis for in-
dividual power plants, which balances the adverse environmen-
tal impacts against expected technical, environmental, economic,
and other benefits. In deriving these numerical values, the NRC
assumed the existence of a model, but not prohibitively expen-
sive, facility for disposing of radioactive wastes.285 It did not as-
sess, however, the feasibility of developing such a facility or the
date when it might become available.
The NRC made its initial finding of confidence in the feasi-
bility of radioactive waste disposal when it denied a petition by
the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) requesting
that NRC conduct a formal rulemaking to determine whether a
reasonable assurance exists that radioactive wastes can be dis-
posed of without undue risk to the public health and safety.
28
The NRDC also had requested the NRC to refrain from issuing
operating licenses for nuclear power plants until it has made this
determination. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit upheld the NRC's decision that it was not
statutorily required to make the requested confidence finding
prior to licensing a power plant.87
The Second Circuit decision did not prevent a subsequent
challenge on similar grounds to the NRC's decision to grant li-
cense amendments for the expansion of spent fuel storage pools
at the Prairie Island and Vermont Yankee nuclear power
plants.2 8 The licensing board had relied upon the Commission's
implicit finding of confidence to dismiss contentions that it
should consider the environmental impacts of indefinite on-site
storage of spent fuel resulting from the lack of a demonstrated
method for disposal.289 In upholding that decision, the appeal
284. Id. § 51.20. The values were intended to represent the incremental contribution
of a hypothetical 1000 MWe model, light-water reactor to the total environmental effect
of the uranium fuel cycle. The supporting data for the summary table are contained in
NRC, ENvIRONMENTAL SURVEY, supra note 85.
285. 10 C.F.R. § 51.20 (1980).
286. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,391 (July 5, 1977), petition for review dismissed sub noma.,
NRDC v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978).
287. NRDC v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978).
288. In re Northern States Power Co., 6 N.R.C. 265 (1977); In re Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp., 6 N.R.C. 436 (1977).
289. In re Northern States Power Co., 6 N.R.C. 265 (1977); In re Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp., 6 N.R.C. 436 (1977).
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board indicated that, under a reasonable reading of NEPA, the
NRC must consider whether safe, off-site facilities for perma-
nent waste disposal would be available when needed (that is,
when the applicants' operating licenses expire in the years 2007
to 2009). It found, however, that in denying the earlier NRDC
petition for a rulemaking, the Commission had resolved that is-
sue by stating that it had reasonable confidence that safe meth-
ods of permanent disposal would be available when needed.
Therefore, the licensing board need not have considered the en-
vironmental impacts of indefinite on-site storage of spent fuel.290
Reviewing the NRC decision on appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Minne-
sota v. NRC,291 clearly stated that the NRC need not make a
finding on the feasibility of waste disposal prior to the issuance
of licensing amendments for expanding the spent fuel pools at
the two power plant sites. To this extent, therefore, the decision
was consistent with the earlier Second Circuit decision. At the
same time, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit noted that a proceeding to update Table S-3 was
pending before the NRC. Considering the relevance of that pro-
ceeding to the case then before it, the court remanded the case
to the NRC for further consideration of the particular issues
presented-"whether there [was] reasonable assurance that an
off-site storage facility solution will be available by the years
2007-09, the expiration date of the plants' operating licenses,
and, if not, whether there [was] reasonable assurance that the
fuel can be stored safely at the sites beyond those dates."29 2 The
court went on to suggest that because the feasibility of interim
or ultimate nuclear waste disposal solutions is an issue "essen-
tially common to all nuclear facilities," the NRC's determination
of those questions in a general rulemaking proceeding was per-
missible.29 3
Thus, the court deftly postponed a judicial determination of
whether NRC's statutory obligations mandate a link between
the licensing of power plants and the problem of radioactive
290. In re Northern States Power Co. and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 7
N.R.C. 41, 51 (1978).
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waste disposal. Nevertheless, the court strongly encouraged the
NRC to exercise its administrative discretion and reassess its
own confidence that a disposal solution will be available when
needed and to consider that finding in future reviews of license
applications.
The Minnesota decision prompted the NRC to initiate a ge-
neric proceeding to: (1) reassess its confidence that safe off-site
disposal of radioactive waste from licensed facilities will be
available; (2) determine when any such disposal will be availa-
ble; and (3) if disposal will not be available until after the expi-
ration of the licenses of certain nuclear facilities, determine
whether the wastes generated by those facilities can be stored
safely on-site until such disposal becomes available.94 Based on
the results of this proceeding, the NRC intends to promulgate a
rule on whether and in what manner it will consider in individ-
ual facility licensing proceedings the safety and environmental
implications of having radioactive waste remain on-site after the
anticipated expiration of the facility license.29 5 The NRC proba-
bly will not reach a final determination before the end of 1981.
Aside from the pending NRC waste proceeding, two nuclear
waste bills, introduced in the Senate, sought to require the NRC
to consider the feasibility of waste disposal facilities in connec-
tion with the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants.
The proposed Nuclear Waste Regulation Act of 1979 (S. 1521)296
directed the NRC and EPA to conduct an adjudicatory proceed-
ing to determine whether a technology exists for the preparation
and disposal of radioactive wastes and to report their findings
and determinations to Congress by December 31, 1982.297 If the
proceeding resulted in a negative determination, the NRC and
EPA would have to identify the unresolved issues and, every
second year thereafter, reassess their determination.2 s In addi-
tion, the NRC would have to suspend issuance of construction
294. 44 Fed. Reg. 61,372-74 (Oct. 25, 1979).
295. Id. at 61,373.
296. S. 1521, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
297. Id. § 5. The provision also required that the technology not present a "substan-
tial probability to one or more individuals or the general population of death, serious
injury or disease, or mutagenic consequences." Id. § 5(a)(1). Such a standard could prove
virtually impossible to meet. See Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at
277 (statement of John T. Conway, President, American Nuclear Energy Council).
298. S. 1521, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(c)(1) (1979).
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permits and new operating licenses for nuclear power plants un-
til the NRC and EPA could make an affirmative determina-
tion.299 In establishing a regulatory link between the licensing
and operation of nuclear power plants and the availability of an
adequate waste disposal technology, the bill set unrealistic re-
quirements by mandating a full adjudicatory proceeding rather
than relying on the current NRC rulemaking proceedings and by
directing the NRC and the EPA to draw the same conclusions
from the record. It did not account for the possibility that the
NRC and EPA could reach contradictory conclusions.
Section 6 of the bill provided as follows:
On or before January 15, 1987, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, in consultation with the Department of Energy,
shall report to the Congress and the President on whether ade-
quate permanent disposal capacity ... will exist on or before
December 31, 1990, for the volume of high level radioactive
waste, non-high level transuranium contaminated waste, and
irradiated nuclear reactor fuel, from whatever source, which is
projected to require such disposal within the United States on
such date.300
If the NRC had determined that adequate disposal capacity
would not exist, it would have been required to report to Con-
gress and the President every third year and to suspend all fur-
ther commercial generation of wastes until the Commission
found that adequate disposal capacity existed for the volume of
waste requiring disposal in the United States at the time of the
report.30 This provision raised the anomalous possibility that
the NRC could find confidence in 1985 that a disposal technol-
ogy exists, resume the issuance of construction permits and new
operating licenses, and yet have to suspend all commercial activ-
ities in 1987 because the technology could not be implemented
in time to provide the required permanent disposal capacity by
December 31, 1990.
The National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control Act of
1979302 similarly linked confidence in waste disposal technology
299. Id. § 5(c)(2).
300. Id. § 6.
301. Id.
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to further use of nuclear power, but departed from S. 1521 by
attempting to conform its requirements to the existing NRC
waste confidence proceeding. It directed the NRC to conduct a
rulemaking proceeding similar to the one currently underway to
determine whether a technology exists that would permit it to
license a facility for the disposal of high-level and transuranic
contaminated wastes without presenting a significant hazard to
public health and safety or to the environment during the toxic
life of the wastes. 03 If, by January 1, 1985, the NRC could not
make an affirmative finding, the provision required the NRC to
identify the unresolved issues and to suspend the issuance of
construction permits and operating licenses for new nuclear
power plants until it could make an affirmative finding. Finally,
it directed the NRC annually to reassess its finding and for each
successive year that the finding remains negative, to reduce by
ten percent the maximum allowed generating capacity of all
commercial nuclear power plants.80 '
The National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control Act of
1979 relied upon similar regulatory links to enhance the effec-
tiveness of deadlines in a comprehensive schedule for the orderly
development of a safe geologic repository. It established four
deadlines by which time appropriate federal agencies must ac-
complish specified tasks.30 5 It required the EPA to issue general
radiological standards for high-level waste disposal by January
1, 1981. By January 1, 1982, the NRC was to promulgate regula-
tions for licensing a high-level waste repository. The DOE was
directed to submit to the NRC, on or before January 1, 1984, an
application for construction permits for repositories in each of
two or more states. The NRC was required to act on the DOE
applications by January 1, 1992.306
If DOE failed to submit the construction permit applica-
tions by the deadline, the provision required the NRC to sus-
pend issuance of construction permits and operating licenses for
new nuclear power plants.07 Similarly, if the NRC failed to act
upon the applications by the deadline, the provision directed it
303. S. 1521, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1979).
304. Id. § 6(1).
305. Id. § 4.
306. Id.
307. Id. § 4(c).
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to reduce the maximum generating capacity of each power plant
by ten percent and, for each successive year that it did not act,
to reduce the capacity by an additional ten percent. 8
This regulatory link served two distinct purposes. First, it
provided an enforcement mechanism designed to help minimize
future bureaucratic delays that could disrupt the statutory
schedule for repository development and to foster greater gov-
ernment commitment to solving the problem of radioactive
waste disposal. Second, it simply recognized as a practical mat-
ter, that the United States should not continue to rely on nu-
clear-generated electricity if a technology for disposing of the re-
sulting wastes does not exist or will not exist within a reasonable
period of time.
The opponents of such a regulatory link between continued
use of nuclear power and the feasibility of waste disposal re-
sponded only to the first purpose. They argued that the nuclear
industry and the utilities should not bear the responsibility for a
federal agency's failure to meet a statutory deadline and, there-
fore, that the sanctions for that failure should not run against
them.309 In a broader sense, however, the sanction runs against
voters, who must either use the political process to insist upon a
greater federal commitment to solving the waste disposal prob-
lem or relinquish some of the benefits of nuclear power. The nu-
clear industry cannot so easily escape responsibility for the lack
of progress in the waste disposal program. The federal govern-
ment does not have a statutory monopoly on the right to con-
duct research and development activities on techniques for the
packaging, handling, or disposal of radioactive waste. Thus, the
industry independently could engage in such activities and offer
them for incorporation into the federal government's program
for developing an acceptable waste disposal method.
None of the previously discussed provisions for linking a de-
termination of confidence in the feasibility of waste disposal
with continued licensing of nuclear power plants was included in
the National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control Act of 1980,
as reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Pub-
lic Works.310 It was believed that this regulatory link could in-
308. Id. § 6(2).
309. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 262-63, 283.
310. S. 2980, S. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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duce the NRC to make unsupported findings of confidence to
avoid the requirement that it suspend the issuance of licenses
for new power plants and the operations of existing power
plants.
Similar timetables for developing a repository, but without
automatic sanctions for failure to meet specific deadlines, were
incorporated into both the National Nuclear Waste Regulation
and Control Act of 1980 (S. 2980),311 as reported by the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee, and the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act,3 12 as passed by the House. Both bills required
the EPA to issue general radiological standards313 and the NRC
to promulgate regulations. 14 In addition, S. 2980 directed the
DOE to submit to the NRC, by January 1, 1985, four plans for
characterizing potential repository sites.315 The House bill di-
rected the DOE to submit to the President, by January 1, 1982,
at least two sites suitable for characterization and, by February
1, 1985, two additional sites.3 16 The Senate bill further required
DOE, by January 1, 1989, to submit to the NRC an application
for authorization to construct a repository;3 17 it required the
NRC to act on this application by January 1, 1993.318 Finally,
DOE was required to submit to the NRC by January 1, 1998, an
application to emplace radioactive wastes in the licensed reposi-
tory and, by January 1, 2000, the NRC was required to act on
the application.1 9
Failure to meet the various deadlines recommended in S.
2980 would have triggered congressional scrutiny of the reasons
for the failure and a determination of the appropriate legislative
response. An agency with responsibility to fulfill a certain re-
quirement by a specific deadline was required to notify the Pres-
ident if it determined that it could not meet the deadline.320
Upon receiving notice, the President would have to submit a re-
311. S. 2980, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., supra note 10, § 7(a) (1980).
312. H.R. 8378, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., supra note 10, § 110 (1980).
313. See notes 324 & 325 supra.
314. S. 2980, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(b) (1980); H.R. 8378, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
supra note 10, § 110 (1980).
315. S. 2980, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., supra note 10, § 7(c) (1980).
316. H.R. 8378, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., supra note 10, § 102(b) (1980).
317. S. 2980, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., supra note 10, § 7(d) (1980).
318. Id. § 7(e).
319. Id. § 7(g).
320. Id. § 8(b)(1).
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port to Congress that included: (1) a detailed explanation of why
the agency could not fulfill its requirements by the deadline; (2)
an estimate of when the agency would fulfill its requirements
and a description of the measures taken to meet the new dead-
line; (3) a description of the measures that the President in-
tended to take to ensure that subsequent requirements were sat-
isfied by the specified deadline; and (4) the President's
recommendation on whether Congress should prohibit the issu-
ance of construction permits or operating licenses for new nu-
clear power plants. 21 Within sixty days after receipt of the Pres-
ident's report, the congressional committees of jurisdiction were
required to submit to their respective houses reports on the
President's recommendation about the continued issuance of
construction permits or new operating licenses. 22 These reports
were to include proposed legislation. Finally, the bill set an
outside limit for repository development. If the NRC had not
issued a license for emplacement of radioactive wastes in a re-
pository by January 1, 2000, the bill would prohibit it from issu-
ing a construction permit or operating license for a new nuclear
power plant until after it issued an emplacement license.2 3 The
House-passed bill included no similar provisions for congres-
sional review of an agency's failure to comply with the statutory
schedule for developing a repository.
(d) Department of Transportation.-The implementation
of a comprehensive waste management program necesarily will
bring with it an increase in the transportation of all types of
radioactive waste from which the public health and safety will
require protection. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
of 1975324 gives DOT primary federal authority to regulate all
modes of transportation in interstate commerce of hazardous
materials, including radioactive materials, with the sole excep-
tion of postal shipments.325 The Act authorizes DOT, in consul-
tation with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), to issue
regulations covering the packing, handling, labeling, and routing
321. Id. § 8(c).
322. Id. § 8(d).
323. Id. § 8(e).
324. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1976 & Supp. EI 1979).
325. Id. § 1804. Interstate Commerce Commission regulatory authority over the
transportation of radioactive material by a carrier in interstate or foreign commerce was
transferred to DOT in 1966. Id. § 1655(e)(4).
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of materials, as well as the manufacture, maintenance, repair, or
testing of their containers. It also directs DOT to prohibit the
transportation of any radioactive materials on aircraft except for
those intended for use in medical diagnosis or treatment.326 Con-
sistent with the Act, DOT, by regulation, has delegated its regu-
latory authority over transportation of radioactive materials to
the ICC for rail and highway shipments, to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) for air transport, and to the Coast Guard
for water transport.
3 2 7
The broad regulatory authority of the NRC over the receipt,
possession, use, and transfer of nuclear materials 328 overlaps
DOT jurisdiction. Thus, to avoid inconsistent or duplicative reg-
ulation, on June 8, 1979, NRC and DOT entered into a memo-
randum of understanding delineating their respective jurisdic-
tional responsibilities. 29 Under the agreement, NRC will adopt
safety standards for the designs of packages to contain fissile
materials and quantities of other radioactive materials exceeding
Type A limits and review the designs in accordance with its
standards. 3 0 The DOT will develop safety standards for the de-
signs of packages to contain quantities of radioactive materials
not exceeding Type A limits. In addition, DOT will adopt gen-
eral regulations for safe transportation of radioactive materials
including requirements for labeling and marking of all radioac-
tive material packages and vehicles, the conditions of the carrier
equipment, the qualifications of carrier personnel, and the trans-
portation mode and route. Finally, DOT and NRC will adopt the
relevant regulations of the other agency, and NRC will assist
DOT in inspecting shippers of fissile materials and other radio-
active materials in quantities exceeding Type A limits.3 31
Concern over the potential hazards of radioactive materials
326. Id. § 1807.
327. For related DOT regulations, see 49 C.F.R. §§ 170-189 (1979).
328. See note 218 and accompanying text supra.
329. 44 Fed. Reg. 38,690 (1979).
330. Id. at 38, 691. The NRC regulations classify radioactive material into "trans-
port groups" according to their toxicity and relative potential hazards during transporta-
tion. 10 C.F.R. pt. 71 app. C (1980). The regulations further classify the transport groups
into two categories, Type A or Type B, based on the aggregate radioactivity of a given
quantity of radioactive material. Id. § 71.4(q).
331. 44 Fed. Reg. at 38,691. The NRC also regulates the physical security and safe-
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transportation has caused several states and localities to ban or
restrict shipments of such materials within their jurisdictions.
332
The resulting patchwork of local and state restrictions could im-
pede the shipment of radioactive materials from power plants,
hospitals, and educational institutions. Consequently, DOT has
promulgated regulations that establish a uniform federal system
for routing shipments of radioactive materials, thus preempting
inconsistent state or local requirements. 3  The new regulations
require that shipments by motor vehicles of large quantities of
radioactive materials occur over a preferred highway-either a
highway so designated by a state in accordance with DOT guide-
lines or an interstate highway for which an alternate highway
has not been designated by the state. 3 4 If there exists both a
preferred highway bypassing33 5 a city and an interstate highway
through that city, the motor vehicle operator must use the by-
pass route.336 The regulation thus reserves authority to the
states to designate the routes along which it would prefer to
have radioactive materials shipped, but preempts state or local
attempts to prohibit such shipments altogether.
Only one bill, the Nuclear Waste Transportation Safety Act
of 1979, 337 was introduced during the Ninety-Sixth Congress to
address the concerns over transportation of nuclear materials.
The Act required the Secretary of Transportation to prepare a
national plan for responding to emergencies that may occur dur-
ing the shipment of nuclear materials. 38 The plan was to "define
clearly the role of Federal, State and local governments in re-
sponding to an emergency situation."3 9 Moreover, the Act re-
quired the DOT, upon receiving notification of plans to develop
a long-term storage facility, including a test facility, which
would result in shipments of radioactive waste within a state, to
notify the governors of the states within which the waste would
332. See note 121 supra.
333. 46 Fed. Reg. 5298-5318 (Jan. 19, 1981).
334. Id.
335. Id. In designating or disapproving a preferred highway, the state must attempt
to minimize the total impact of highway transportation of the materials.
336. Id.
337. S. 535, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Rzc. S2056-58 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1979).
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be shipped.4 0 The state then could apply to DOT for a grant of
up to $50,000 to assist it in independently reviewing the safety
and the logistics of shipments across its borders of waste associ-
ated with the proposed facility.3 1 Finally, the Act required the
DOT to review safety requirements associated with the ship-
ment of nuclear wastes, recommend changes that might enhance
significantly the safety or security of shipments, compile ship-
ment data to aid risk assessment and help improve container
and vehicle design, and recommend federal guidelines or re-
quirements for routing of shipments that might discourage state
and local governments from further restricting shipments within
their jurisdictions.4 2 Neither the Senate nor the House consid-
ered the bill.
The overlap and occasional conflict among the jurisdictions
of the four agencies primarily responsible for various aspects of
federal radioactive waste activities"' have the potential for dis-
rupting or delaying the federal program. Presumably, the Presi-
dent can resolve such conflicts without the intervention of Con-
gress. Otherwise, to ensure the success of the program, Congress
may have to resolve them legislatively, either by strengthening
the authority of the agency designated to coordinate the pro-
gram or by delineating more clearly each participating agency's
jurisdiction.
2. Intergovernmental Relationships.-The history of politi-
cal difficulties arising from the management of radioactive
wastes underscores the importance of building a partnership
among the federal government, potential host states, and af-
fected Indian tribes to implement a program for disposing of
high-level waste. Questions about the appropriate role of the
states in a federal waste disposal program cut to the very heart
of federalist principles embodied in the Constitution 4 and
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. § 6.
343. Two other agencies have important, but lesser, roles in federal efforts to dis-
pose of high-level radioactive waste. The Bureau of Land Management has statutory
responsibility to withdraw and preserve federal lands on which DOE proposes to site a
repository. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, P.L. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1976)). The U.S. Geological Survey has begun to work
closely with DOE in its screening of states for potential repository sites.
344. Several commentators foresee significant state-federal conflicts over the limits
of state authority to dictate the siting and development of radioactive waste facilities.
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could have implications for the development, siting, and con-
struction of other federal, particularly military, projects.4 5 The
responsibility for resolving these issues inevitably will fall to
Congress and will require Solomonic wisdom to strike the proper
balance among a state's legitimate rights in exercising its tradi-
tional police power to protect the health and safety of its citi-
zens, the similar interests of affected Indian tribes, and the na-
tional interest in disposing of radioactive waste. Legislative
attempts to strike this balance should acknowledge the impor-
tance of state support to the sociopolitical success of any federal
radioactive waste management program and, therefore, should
protect against heavy-handed methods that would offend re-
sidents of a region being considered as a disposal site.u 6
IRG took a first step toward defining the appropriate state-
federal relationship by making two substantive recommenda-
tions, both endorsed by President Carter in his policy statement
on radioactive waste management.3 4 7 First, IRG recommended
the establishment of an executive planning council composed of
selected governors, Indian nation representatives, officials of lob-
bying organizations for state and local governments, and repre-
sentatives of DOE, the NRC, and other relevant federal agen-
cies.34 8 Although the council would not have authority to
implement proposals, IRG recommended that the council advise
both the executive branch and Congress on (1) mechanisms and
timetables for carrying out joint planning activities in radioac-
tive waste management; (2) acceptable criteria for evaluating
proposed radioactive waste management activities; (3) plans for
regional siting of waste disposal facilities; (4) the design, prepa-
See, e.g., Graff, Legal Constraints on Consultation and Concurrence, reprinted in CON-
SULTATION AND CONCURRENCE: WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 57 (ONWI-87, Jan. 1980).
Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, South Carolina
Governor James B. Edwards noted, "The issue [of nuclear waste disposal] is as divisive
as any that we have faced in many years. The final resolution of the nuclear waste man-
agement issue will indeed test the fabric of our federal system of government. If we are
to deal with this matter and avert a constitutional crisis, we must develop positive ap-
proaches and avoid pitting States against the Federal Government and against each
other." Nuclear Waste Management: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regu-
lation of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, supra note 159, at 633.
345. See notes 187 & 190 and accompanying text supra.
346. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 95.
347. See note 7 supra.
348. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 89-93.
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ration, and evaluation of environmental impact statements cov-
ering waste management activities; and (5) a mechanism for
planning that will effectively represent all interests at the state
and local levels."9 President Carter established the State Plan-
ning Council by executive order for an eighteen-month period,
pending enactment of legislation to make it permanent.350
349. Id. at 89-90. It is unclear whether any state planning council can fully represent
the broad spectrum of states with potentially conflicting interests. Because only the duly
elected representatives of the 50 states in Congress can legitimately allocate the costs
and benefits of waste disposal among the states, it seems unlikely that Congress would
permit the State Planning Council to act as its surrogate in resolving the fundamental
issues regarding the appropriate 'national policy for radioactive waste management.
Nevertheless, the idea of a State Planning Council has drawn criticism as merely a
means to "finesse the relationship between the National Government and the States" by
pacifying constituencies that otherwise would confront Congress directly to protect their
interests in a waste management plan. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra
note 3, at 49-50 (testimony of Emilio E. Varanini, I, Commissioner, California Energy
Resource Conservation and Development Commission).
350. Exec. Order No. 12,192, 45 Fed. Reg. 9727 (1980). The order directs the Coun-
cil, within one year after its first meeting, to submit to the President a report on its
functions. These functions include: (1) recommending procedural mechanisms for re-
viewing nuclear waste management plans in a way to ensure timely and effective involve-
ment of state and local governments and Indian tribes; (2) reviewing the development of
the National Nuclear Waste Management Plan and providing recommendations to en-
sure that this plan adequately addresses the needs of the affected state and local areas;
(3) advising on all aspects of siting waste storage and disposal facilities, including the
review of recommended criteria for site selection and suitability, guidelines for regional
siting, and procedures for site characterization and selection; (4) advising on an appro-
priate role for state and local governments and Indian tribes in the licensing, permitting,
regulation, and operation of nuclear waste repositories; (5) advising on proposed federal
regulations, standards, and criteria related to nuclear waste management programs; and
(6) identifying and making recommendations on other matters related to the transporta-
tion and disposal of nuclear waste. Id. See generally STATE PLANNING COUNCIL ON RADIO-
ACTIE WAsTrE MANAGEMENT, INTERIM REPORT (Feb. 24, 1981). The Council first convened
on Feb. 24, 1980.
The Senate approved an amendment to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (S. 2189),
offered by Senators John Glenn and Charles Percy, that would have given the State
Planning Council a 10-year life. S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 701 (1980). The Council
would have consisted of 18 members, 14 appointed by the President, of whom eight
would be governors, five state and local elected officials other than governors, and one a
representative of Indian tribal governments. The remaining four included the Secretaries
of Energy, Interior, Transportation, and the Administrator of the EPA. Id. § 702(a).
Addressing the need for a balanced consideration of diverse interests by the Council, the
amendment directed the President to "ensure representation of a broad range of views
with respect to nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel management and to ensure repre-
sentation of geographical areas which are users of nuclear power and geographical areas
which are serving or may likely serve as locations for nuclear waste and spent nuclear
fuel storage or disposal, or which may be directly or substantially affected by those activ-
ities." Id. § 702(b).
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IRG also recommended that the state-federal relationship
for decisionmaking on radioactive waste management take the
form of cooperative federalism that would provide "consultation
and concurrence," a catchy, if unenlightening phrase that may
have raised more questions about the appropriate state role than
it has answered.351 Rejecting both exclusive federal supremacy
and an absolute state veto, IRG described consultation and con-
currence as implying
the development of a cooperative relationship between states
and all relevant Federal agencies during program planning and
the site identification and characterization programs on a re-
gional basis using the systems approach, through the identifi-
cation of specific sites, the joint decisions on a facility, any sub-
sequent licensing process and through the entire period of
operation and decommissioning. Under this approach the State
effectively has a continuing ability to participate in all activi-
ties at all points throughout the course of the activity and, if it
deems appropriate, to prevent the continuance of Federal ac-
tivities .... Such an approach will lead to better protection
of States' interests than would a system of State veto ... as
well as ensure effective state participation in the Federal Gov-
ernment's waste management program.35
The amendment essentially would have ratified the IRG's recommendations and
President Carter's Radioactive Waste Policy by charging the Council to advise the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of Energy and, as appropriate, other federal agencies, Congress, state
and local governments, and Indian tribes on nuclear waste management. Its specific
functions would have been virtually identical to those set forth in the Executive Order
establishing the State Planning Council. Id. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, H.R. 8378,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979), as passed by the House, did not provide for a state planning
council.
The State Planning Council established in S. 2189 differs from the Nuclear Waste
Management Planning Council provided for in the Nuclear Waste Management Reor-
ganization Act of 1979, S. 742, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), as introduced by Senators
Percy and Glenn. The bill sought clearly to separate the state and federal perspectives
on nuclear waste management policy. Thus, it established a Nuclear Waste Coordinating
Committee, comprised exclusively of federal representatives, and gathered together the
state, local, and Indian representatives in the Nuclear Waste Management Planning
Council. See note 195 and accompanying text supra. In addition, it attempted to allay
concerns that state officials may not represent fully the interests of local governments,
Indian tribes, or the public by balancing more evenly the representation of these groups
and adding four average citizens unaffected by political considerations. See S. 2189,
supra note 10.
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This unwieldly definition left unresolved one fundamental ques-
tion: Does the right to concur imply a right not to concur, or to
veto, subsequent federal plans to locate and construct a radioac-
tive waste repository? 53
President Carter failed to clarify the definition:
Under the framework of consultation and concurrence, a host
State will have a continuing role in Federal decisionmaking on
the siting, design and construction of a high level waste reposi-
tory. State consultation and concurrence, however, will lead to
an acceptable solution to our waste disposal problem only if all
the States participate as partners in the program I am putting
forth.3"
He charged the State Planning Council, however, to recommend
procedural mechanisms for reviewing specific nuclear waste
management plans and programs and for implementing consul-
tation and concurrence." 5 Subsequently, the Council passed res-
olutions setting forth its recommendations. First, it recom-
mended that the scope of consultation and concurrence should
cover all issues related to a repository and include all stages
from the earliest planning activities to the decommissioning of
the repository. Second, the federal government, the states, and
affected Indian tribes should conclude agreements on the ele-
ments of consultation and concurrence. In particular, the agree-
ments should specify the spokesmen and responsibilities of the
parties, define planned activities and studies to be carried out,
specify DOE funding of state or tribal activities, contain a
schedule for key events, give time periods for review and com-
ments, and provide a conflict resolution mechanism, preferably a
neutral and expert third party agreeable to both sides. As part
of the conflict resolution procedures, the agreement should in-
clude an override mechanism. Third, if a state's objections to a
decision to site a repository cannot be resolved in a mutually
satisfactory manner, an explicit Presidential determination and
affirmative action by both houses of Congress shall be required
353. The IRG Report suggests that the right of concurrence does, in fact, imply a
right of nonconcurrence: "The State would be in agreement with each step in the reposi-
tory siting process before the next activity was begun." Id. at 93.
354. President's Message to Congress on Establishing a Radioactive Waste Manage-
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to override these objections. Last, if an affected Indian tribe's
objections to a decision to site a repository cannot be resolved in
a mutually satisfactory manner, an act of Congress would be re-
quired to override these objections.3 15
In analyzing the appropriate state-federal relationship,
whether labeled cooperative federalism or consultation and con-
currence, it is not sufficient simply to speak of granting states a
meaningful role in setting radioactive waste disposal policy. Two
collateral issues enter into the analysis. First, proposals for a
state role in decisionmaking on radioactive waste disposal
should clarify the extent to which various classes of states will
have the right to participate in planning a repository. Undoubt-
edly, those states designated as potential hosts for a repository
should receive the largest measure of participatory rights since
they will bear the heaviest political and economic burdens re-
sulting from a decision to site a repository within their borders.
Narrowly circumscribing participatory rights so that they apply
only to potential host states, however, ignores the possibility
that the health, safety, or environmental effects of a repository
may reach beyond territorial boundaries into neighboring states.
For example, radioactive material escaping from a breached or
improperly constructed repository could enter an aquifer or
other hydrologic flow path that extends into several states.357
Thus, certain "affected states" justifiably could claim par-
ticipatory rights coextensive with those granted potential host
states. Eligibility for "affected state" status probably should rest
upon specific geologic, or perhaps even socioeconomic, grounds,
which a state would have to establish to the satisfaction of DOE,
the NRC, the State Planning Council, or some other appropriate
entity.
In addition to "affected states," there exists an even broader
category of "interested states"-states not directly affected by
the construction or operation of a particular repository but
nonetheless interested in the generic issues related to radioactive
waste disposal. Into this category would fall states with commer-
356. Resolution Nos. 4-6, 4-9, 4-10, passed by the State Planning Council on Radio-
active Waste Management, September 8, 1980, reprinted in STATE PLANNING COUNCIL
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 350.
357. Varanini, A View on Consultation and Concurrence, reprinted in CONSULTA-
TION AND CONCURRENCE: WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 41-42 (ONWI-87, Jan. 1980).
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cial nuclear power plants that have enacted laws or approved
referenda linking the continued or expanded generation of elec-
tricity from nuclear power to a satisfactory resolution of the
waste disposal issue.3 58 Those states arguably could request an
opportunity to participate in decisionmaking on general radioac-
tive waste policy without a concomitant right to object to site-
specific plans for a particular repository.
Second, it may seem preferable for the participatory role af-
forded an affected state not to remain constant throughout the
planning process but rather to increase during successive stages
of repository development as the state's interest becomes more
clearly defined.3 5e For example, an affected state probably
should not have the right to prohibit preliminary DOE surveys
of a region to determine general site suitability or even explora-
tory activities conducted at a specific site. When the DOE un-
dertakes detailed site characterization leading to a decision on
whether to apply for construction authorization, however, the
greatest degree of statutorily prescribed rights then should ob-
tain and remain in effect until decommissioning.3 60
Numerous bills were introduced in the Ninety-Sixth Con-
gress proposing various roles for states in establishing a radioac-
tive waste program that spanned virtually the entire spectrum of
state-federal relationships. In the discussion following, the vari-
ous bills are categorized according to the mechanisms they em-
ployed to resolve the problems of governmental relationships. 61
358. See, e.g., note 154 and accompanying text supra.
359. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, MEANS FOR IMPROVING STATE PARTICIPATION IN
THE SITING, LICENSING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR WASTE FAcILrrIEs 13
(NUREG-0539, March 1979).
360. Two general models for a consultation and concurrence process have been sug-
gested. One model envisions a continual process in which the affected state may scruti-
nize a broad range of DOE activities and object to a specific activity at any time. An
alternative model contemplates the establishment of a few critical milestones at which
the affected state would review DOE plans and decide whether to object to their imple-
mentation. CONSULTATION AND CONCURRENCE: WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 22 (ONWI-87,
Jan. 1980). State governors or legislatures may resist the first model because it could
place them in the politically undesirable position of repeatedly agreeing with the DOE as
plans progress through the many decision points. On the other hand, the second model
places such emphasis on a few, vital decision points that extraordinary political pressure
against siting of a repository may build, increasing the chance that the state governor or
legislature will object to further progress on the DOE program.
361. There are a number of possible state-federal relationships that Congress by
statute could prescribe. Most advantageous to the states and, thus, least favorable to the
1981] 723
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(a) Absolute state veto.-During the Ninety-Sixth Con-
gress, four bills were introduced in the House of Representa-
tives36 2 and four in the Senate s that would have granted a po-
tential host state the right to halt permanently federal efforts to
develop a particular site within its borders for a radioactive
waste repository. These bills have the same general features.
They require the Secretary of Energy (or the NRC Chairman) to
notify a state of the federal goverment's intent to explore and
characterize a site within the state's borders to assess its suita-
bility for a waste repository. The state, within a specified period
of time after DOE decides to construct a repository at the site,
may veto construction for any reason.s
federal government would be a provision that the project stops if the state objects to
proposed federal action. See, e.g., notes 371 & 372 supra.
In order of decreasing advantage to the state and, thus, increasing advantage to the
federal government, would be proposals that (1) the project stops unless both houses of
Congress override state objections, see, e.g., H.R. 6390 § 203 (h)(2), 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980); (2) the project stops unless one house of Congress overrides state objections; (3)
the project continues unless one house of Congress approves state objections, see, e.g.,
notes 383 & 391 and accompanying text infra; (4) the project continues unless both
houses of Congress approve state objections, see, e.g., note 392 and accompanying text
infra; and (5) the project continues notwithstanding state objections.
This listing does not include the possibility of a statutory requirement that the Pre-
sident first must make a determination upon a state's objections (or the proposed federal
action) before the issue goes to Congress-known as a two-step federal override. It is
likely, although not certain, that a President would support the proposal of the federal
agency, presumably DOE, designated to carry out a waste disposal program. To the ex-
tent that a President's rejection of a state's objections (or approval of a proposed federal
action) will carry added weight with Congress, proposals for a presidential determination
prior to congressional action will tend to decrease a state's leverage. In addition, the
listing does not include proposals that the state and federal government negotiate the
specific elements of their relationship, since the results of that negotiation will determine
the category into which the relationship will fall.
362. H.R. 1791, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H46 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1979);
H.R. 2762, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Rac. H1220 (daily ed. March 8, 1979); HR.
5823, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. H10925 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979); H.R. 1071,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Rlc. H188 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
363. S. 594, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. RaC. S188 (daily ed. March 8, 1979); S.
701, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. Rac. S3059 (daily ed. March 21, 1979); S. 1443, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1521, supra note 227.
364. The bills differ only in the mechanics of the proposed procedure, not in their
general concept or intent. Under S. 701, supra note 363, when the Secretary of Energy
decides to construct a wate storage facility, the state has 120 days to disapprove the
construction either by action of the state legislature or by statewide referendum. Senate
bill 594, supra note 363, requires state concurrence in any proposed federal action and
prohibits the federal government from proceeding with any project for the storage or
disposal of radioactive materials "unless the state has determined that its objections
86
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If enacted, these proposals would give the potential host
state the greatest degree of influence in decisions on siting and
developing a repository, influence which proponents consider es-
sential both to balance against the superior resources and tech-
nical capability of federal agencies and to ensure that the federal
government, in good faith, responds to the states' concerns. On
the other hand, they also take an extremely parochial view of
the radioactive waste problem as well as of the civilian and mili-
tary importance of nuclear energy. It seems axiomatic that polit-
ical reality will force a governor or state assembly to exercise its
authority to veto the disposal of high-level radioactive waste un-
less the DOE can meet an almost insurmountable burden of per-
suading citizens that disposal of the wastes will not endanger
public health and safety or the environment now or in the indef-
inite future. Carried to its logical conclusion, this assumption
raises the spectre that each of the fifty states could veto the dis-
posal of radioactive wastes within its borders, thus precluding
the use of the best site (or of any sites) for a repository.3 ' 5 In
addition, a state that knows it can exercise ultimate veto author-
ity over a decision on siting a repository within its borders may
have less incentive to negotiate in good faith over the specific
elements of the federal proposal.
have been resolved." Id. § 4. Senate Bill 1521, supra note 227, authorizes a state to
approve or disapprove, within 90 days after its issuance, a construction permit or operat-
ing license for a facility to store or dispose of high-level radioactive waste. If the state
disapproves, the permit or license becomes void. If the state fails to act within the 90-
day period, the permit or license will take effect. Id. § 4. Senate bill 1443, supra note
363, permits a state to nonconcur in any proposed action and, in the event of a state
nonconcurrence, prohibits the federal government from further "investigating the possi-
bility" of constructing, leasing, or purchasing facilities for the storage of radioactive
wastes until the state determines the objections have been resolved. Id.
365. Even without express authority to veto a proposed federal action, a state has
various ways, such as refusing to grant permits and provide necessary services, to frus-
trate federal efforts to site and construct a waste storage or disposal facility. CONSULTA-
TION AND CONCURRENCE: WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 360, at 38. These state ac-
tions virtually would constitute exercise of a veto.
Although the DOE has acknowledged that it does not have the authority to grant
affected states the power to veto absolutely federal plans for siting a repository, Hart
Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 79, at 74, it has adhered to a policy in the
past that it would not proceed with a repository over the objections of the potential host
state to the criteria for selecting a site and their application. Id. at 76. The DOE formally
made such a commitment to Michigan and Louisiana-two states in which it had ex-
plored for suitable repository sites. See generally Letter from R.F. Keller, Acting U.S.
Comptroller General, to Rep. John D. Dingell, June 19, 1978 (B-164105).
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Finally, proposals for an absolute state veto disregard the
fundamental fact that disposal of high-level radioactive waste is
a national problem that requires a national solution. Even citi-
zens in those states that do not have commercial nuclear power
plants enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy. These beneficial nu-
clear activities, all of which generate waste, fall into three cate-
gories: (1) research, industrial, and medical applications of nu-
clear materials that improve the quality of life; (2) use of nuclear
materials in the defense program to enhance national security;
(3) availability of alternative energy sources from other states
that use nuclear power to generate electricity.
Unfortunately, economies of scale and the limited number
of suitable sites will prevent each state from having a repository
in which to dispose of the radioactive waste it generates. There-
fore, a potential host state may argue that it will bear a dispro-
portionate burden of the national radioactive waste disposal pro-
gram. Federal legislation providing financial assistance to a host
state for economic impacts caused by construction of a reposi-
tory s and authorizing states to enter into regional compacts
that distribute the responsibilities for potentially hazardous ac-
tivities among states within the region could lessen any per-
ceived inequity. Congress should avoid, however, setting a prece-
dent that leads to a proliferation of state "ledger sheets"
attempting to record and balance the costs and benefits of the
366. The sudden introduction of a large federal or private developmental project
into an area often causes severe dislocations for the residents and imposes a burden upon
those local governments that must supply additional public services. In the area of en-
ergy development, for example, Congress has provided for "energy impact assistance" to
help relieve the resulting socio-economic burdens upon the region in which increased
coal or uranium development will occur. Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of
1978, § 601, P.L. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289. Although Congress has not considered such a
proposal for radioactive waste management, similar impact assistance funds might make
a state or locality more willing to accept construction of a radioactive waste facility. Im-
pact assistance provisions must be drafted carefully, however, so as not to appear as a
"bribe" to a state or region to accept a repository, but rather to compensate the affected
governments for the costs incurred as a result of the project.
H.R. 6390, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., 126 CONG. REc. H511 (1980), as reported by the
House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, H.R. REP. No. 1382, part 2, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980), directed DOE to study the desirability of impact assistance financed by
fees imposed upon users of a repository. Id. § 105(g). The study would determine (1) the
amount of the fee and the manner of assessment; (2) the process of determining eligibil-
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various undesirable activities conducted within that state to ser-
vice a national rather than a state purpose.
(b) State disapproval with a federal override.-During the
Ninety-Sixth Congress, the Senate and the House of Represent-
atives approved provisions for a state role in repository siting
and development, including mechanisms for consultation and
concurrence that fall between the two extremes of granting
states an absolute veto and of invoking federal supremacy. Each
of these provisions incorporates one of several permutations that
affords states a broad opportunity to participate in the decision-
making process, but in the event of an irreconcilable conflict be-
tween the DOE and a potential host state on an important com-
ponent of the DOE program, vests the final decision with the
federal government. The actual operation of the federal override
mechanism has engendered more debate than perhaps any other
aspect of the radioactive waste management issue.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives,3 67 requires the establishment of a review board in a
potential host state to represent it in proceedings before the
NRC on repository siting and development, to review federal
waste activities in the state, and to determine potential eco-
nomic, environmental, social, and health and safety impacts of
the proposed repository.6 8 If the President recommends to Con-
gress a site for constructing a repository, the bill gives the state
review board thirty days, by majority vote, to submit a petition
to Congress requesting that it disapprove the site designation." 9
367. H.R. 8378, supra note 10.
368. Id. § 106(a)(2).
369. Id. § 106. The version of H.R. 6390 reported by the House Interstate and For-
eign Commerce Committee, supra note 10, deferred the authority for a state review
board to petition Congress to disapprove construction of a repository until after the
NRC has authorized construction. Two reasons favor allowing the NRC to act before the
state may petition Congress. First, in addition to the judgments of the state review board
and DOE, it provides a third independent assessment of the technical suitability of a site
for construction of a repository. Congress would commit time and resources to review
only the selection of a site that the NRC already has determined meets its technical
criteria. Second, it would avoid placing the NRC in the inappropriate position of overrul-
ing a decision of Congress. For example, Congress could approve a site on technical as
well as social and economic grounds and yet the NRC subsequently could disapprove the
site perhaps on the same technical grounds. Similarly, if Congress approves a site, the
NRC may feel substantial pressure not to overrule the congressional determination, even
though its review, utilizing more extensive resources, finds the site technically inade-
quate for a repository.
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The site designation will take effect unless, within ninety days
after submittal, one house of Congress passes a resolution ap-
proving the petition of the state review board.370 The House bill
raises to the presidential level the final decision to select a site
for characterization as well as a site for construction of a reposi-
tory.37 1 Thus, it implicitly acknowledges that the sociopolitical
as well as health, safety, and environmental implications of
these activities require responsible decisionmaking at the high-
est level independent of potentially narrow departmental
interests.
372
The state participation title accepted in the Senate as an
amendment to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act3 73 is somewhat
more complicated than the House-passed provision. Under the
Senate-passed title, each potential host state must have a nu-
clear waste repository review panel, established either by state
law or by the governor. If established by state law, any govern-
mental organization, task force, council, or other body intended
to represent the state in decisions on siting, developing, and op-
It seems equally clear, however, that if the NRC must evaluate a site before the
state may petition Congress for disapproval and the NRC has approved the site, an insti-
tutional momentum will have been built that could prejudice the congressional decision
against the state petition.
370. Id. § 105(b). The one-house veto in the House-passed bill also was provided in
the bill reported by the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. The accompanying report states that the
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee adopted this approach to "equalize the positions
of densely populated and sparsely populated states." H.R. REP. No. 1382, part 2, supra
note 366, at 17.
The original version of H.R. 6390, supra note 366, as introduced by Representative
Morris Udall, required both houses of Congress, by concurrent resolution, to approve
issuance by the NRC of a permit to construct a repository before the permit could take
effect. Id. § 203(b)(2)(A). An amendment to the bill was offered on the floor during
House consideration by Representative Peter Kostmayer to reinstate the two-house over-
ride of a state's objection to construction of a repository. It failed 161 to 218, with 53 not
voting. 126 CONG. REC. H11768 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
371. H.R. 8378, supra note 10, at § 102(c). Within 60 days after the Secretary of
Energy recommends a site for characterization, the President must review the site and
either approve or disapprove it. Id. § 102(c)(1). The President, after written notice to
Congress, may delay for more than six months his decision upon determining that the
information provided him is not sufficient to make a decision within the 60-day period.
Id. § 102(c)(2). If the 60-day period expires without the President's having notified Con-
gress of the need for six additional months, or if the additional six-month period has
expired and the President has not made a decision, the site will be considered approved.
Id. § 102(c).
372. See H.R. REP. No. 1382, supra note 10, at 25.
373. S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 901-1003 (1980).
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erating the repository may serve as the review panel. If no such
law is enacted, the governor then must appoint a review panel
consisting of the governor, who shall serve as chairman, and
seven additional persons, including local government or Indian
tribe officials of the area under study by DOE as a possible site
for a proposed repository. The governor also may appoint other
state officials, including members of the state legislature, and
"interested residents of the State, except that such residents
shall be selected so as to ensure representation of a broad range
of views on nuclear waste repository siting, development and
loading issues.'' 74
The provision establishes three decision points during the
planning and operation of a repository at which a potential host
state can raise objections to the DOE's proposals. These points
correspond to the submission to Congress of reports by the Sec-
retary of Energy on characterization of the repository site, plans
for constructing the respository, and plans for emplacing wastes
in the repository. The requirements of this provision that apply
to the second decision point are the most important.
3 7 5
At the earliest feasible time before the DOE submits an ap-
plication to the NRC for a license to construct the main shaft of
374. Id. § 1002(2)(B).
375. At the first decision point-after detailed site characterization at one or more
possible repository sites-if the Secretary has selected a repository site and prepared and
submitted to Congress a "Proposed Site Report," DOE may not further develop the pro-
posed repository for 45 days. Id. § 902(b). Preparation of this report does not trigger any
explicit right for the host state to object to the DOE proposal, or require any specific
action by Congress. This section presumably was intended to create a "cooling off" pe-
riod during which Congress may review the report, hear any objections registered infor-
mally by the host state, and, if deemed appropriate, disapprove through legislation fur-
ther development of the proposed site. The third decision point occurs prior to
submission of an application to the NRC for a license to emplace significant quantities of
radioactive waste into the repository or, if a license is not required by law, prior to actual
emplacement of the wastes. At that point, the Secretary must, in close cooperation with
the review panel, prepare and submit to Congress a repository loading report that identi-
fies any differences between current plans and analyses and those contained in the repos-
itory development report, prepared at the second decision point. The analysis should
review any changes in the health, safety, and environmental impacts based upon infor-
mation collected during construction of the repository. Id. § 904. DOE may not emplace
significant quantities of radioactive waste in the repository for 45 days after submission
of the report to Congress. Id. § 904(d). Apparently similar in purpose to the period after
submission of the proposed siting report to Congress, this period provides Congress with
a chance to review carefully the report, hear a state's objections to the proposed plans for
waste emplacement, and disapprove or amend through legislation those plans.
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a repository, the Secretary must prepare, with the close coopera-
tion of the appropriate review panel, a "Repository Development
Report" that contains any license application submitted to the
NRC, together with the relevant environmental impact state-
ments, a plan for transporting high-level, transuranic contami-
nated waste or spent fuel to the repository, and any plan to com-
pensate states, local governments, or Indian tribes for the
adverse impacts arising from the proposed repository.37 The re-
pository review panel may file formal objections, which the Sec-
retary must include in his transmittal of the report to Congress.
If the review panel does file formal objections, the Secretary may
not apply for a construction license or, if a license is not re-
quired by law, may not begin preparations for construction of a
main shaft, if either house of Congress passes a resolution stat-
ing that the report does not sufficiently address state and local
concerns.5 " This configuration gives the same leverage to the
potential host state as the House-passed version of the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, but gives the state less leverage than the two-
house override required in the original Percy-Glenn bill.378
A different mechanism applies to repositories in which the
DOE plans to dispose of primarily defense high-level or transu-
ranic contaminated waste. In that case, the President notifies
Congress that development of the repository is "essential to pro-
mote the national security of the United States." To disallow
the Secretary from either applying for a construction permit or,
if a license is not required by law, to begin construction of the
proposed repository, both houses of Congress must pass a reso-
lution stating that the report does not sufficiently address state
and local concerns3 9 For either type of repository, if Congress
disapproves the repository report, the prohibition against apply-
ing for a construction license or proceeding with construction
will remain in effect until either the review panel does not object
to a revised report, or Congress, under the statutory override
mechanism, finds that the reviewed report sufficiently addresses
376. Id. § 903(b).
377. Id. § 903(f).
378. See S. 742, supra note 193.
379. Id. § 903(f)(2). This separate mechanism for defense waste repositories formed
the basis of a compromise essential to passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act by the
Senate. The compromise later fell apart during negotiations with the House. See notes
183-86 and accompanying text supra.
730'* [Vol. 32
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state and local concerns.38 0
The amendment seeks to bring Congress into the decision-
making process at the three most crucial decision points and to
give a state more than one opportunity to object to the current
course of repository development. It seems clear, however, that
the only truly effective chance a state has to alter or reject the
DOE's plans by appealing to Congress occurs when the DOE has
applied for a construction permit.
-This mechanism for ensuring effective state and Indian par-
ticipation represents a composite of other legislative proposals
introduced in the Senate during the preceding two years. The
proposed National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control Act of
1979381 provided a two-step federal override mechanism that
permits a state to disapprove a license issued by the NRC to
construct or operate a repository for either defense or civilian
wastes. Within sixty days after the state has filed its disapproval
with the NRC, the President may reject the disapproval and re-
instate the construction permit upon finding that the proposed
repository presents no significant hazard to health, safety, or the
environment, 82 and that failure to build the proposed repository
would significantly impair the nation's energy interest.383 The
President's determination will stand, and the construction or op-
erating license will take effect unless, within ninety days, Con-
gress, by concurrent resolution, disapproves or amends the
determination.38
This provision differs in several important respects from the
state participation mechanism in the Senate-passed bill applica-
ble to nondefense waste repositories. First, it defers the state's
right to disapprove construction of a specific repository until af-
ter the NRC has reviewed the DOE proposal and acted upon the
construction permit application so that the results of the NRC's
extensive and independent technical review may enter into the
final decision on whether the project should proceed. 85 Second,
it places the decision squarely before the President who, al-
380. Id. § 903(g).
381. Amend. 646 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979) (amending S. 1521).
382. Id. § 7(c)(1).
383. Id. § 7(c)(2).
384. Id. § 7(c).
385. See note 369 supra.
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though he will likely support the recommendations of his Secre-
tary of Energy, can consider a broader range of often disparate
interests that would not have figured into the DOE's proposal. A
Presidential determination to continue the project, however,
must rest on two narrow grounds. Presumably the President
would accept the NRC's health and safety conclusions in making
the first of the two findings, unless compelling new and indepen-
dent information revealed a potential significant hazard to pub-
lic health and safety or the environment. The second required
finding is comparatively more important because even if he finds
that the proposed facility meets statutory health and safety
standards, the President still may not override the state's disap-
proval unless abandonment of the specific proposal "would sig-
nificantly impair the Nation's energy interest." Accordingly, the
President must consider the near-term availability of other re-
pository sites in this or other states and the extent to which the
national interest requires the expansion or continuation of ex-
isting waste-producing activities, such as the generation of elec-
tricity. In effect, the two findings together would constrain the
President to reject a host state disapproval only when it would
foreclose use of the last available repository site that meets stat-
utory health and safety standards. Moreover, requiring the Pres-
ident to make this preliminary determination would avoid bring-
ing Congress into every decision on where to site a specific
repository. Because a Presidential rejection of the state's disap-
proval elevates the issue from one of merely choosing a reposi-
tory site to one of charting the nation's energy future and the
role of nuclear power, the provision requires a resolution by both
houses of Congress to override the President's determination.
(c) Negotiated arrangements between a potential host
state and the federal government.-Senator Peter V. Domenici,
drawing upon his state's experience with the WIPP 88 intro-
duced novel legislations87 that would leave it to the potential
host state and the DOE to define consultation and concurrence
by negotiating the contours of their relationship. This provision,
included by the Senate Environment and Public Works Com-
mittee in the National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control
386. See notes 122-30 and accompanying text supra.
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Act of 1980,3ss granted a potential host state and affected Indian
tribes a general right "to concur or nonconcur based on legiti-
mate public health and safety or environmental concerns, in all
stages of the planning, siting, developing, construction and oper-
ation" of a repository.889 The Secretary must negotiate with the
host state and affected Indian tribes to establish "formal ar-
rangements" for the exercise of the right. 90 The provision speci-
fies as minimum requirements that the negotiated arrangements:
(1) identify specific points in the development of a repository at
which the state or affected Indian tribe may formally concur or
nonconcur; (2) provide procedures for negotiating and resolving
a nonconcurrence; and (3) establish binding arbitration mecha-
nisms for determining the legitimacy of the health, safety, or en-
vironmental concerns that led to the nonconcurrence.3 9 1
The provision gives the parties one year to conclude negoti-
ations over the formal arrangements. Once agreement has been
reached, the arrangements go to the President for review and, if
he approves them, to Congress. The arrangements will become
effective if, within sixty days, Congress fails to adopt a concur-
rent resolution of disapproval.39 '
Although the Domenici proposal explicitly prohibited any
aspect of development to proceed in which the state or affected
Indian tribe has not concurred, it intentionally left unspecified
the consequences that would flow from continued failure to re-
solve the nonconcurrence. The proposal reflected the theory that
an explicit federal override of a nonconcurrence would give the
DOE too much power in negotiations with the state and affected
Indian tribes and cause it not to negotiate in good faith.3 9 3 This
388. See note 10 supra.




392. Id. § 9(c).
393. The accompanying report states that
Although the committee believes that disposal of nuclear waste is a national
problem that requires a national solution, it elected not to include in the provi-
sion an explicit mechanism for the President or Congress to override a State's
or Indian tribe's unresolvable nonconcurrence. By remaining silent on this
question, the committee attempted to avoid prejudicing the negotiations in
favor of the federal government. At the same time, however, the committee
recognizes that Congress could at any time pass additional legislation to assert
its constitutional authority to override an unresolvable nonconcurrence of a
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proposal was appealing because it permitted the potential host
state, through negotiations, to tailor a relationship with the fed-
eral government that would best protect its interests and to en-
hance general public confidence in the DOE's waste disposal
plans. A state would not have to fit within a rigid, statutorily
prescribed mechanism for consultation and concurrence that
might not accomodate its peculiar characteristics. In addition,
by not specifying particular decision points, the provision main-
tained a fluidity that permitted a state a continuing role in de-
velopment of a repository with varying degrees of power to reject
a DOE proposal at various stages of development.
The same lack of specificity that provided a certain flex-
ibility in the state participation mechanism also raised certain
concerns, however. It is conceivable that, particularly with a
one-year limitation on the negotiations, the DOE would stall the
negotiations to avoid agreeing upon any formal arrangements,
thus throwing the entire issue back to Congress for final resolu-
tion. In addition, even if a state and the DOE could agree upon
the formal arrangements, the lack of a procedure for congres-
sional review and override of an unresolvable state objection
would mean that, in order to insist upon further development of
a repository, the Congress would have to go through the time-
consuming process of enacting legislation directing DOE to pro-
ceed with the project. In this instance, the state would have the
burden of persuading a majority in both houses of the merits of
their objections. Thus, regardless of whether the state or the
DOE ultimately had the burden of persuasion, it seems appro-
priate to have an explicit override mechanism requiring Con-
gress to respond to the state's objection by either a one-house or
concurrent resolution under an expedited procedure that would
disallow extraneous amendments. Finally, the vagueness of the
arbitration mechanism for determining the legitimacy of the
state's health, safety, or environmental objections usurps a deci-
sion that rests properly and exclusively with the NRC, the Presi-
dent, or Congress, rather than with an independent third entity
composed of yet unknown persons in a surrogate role. Moreover,
if the DOE disagrees with the decision of the arbiter, it could
readily appeal to Congress through the authorization process. A
State or affected Indian tribe.
S. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., at 9 (July 25, 1980).
[Vol. 32
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state that rejected the arbiter's decision would have less oppor-
tunity for similar recourse to Congress.
(d) Exercise of federal supremacy authority.-To date, no
legislation has been introduced that expressly denies an affected
state or Indian tribe the right to object to and temporarily sus-
pend activities on specific aspects of repository planning and de-
velopment. A bill offered by Senator Henry M. Jackson as an
amendment to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, but not taken up
by the Senate, would have required the Secretary of Energy,
ninety days prior to submitting an application for a permit to
construct a repository, to notify the governor of the potential
host state of his intent to file the application. 3 Within ninety
days of notification, the governor may submit formal objections
to the Secretary, who must transmit these objections to the
President and suspend further site-specific activities. If within
ninety days the President does not determine that the proposed
facility "is essential to the national interest," the Secretary must
terminate work at the site. By requiring the President to make a
specific national interest determination as a prerequisite for au-
thorizing the project to proceed, the Jackson amendment stops
just short of simply invoking the presumed federal supremacy
authority to override a state's objections.
(e) Consultation between the federal government and other
governmental jurisdictions.-As important as the need to estab-
lish clear points for responding to federal radioactive waste pro-
posals is the need to assure continuous consultation between the
DOE and a potential host state or other affected jurisdictions on
waste management plans. Indeed, the very theory of consulta-
tion and concurrence implies that if a state has before it all the
facts upon which the DOE intends to ground its decision and, if
the DOE considers the state's analysis of the facts in reaching
that decision, then the state very likely will concur. Thus, a
mechanism for effective consultation with states or affected In-
dian tribes should have three components: (1) a continuous flow
of information and data from the federal government to the ap-
propriate state or Indian officials; (2) a technical capability on
the part of the state or affected Indian tribe to assimilate and
analyze the information and data it receives; and (3) a guaran-
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teed opportunity for the state or affected Indian tribe formally
to respond to the federal government's specific proposals for de-
veloping a repository.
Virtually every piece of legislation addressing the state par-
ticipation issue requires some degree of consultation between
the federal government and a state or affected Indian tribe. 95
Most of the bills at a minimum require the Secretary of Energy
to notify a potential host state of the DOE's intent to character-
ize or investigate a particular site and to assess its suitability for
a repository. A few bills incorporate more fully the spirit of con-
sultation and concurrence by guaranteeing a potential host state
the right to obtain from the federal government, in a timely
manner, complete information and data relevant to siting, devel-
opment, design, construction, or operation of a repository. The
Percy-Glenn amendment to the Senate-passed Nuclear Waste
Policy Act 398 provides perhaps the most effective guarantee of
consultation among the federal government, potential host
states, and affected Indian tribes by explicitly weaving that
guarantee into its detailed concurrence mechanism. It directs
the Secretary to keep the state repository review panels "fully
and currently informed" about the potential effects of a project
upon the public health and safety, and to solicit and evaluate
the concerns and objections of the review panel "on an ongoing
basis. 3 97 Moreover, it requires the Secretary, in preparing each
of the three prescribed reports-the proposed site report, the re-
pository development report, and the repository loading re-
port-to solicit, consider, and include comments from the review
panel, the State Planning Council, other interested states, and
the public.398 This approach comes close to complying with the
recommendation of IRG that DOE involve the states and af-
fected Indian tribes early in the process of planning research
and development activities and continue that involvement
through the identification, characterization, and selection of the
site.39
9
395. See notes 12, 227, 362, 363, 387 & 394 supra.
396. S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
397. Id. § 901(d).
398. Id. §§ 902(c), 903(d), 904(c).
399. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 95. The state planning council passed a resolu-
tion recommending that "the Secretary of Energy begin consultation with all states and
tribal governments immediately by providing all states and tribes information on the
[Vol. 32
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A state or affected Indian tribe may find it difficult to take
full advantage of its opportunity to consult with the federal gov-
ernment if it cannot develop the technical capability to evaluate
thoroughly the data and information provided it and to prepare
informed responses. Thus, at least one bill would have author-
ized an unconditional transfer of federal funding to an affected
state or Indian tribe so that it can obtain an independent tech-
nical capability to review federal waste management plans.400 It
is not clear how much such a program would cost, although the
NRC estimated in 1980 that it could cost $500,000 per year for
each state to undertake a review of federal plans for a reposi-
tory.40 1 It has even been suggested that because of a general lack
of available technical experts the federal government may have
to take more fundamental steps to help increase the pool of ex-
perts from which states can draw.
40 2
Notwithstanding whether efforts to mandate legislatively a
specific mechanism for consultation among the federal govern-
ment and affected states and Indian tribes prove successful,
these entities will retain their right under existing legislation to
participate in decision-making on radioactive waste manage-
ment. For instance, they can comment generically on the EPA's
proposed standards for radiation releases from high-level waste
disposal activities, the NRC's regulations for licensing the con-
struction and operation of a high-level waste repository, DOE's
generic and other environmental impact statements on the man-
agement of radioactive waste, and DOT's regulations of inter-
state transportation of radioactive materials. In addition, they
can participate directly in hearings before the NRC on DOE's
application for a license to construct or emplace radioactive
waste into a repository. Nevertheless, without an explicit mecha-
nism for consultation and concurrence, the existing legislative
guarantees for state and Indian participation seem inadequate to
the task of structuring and inspiring confidence in a waste dispo-
national screening process for the selection of sites for high level waste repositories."
Res. No. 306. Arguably, the involvement of states, affected Indian tribes, and the public
should continue through the operation and decommissioning phases of the repository.
400. H.R. 6390, supra note 366, § 203(d).
401. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 106.
402. See generally T. Lash, Relationship of Technology Development and Technol-
ogy Review to the Process of Consultation and Concurrence, reprinted in CONSULTATION
AND CONCURRENCE: WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 344 at 68-72.
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sal program that will minimize risks to the health, safety, and
environment of this or future generations.
(f) Participation rights for affected Indian tribes.-Many
bills addressing radioactive waste issues concentrated primarily
upon appropriate mechanisms for ensuring effective state partic-
ipation in radioactive waste management, and only casually re-
ferred, if at all, to the participatory role of affected Indian tribes
as additional participants.0 3 Thus, they implicitly, although im-
properly, assumed that the interests of affected Indian tribes co-
incide with those of states. Close examination of the relation-
ships among the federal government, a potential host state, and
the affected Indian tribe, however, suggests that the interests of
an affected Indian tribe may conflict as much with the potential
host state in which its reservation is located as with the federal
government.
By law and treaties, Indian tribes are quasi-sovereign na-
tions in a trust relationship with the federal government.
4
" In-
dian representatives, however, prefer not to rely exclusively
upon the fiduciary responsibility of the federal government to
protect their interests, but rather to seek a clearly defined role
for participating in decisions on siting, construction, and opera-
403, See notes 227, 362, 363, 387 & 394 supra.
404. Drawing from article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution
granting to Congress the power to regulate commerce with Indians, the Supreme Court
has held that the reservation of land to a particular Indian tribe by the federal govern-
ment gives the tribe and its members a possessory interest in the land, which cannot be
alienated absent the consent of the federal government Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823). For an analysis of the principle of tribal sovereignty, see McClan-
nahan v. State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 171, 173 (1973).
The federal government acts as a trustee of the land, in which the Indian or tribe
owns a beneficial interest. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 463f (1976). In
addition, the federal government has full fiduciary responsibility to secure, protect, and
enhance Indian rights, especially property rights. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Con-
servation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 812 (1976); Seminole Nation v. United
States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942). The courts have advised the trustee to act with utmost
good faith and not as a "mere contracting party" or "a better business bureau." Seneca
Nation of Indians v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 917, 925 (1965). See also Lane v. Pueblo
of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919).
A corollary to the trust relationship is the denial to the states of the power to regu-
late Indian activities. The Supreme Court has stated: "The treaties and laws of the
United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the
States; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the
government of the Union." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832). See United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
425 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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tion of a repository.40 5 Similarly, Indian officials legitimately fear
that potential host states also will not represent Indian interests,
but instead will exercise any concurrence power granted to them
to "encourage" the federal government to site a repository on or
near Indian lands. It seems possible, for example, that a poten-
tial host state granted absolute veto power, in negotiations with
DOE, could threaten to veto any repository within its borders
unless it is sited on an Indian reservation.0 8 Consequently, Indi-
ans request that any mechanism developed for state consulta-
tion and concurrence apply equally but independently to af-
fected Indian tribes. Such an approach would transform the
consultation and concurrence mechanism from a bilateral nego-
tiation, with state and affected Indian tribes aligned against the
federal government, into a trilateral negotiation with Indian,
state, and federal representatives bargaining as equal partners.
Indian interests in radioactive waste disposal differ from, as
well as potentially conflict with, the interest of the potential
host state. Just like officials of potential host states, Indian rep-
resentatives are concerned that the siting or development of a
particular radioactive waste repository could endanger the
health and safety of their constituents. In addition, however, In-
dian heritage and lifestyle make the possibility of improper dis-
posal of radioactive wastes even more loathesome. First, many
Indians rely upon wild and natural foods for sustenance. They
are directly susceptible to contamination through the food chain
caused by accidental releases of radiation from a nearby reposi-
tory. Second, Indians consider much of their land sacred, so that
attempts to site a repository on that land, even if it would not
endanger public health and safety or the environment, would
trench upon the Indian's religious rights. Finally, because of
their cultural attachment and religious devotion to their lands,
Indians cannot readily evacuate their homes to avoid the ad-
verse consequences of radioactive contamination of their reser-
vation or nearby lands.'
Because of the growing awareness that Indian tribes have
405. Resolution No. 80-4, Council of Energy Resource Tribes (March 18, 1980); Hart
Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 427 (statement of Russell Jim, tribal
councilman, Yakima Indian Nation).
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interests distinct from those of affected states, recent legislative
proposals have sought to grant tribes an independent right to
participate in decisions leading to the siting, construction, and
operation of a radioactive waste repository. The Glenn-Percy
state participation amendment to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
was further amended on the Senate floor to provide that, in the
event DOE seeks to locate a repository on Indian lands, the tri-
bal organization shall have the same participatory rights as the
repository review panel.40 8 Accordingly, an Indian tribe would
have the right to consult fully with DOE, to receive financial as-
sistance for developing a technical capability to analyze relevant
information and data, to negotiate with DOE a separate agree-
ment for consultation and concurrence, and to object to the re-
pository development report that precedes application for a con-
struction permit, thus triggering a one-house or two-house
override, depending on whether the repository is primarily for
the disposal of defense-related wastes. 409 Unfortunately, ex-
pected floor opposition prevented an extension of the rights
under the amendment to all affected Indian tribes and, instead,
dictated the granting of these rights only to Indian tribes whose
lands may host a repository.410
The House-passed version of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
similarly granted an Indian tribe on whose reservation is located
a potential repository site authority coextensive with that of the
state to petition the Congress to disapprove construction of a
repository.411 In addition, the bill provided the tribe funds to ob-
tain technical assistance to review the planning for the facility
and to evaluate its potential economic, environmental, social,
health, and safety effects. 41
2
B. Technological Strategies for High-Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal
Two philosophically different approaches toward managing
408. S. 2189, supra note 10, at § 915. See generally 126 CONG. REC. S10004-05,
S10007 (daily ed. July 28, 1980)(floor debate on S. 2189).
409. For an explanation of the two types of override mechanisms, see text accompa-
nying notes 377-380 supra.
410. S. 2189, supra note 10, at § 915.
411. Id. § 107(a).
412. Id. § 107(b).
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the back end of the fuel cycle distinguished the various pieces of
radioactive waste legislation before the Ninety-Sixth Congress.
One approach would require the federal government to concen-
trate on research and development efforts leading to permanent
disposal of high-level waste, spent reactor fuel, and transuranic
waste in a mined geologic repository.413 The alternative ap-
proach would relegate the mined geologic repository to one of
several options for study and instead require the federal govern-
ment to develop a facility for long-term, retrievable, monitored
waste storage.414 This difference in technological strategies
eclipsed the more traditional debate over whether reprocessing
of spent fuel is essential for the safe disposal of high-level
waste. 1
5
The IRG report stated a primary objective for waste man-
agement planning as follows: "Existing and future nuclear waste
from military and civilian activities (including discarded spent
fuel from the one-through nuclear fuel cycle) should be isolated
from the biosphere and pose no significant threat to public
health and safety. 41 6 Although it acknowledged some uncer-
tainty over the ultimate feasibility of geologic waste disposal, 17
IRG recommended that the federal program use mined reposito-
ries for the first waste disposal facilities. 418 At the same time,
however, it proposed that the federal program consider other
413. S. 2980, supra note 10; H.R. 8378, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H11749
(daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
414. S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. Rxc. S10266 (daily ed. July 30, 1980).
415. See note 36 supra.
416. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 17.
417. The IRG concluded that
[p]resent scientific and technological knowledge is adequate to identify poten-
tial repository sites for further investigation. The feasibility of safely disposing
of high-level waste in mined repositories can only be assessed on the basis of
specific investigations at and determinations of suitability of particular sites.
... However, even at the time of decommissioning some uncertainty about
repository performance will still exist. Thus, in addition to technical evalua-
tion, a societal judgment that considers the level of risk and the associated
uncertainty will be necessary.
Id. at 42.
Disposing of nuclear wastes in mined repositories is a highly promising approach to
long-term isolation. While there is a possibility that such a technique could not be suc-
cessfully employed, there is a high degree of confidence that a repository can be sited,
designed, and operated so as to provide reasonable assurance of long-term isolation of
radionuclides. Id. at 66.
418. Id. at 61.
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technological options for disposal as soon as they prove techno-
logically sound and economically feasible.419
IRG further recommended that the federal government pur-
sue the geologic disposal option in a technically conservative,
step-by-step manner.420 This strategy has four elements: (1)
identifying and characterizing in detail several sites in different
geologic media; (2) viewing the disposal of radioactive waste as
an integrated system that relies upon multiple, and to some ex-
tent independent, barriers-the waste form, engineered barriers
such as the waste canister, and the repository host rock-to pre-
vent the release of radionuclides from the wastes into the bio-
sphere; (3) providing, at least in the first repository, for retrieva-
bility of the wastes during an initial period of operation; and (4)
adopting conservative engineering practices that provide a mar-
gin of safety, thus reducing residual risks and uncertainties.421
Characterizing it as "safe, technically sound and conserva-
tive," President Carter's radioactive waste policy statement en-
dorsed the IRG planning strategy for developing a disposal tech-
nology.4 22 In particular, the policy statement called for the
detailed evaluation of a "number of repository sites in a variety
of different geologic environments with diverse rock types. 428
The policy statement contemplated that after four to five sites
have been evaluated and found potentially suitable for a reposi-
tory, one or more will be selected for further development of a
licensed, full-scale repository.424 This requirement presupposes
that DOE may have to characterize an even greater number of
sites to find four or five that prove potentially suitable after
characterization. The policy statement predicted that this strat-
egy would lead to the choice of a site for a full-scale repository
by 1985 with operation to begin in the mid-1990s.
425
419. Id.
420, Id. at 62.
421. Id. at 42, 48.
422. President's Message to Congress on Establishing a Radioactive Waste Manage-
ment Program, 16 WEEKLY COMP. oF PRES. Doc. (Feb. 12, 1980).
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. The Carter policy sought to balance the conflicting objectives of developing and
opening a repository for high-level wastes in a timely manner while ensuring that devel-
opment of the repository does not proceed so quickly as to prove inadequate to protect
public health and safety or the environment. "What To Do About Nuclear Garbage?",
Wash. Post, at A-20 July 24, 1980.
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Both the Senate Environment and Public Works bill, the
National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control Act of 1980 (S.
2980), and the House-passed bill, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(H.R. 8378), adopted President Carter's general strategy for geo-
logic waste disposal and many of the specific elements in his pol-
icy statement. The House-passed bill directed the DOE, not
later than June 30, 1981, to issue guidelines for site recommen-
dations specifying factors that would disqualify a site from de-
velopment as a repository.4" The guidelines would require DOE
to consider and recommend to the President potential repository
sites in various geologic media for characterization.4 7 In addi-
tion, the bill required DOE to recommend to the President at
least two of these sites by January 1, 1982, and at least two addi-
tional sites by February 1, 1985.28 The bill, however, did not
specify the number of potential sites that DOE must find suita-
ble after characterization before it may choose a site for con-
structing a repository.
The House bill added an additional measure of conserva-
tism by requiring DOE, before it sinks a shaft at any site, to
submit to the NRC, the state review panel, and if appropriate,
the Indian tribe on whose reservation a site is located, a general
plan for the site characterization activities it intends to conduct
at the site, and an environmental assessment of their nonradio-
logical impacts, including a discussion of alternative activities
that could avoid such impacts.4 2 9 The House bill did not explic-
itly require NRC approval of an on-site characterization plan
before activities proposed in the plan may go forward. Its silence
on that issue, however, did not preclude the NRC from promul-
gating regulations requiring prior NRC approval of the plan.3 0
The National Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control Act of
1980 (S. 2980) adopted a similar technically conservative ap-
proach to developing geologic repositories. It required the NRC
to approve a plan for characterizing an individual site before the
proposed activities could proceed. The plans would have to in-
clude a description of the site, a description of the characteriza-
426. H.R. 8378, supra note 10, at § 102(a).
427. Id.
428. Id. § 102(b).
429. Id. § 103(b). For a description of site characterization, see note 223 supra.
430. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 70,411 (1979)(to be codified at 10 C.F.R. part 60).
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tion program, and an identification of alternative media and
sites intended for characterization.3 1 In addition, the provision
required the plan to state both the criteria and the procedure
used to select the sites, requirements that the House bill pro-
vided for independent of its requirement of a site characteriza-
tion plan.432 DOE was required to submit to the NRC at least
four of these plans not later than January 1, 1985.
431
The Act also defined the NRC's responsibilities under the
alternatives analysis provision of NEPA as requiring DOE to
submit a report on its characterization of at least four sites in at
least three different geologic media before the NRC may con-
sider an application for authorization to construct a reposi-
tory.434 The NRC's regulations on high-level waste disposal an-
ticipated the site characterization provisions in the House bill
and S. 2980 by suggesting the detailed characterization of at
least three sites in at least two geologic media as a condition of
the NRC's review of an application to authorize construction.
435
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as passed by the Senate,
took a radically different approach by requiring DOE, within
one year after enactment, to submit a project proposal to Con-
gress for a facility designed to "accommodate" civilian but not
defense-related, high-level waste.436 The facility would permit
"continuous monitoring, management, and maintenance" of the
waste, provide for its ready retrieval for further processing or
disposal, and safely contain the waste "for so long as may be
necessary" through constant maintenance and, if necessary, re-
placement of the facility.
437
The provision "fast-tracked" the development of a long-
term retrievable storage facility by requiring this proposal to in-
431. S. 2980, supra note 10, at § 6(a).
432. See note 426 and accompanying text supra.
433. Id. § 7(c). Unlike H.R. 8378, which required DOE to complete the site charac-
terization process by 1985, S. 2980 deferred until 1985 the date for submitting the plans
required to precede site characterization, in order to give DOE additional time to ex-
amine sites other than the sites it has already begun to characterize. For a discussion of
DOE's current site characterization activities, see note 165 and accompanying text supra.
434. Id. § 7(b). For a summary of the general NEPA requirements, see notes 167-
170 and accompanying text supra.
435. 10 C.F.R. part 60 (1981). The rule phrases this requirement as what the NRC
"anticipates" to satisfy NEPA requirements.
436. S. 2189, supra note 10, at § 402(a).
437. Id. § 402(b).
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clude site-specific designs, specifications, and cost estimates ade-
quate to solicit bids. 4 8 It thus presupposes that within a year
the DOE will have selected a site for which it can design a facil-
ity, notwithstanding the elaborate mechanism for state partici-
pation in site selection apparently applicable to the facility.439
Although this project proposal likely would influence a decision
by Congress to authorize the project and thus arguably should
include a full environmental impact statement under NEPA, the
Act required only that an environmental assessment accompany
the proposal.440 Only after Congress authorized the project
would the provision permit the preparation of a full environ-
mental impact statement (EIS), provided it does not consider
any alternatives to the design criteria in the bill.44 1 Finally, the
Act precluded the NRC, in licensing such a facility, from consid-
ering any alternative design criteria.44"
The restrictions upon both the timing and the scope of the
EIS, intended to "fast-track" the development of a long-term re-
trievable storage facility, severely undermined the broad policy
underlying NEPA. That policy sought to ensure that "presently
unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with eco-
nomic and technical considerations" through a detailed analysis
of environmental impacts of and alternatives to a proposed ac-
tion.4 3 Moreover, the constraints upon the scope of the NRC's
licensing review would hamper its ability to carry out fully its
438. Id. § 403.
439. Title IX of S. 2189 sets out procedures for consultation and concurrence be-
tween DOE and state or Indian tribe officials in decisions on selecting a site for a reposi-
tory, a process that conceivably could take more than a year. See notes 373-80, 396-99 &
408-410 and accompanying text supra. The Act defined a repository as a "facility for the
disposal of high-level waste, transuranic contaminated waste or spent nuclear fuel." S.
2189, supra note 10, at § 201(16). It also incongruously defined "disposal" as "long-term
isolation of material, including long-term monitored storage which permits retrieval of
the material stored." Id. § 201(3). By these two definitions, the disposal facility described
in § 402 would qualify as a repository, which comes within the provisions of Title IX.
440. Id. § 405(a). An environmental assessment provides the evidence and analysis
for determining whether a federal agency must prepare an environmental impact state-
ment, but does not include the exhaustive analysis of alternative proposals and potential
environmental impacts required in an environmental impact statement. 40 C.F.R. §§
1508, 1509 (1980).
441. S. 2189, supra note 10, at § 405(b).
442. Id. § 406(c).
443. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(a)(B) (1976).
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mandate under the Atomic Energy Act to protect public health
and safety from the hazards of radioactive waste disposal.4" Fi-
nally, although the language of the bill was less than clear, the
accompanying report suggested that it contemplated an engi-
neered facility built on the surface or just below the surface of
the earth with a finite design life for storing wastes.4 5 When the
facility wears out or becomes obsolete, a new facility would be
constructed adjacent to it to store the wastes for an additional
period of time.
Theoretically, the process of constructing new facilities
when the old ones have become obsolete could continue indefi-
nitely. The series of facilities either could provide interim stor-
age before permanent disposal of the wastes or become a substi-
tute for permanent disposal. In either case, the storage of wastes
in such a facility poses health, safety, and environmental conse-
quences at least as grave as disposal of wastes in a geologic re-
pository. Arguably, therefore, the same requirements for licens-
ing by the NRC and participation by potential host states,
affected Indian tribes, localities, and the public should apply to
decisions on siting and developing such a facility as apply to
similar decisions on geologic disposal. Indeed, failure to secure
public confidence in the proposal through broadbased participa-
tion could lead to the same kind of institutional and public op-
position that previous DOE proposals have encountered.
If developed under an adequate participatory and regula-
tory scheme, a long-term retrievable storage facility, as contem-
plated in the Senate-passed version of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act, merits consideration. It would either avoid an irreversible
commitment to a disposal technology that, once implemented,
proves ill-conceived and hazardous to public health and safety,
or provide additional time for scientific and technological pro-
gress in alternative waste disposal methods. Retrievability not-
withstanding, the facility should for several reasons serve only as
a temporary waste management option for use after attempts to
develop and implement in a timely manner other permanent dis-
posal technologies have failed. First, because it would require
continous monitoring and periodic replacement, the establish-
ment of a long-term retrievable storage facility assumes the sta-
444. See notes 208-11 and accompanying text supra.
445. S. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980).
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bility or even the existence of social or governmental institutions
to ensure the security of waste isolation for the period of stor-
age. Over an extended period of time, however, the assumption
loses validity as the institutional memory fades of not only the
characteristics of the wastes in storage but also the very location
of the facility. Second, by permitting ready retrieval of the
stored spent fuel, the Act preserves the reprocessing option and
thus might undermine the Carter Administration policy of in-
definitely deferring commercial reprocessing to further non-
proliferation objectives. 4 Third, given the current stage of de-
velopment of geologic disposal and other technologies, a decision
now to develop a long-term retrievable storage facility would be
premature. The availability of such a facility for accepting
wastes could likely remove the bureaucratic incentive to further
develop and implement other options for more permanent dispo-
sal.447 Thus, the long-term retrievable storage of wastes could
become an alternative to ultimate disposal, a result against
which both the IRG and President Carter cautioned.4 8 More-
over, there is no indication that current methods for storing
spent reactor fuel in pools, either at the reactor site or away
from the reactor, or for storing federal high-level and transura-
nic contaminated wastes, will not suffice until a permanent dis-
posal technology becomes available. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, to the extent that the nuclear waste management
program permits long-term retrievable storage to substitute for
permanent disposal of radioactive wastes, it has breached a
moral obligation not to defer the responsibility for radioactive
waste disposal to future generations. It seems self-evident that
the generation that enjoys the benefits of nuclear power also
should bear the responsibility for disposing of the resulting
wastes. 449 There is little reason to assume that future genera-
446. See notes 134 & 135 and accompanying text supra. But see S. REP. No. 548,
supra note 445, at 14: "The sponsors of the bill believe that this approach. . . is neutral
with respect to the option for further processing of the spent fuel or the high-level
waste."
447. This is the same concern raised by the EPA in its analysis of the AEC's pro-
posed Retrievable Surface Storage Facility (RSSF), a progenitor of the instant proposal.
See notes 105-09 and accompanying text supra.
448. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 37.
449. For a discussion of the obligation of present generations to future generations,
see Golding, Obligations to Future Generations, 56 THE MONIST 85 (1972); Gardner, Dis-
crimination Against Future Generations: The Possibility of Constitutional Limitation,
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tions will have either the resources or the ability to retrieve the
wastes and dispose of them permanently.
For these reasons, Congress should take a prudent approach
and defer any commitment of resources to planning such a facil-
ity until it has determined that efforts to develop technologies
for permanent waste disposal will not prove successful. For ex-
ample, it could require DOE to conduct a feasibility study of
long-term retrievable storage that would include a specific justi-
fication of the need for such a facility in light of current progress
toward geologic disposal. Alternatively, it could simply condition
authorization of such a facility upon failure of DOE to open a
geologic repository within a reasonable period of time. In any
event, the waste disposal program set forth in the House-passed
Nuclear Waste Policy Act and in the National Nuclear Waste
Regulation and Control Act of 1980 and currently pursued by
DOE offers a reasonable compromise by emphasizing the devel-
opment of geologic repositories for permanent disposal yet main-
taining retrievability for a limited period of time.
The waste disposal strategy recommended by IRG, adopted
in the Carter Administration's radioactive waste policy, and set
forth in S. 2980 and the House-passed Nuclear Waste Policy Act
emphasizes development of the first full-scale repository as a
primary objective. Most attempts to develop a new and poten-
tially hazardous technology, however, normally would proceed in
a series of steps from research and development activities,
through operation at a pilot scale to demonstrate the technology,
to full-scale implementation. In contrast, although it noted that
a pilot-scale facility "can play a distinct and desirable role in the
transition from [research and development] to full-scale opera-
tional disposal facilities," IRG did not consider such a facility
"an essential component" of the waste disposal program.450 It
concluded that if the waste remains retrievable for a period of
time, a full-scale repository could provide the necessary techni-
cal engineering and operational data to inform a subsequent de-
cision on whether to commit irreversibly the wastes to the dispo-
sal technology as applied to that particular site.451
9 ENV'L LAW 29 (1978).
450. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 54, 57.
451. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 57. At the same time, however, the IRG did not
recommend against construction of a pilot-scale facility "if an appropriate opportunity,
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By eliminating the intermediate step of a pilot-scale facility
to demonstrate the feasibility of geologic disposal, the Carter
Administration's nuclear waste policy deferred such a demon-
stration until completion of the lengthy process of characterizing
alternative sites and constructing a full-scale repository. Never-
theless, partly in response to laws passed by several states that
condition the construction of new nuclear power plants upon the
satisfactory demonstration of a technology to dispose of the re-
sulting wastes,452 legislation was introduced in Congress to re-
quire an earlier demonstration. The Nuclear Waste Research,
Development and Demonstration Act of 1980, introduced by
Representative Mike McCormack and reported by the House
Science and Technology Committee,45 3 directed DOE to select
four regionally distributed sites-two by the end of the first
quarter of fiscal year 1981 and two more by the end of fiscal year
1983-for construction of four demonstration repositories.4'5 Al-
though it required that the sites "be suitable for future full-scale
repositories," it prohibited their use for commercial disposal ac-
tivities without further legislative action. 45 The bill required the
first repository to begin operation by the end of fiscal year 1986,
the second by the end of fiscal year 1987, and the third and
fourth by the end of fiscal year 1990.456 Apparently assuming
that postreprocessing high-level waste rather than unreprocessed
spent fuel would be the commercial waste form requiring dispo-
sal, the bill required the facilities to demonstrate disposal only
of high-level wastes from federal defense and research and de-
velopment activities.457 To "fast-track" development of the dem-
onstration repositories, the bill exempted them from the NEPA
provision requiring preparation of an environmental impact
statement to precede a "major federal action" and reaffirmed ex-
isting law excluding them from NRC licensing authority.458 Fi-
• ..were to exist. . . significantly prior to the opening of the first full-scale high-level
waste repository." Id.
452. See note 154 supra.
453. H.R. 7418, supra note 10.
454. Id. § 3(1).
455. Id.
456. Id. § 3(2).
457. Section 3(2) specified that the repositories "shall contain wastes owned or ac-
quired by the Federal Government and primarily resulting from unlicensed activities."
Id. Virtually all of these wastes result from reprocessing.
458. Id. § 3(5). See notes 226-27 and accompanying text supra. The report accompa-
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nally, the bill directed DOE to terminate the operation of the
repositories by the year 2000."'1
The bill drew criticism for several reasons.4 60 First, it pro-
vided no procedure for state participation in selection of a site
for a demonstration repository. Even though the bill prohibits
expansion of a demonstration repository into a full-scale com-
mercial repository facility without congressional authorization, it
seems all but certain that the institutional momentum would
favor using the same site for a full-scale facility. Thus, a host
state effectively could have been excluded from any involvement
in the decision on siting a full-scale repository. The inevitability
of such a result would breed the same skepticism about DOE's
intentions that has led states to oppose previous DOE efforts to
select a repository site461 and ultimately could cause the waste
disposal program to fail. Second, because the bill does not con-
template demonstration of spent fuel disposal, the demonstra-
tion repositories could prove useless if, contrary to the expecta-
tion of its sponsors, commercial reprocessing does not resume
and spent fuel becomes the ultimate waste form. Third, the
"fast-track" approach raised concerns that the federal govern-
ment "cares less about the interests of public safety than it does
about the interest of the nuclear industry" in demonstrating
that the problem of nuclear waste disposal is solvable and
should not inhibit a further increase in the use of nuclear
power. 6 2 Moreover, if the NRC is excluded from participating in
the program, emplacement of wastes in the repositories probably
would not constitute a demonstration of a technology for waste
disposal acceptable to states requiring such a demonstration as a
prerequisite for construction of new nuclear plants463 since it
hying the McCormack bill interpreted the demonstration repositories as satisfying the
exemption from NRC licensing under section 202(4) of the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, supra notes 220-21 & 226. H.R. RP. No. 1156, part 1, supra note 10, at 21-23.
It does, however, encourage DOE "to have continuing consultations with the NRC at
all stages of the design, construction and operation to assure that the NRC has full op-
portunity to provide comments and suggestions." Id. at 23.
459. H.R. 7418, supra note 10, at § 3(2). Presumably, this provision sought to allay
concerns of the situs state that the demonstration would become a permanent repository.
460. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1156, part 1, supra note 9, at 36-37 (DOE views).
461. See, e.g., notes 103-06 & 115-121 and accompanying text supra.
462. H.R. REP. No. 1156, part 1, supra note 10, at 40-41 (dissenting views of Repre-
sentatives Howard Wolpe, Donald Pease, and Richard L. Ottinger).
463. See, e.g., note 154 supra.
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would remain unknown whether the technology complies with
the applicable regulatory requirements. The McCormack bill
was subsequently referred to the House Committees on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce and Interior and Insular Affairs,
each of which reported modified versions of the bill.4" None
were considered by the full House.
C. Interim Storage of Commercial Spent Reactor Fuel
President Carter's decision to defer indefinitely the com-
464. The bill reported by the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee,
H.R. REP. No. 1156, part 3, supra note 10, substantially retained the programmatic ele-
ments of the House Science and Technology Committee bill. In addition, however, it
required DOE to select sites in different geologic media, id. § 3(b)(2), and eliminated the
requirement in the Science and Technology Committee bill that emphasized engineered
barriers, rather than the geologic medium, as the means for isolating wastes from the
biosphere.
It also provided for NRC regulation of DOE's activities under arrangements provid-
ing for review and consultation by the NRC. Id. § 3(e). The agreement would have to
include provisions directing DOE to submit to the NRC its plans for characterizing a site
and emplacing waste in a repository. Id. The NRC could object to specific elements of
the plan, in response to which DOE could either review the plan or publish a detailed
statement justifying its retention of the objectionable element. Id. § 3(e)(1). The NRC,
however, ultimately would have to concur before DOE could begin to excavate a site for
constructing a demonstration repository. Id. § 3(e)(3). The bill also granted the NRC
authority to order DOE to take or desist from certain actions in order to protect public
health and safety. Id. § 3(h)(1). The NRC then was required to conduct a public hearing
on its order, and affirm, revise, or rescind it based on the record. Id. § 3(e)(2). This
provision avoided granting the NRC general licensing authority over DOE facilities for
research and development activities, yet ensured effective NRC regulation over the pro-
gram set forth in the bill.
The bill also required DOE to notify a potential host state of its intention to con-
struct a demonstration repository and to consult and coordinate with state officials on its
development. Id. § 3(0(1). Finally, the bill provided for public participation in decisions
on a facility by requiring DOE to conduct public hearings in the vicinity of a site that it
intended to select for construction of a repository. Id. § 3(e)(2)(A).
The House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee substituted a program, virtually
identical to that in H.R. 6390, supra note 10. That program would develop full-scale
repositories licensed by the NRC for permanent disposal, in place of the demonstration
program required by the House Science and Technology Committee. The House Interior
bill required the DOE by December 31, 1985, to select four sites in different geologic
media considered suitable for licensed repositories. Id. § 4(a). After characterizing the
sites, DOE was required to recommend to the President by March 30, 1988, a site it
considers qualified for a full-scale repository. Id. § 4(d). The various mechanisms in H.R.
6390 for state and Indian tribe participation in decisions on selecting a site and develop-
ing a repository were included as well in the House Interior version of H.R. 7418, supra
note 9.
113
Hart and Glaser: A Failure to Enact: A Review of Radioactive Waste Issues and Legi
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
mercial reprocessing of spent reactor fuel465 foreclosed a major
option utilities had counted upon to relieve them of their rapidly
accumulating inventories of spent fuel.41' Assuming that they
would need to store spent fuel for less than a year before ship-
ping it to a reprocessing plant, many utilities initially had pro-
vided at early power plant sites only enough storage capacity to
accomodate an annual discharge of spent fuel from the reactor
core4 6 7 and to maintain a "full core reserve.' 4 8 As a result, the
465. See notes 137 & 138 and accompanying text supra.
466. The NRC estimates that United States commercial nuclear power plants that
either are operating currently, under construction, or planned will discharge 7700 metric
tons of spent fuel by the end of 1980, 17,700 metric tons by 1985, and 81,700 metric tons
by the year 2000. 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT ON HANDLING AND STORAGE OF SPENT LIGHT WATER PoWER REACTOR
FUEL, ES-3 (NUREG-0575, Aug. 1979) [hereinafter cited as NRC SPENT FUEL FGEIS].
Although a downward revision in the projected increase of installed capacity for nuclear-
generated electricity will reduce the estimates of the cumulative amounts of spent fuel,
even those plants currently operating and under construction will generate substantial
quantities of spent fuel requiring addition storage capacity.
467. Nuclear power plants require periodic replacement of part of the uranium fuel
with fresh fuel in order to continue efficient operation. A large reactor (1000 megawatts)
will discharge, or "off-load," about 30 metric tons of spent fuel at each refueling. This
amount is approximately one-third of a pressurized water reactor core and one-fourth of
a boiling water reactor core. Id. at ES-3. Refueling generally occurs once each year, but
the exact frequency may depend on the "reactor capacity factor" (the amount of time
the power plant actually operates) and the fuel burnup rate. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SPENT
FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTs-THE NEED FOR AwAY-FRoM-REACTOR-STORAGE 16, 18
(DOE/ET-0075, Feb. 1979) [hereinafter cited as DOE AFR STORAGE REQUIREMENTS].
468. NRC, Intent to Prepare Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Handling
and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel, 40 Fed. Reg. 42,801 (Sept. 10,
1975), reprinted in Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 79, at 185.
The full core reserve is the capacity needed to permit storage of the entire reactor
core. Although not an NRC safety or licensing requirement, utilities prefer to maintain a
full core reserve because certain repairs of the reactor either require or are facilitated by
removal of the core. On-site storage of the core during these repairs avoids an extended
and expensive shutdown of the power plant that would result if a utility has to arrange
for shipping the core to other off-site storage facilities. During a reactor shutdown, a
utility may have to purchase supplemental power from other utilities, substantially in-
creasing the costs to its customers or reducing the profits realized by its stockholders.
Any extended shutdown of the reactor will tend to increase these costs. DOE AFR STOR-
AGE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 467, at 7. Nuclear Waste and Facility Siting Policy:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, part I, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125, 128-29 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Johnston Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I].
The DOE has estimated that the lack of a full core reserve at commercial nuclear
power plants could increase power costs to ratepayers by $1.5 million for a period ending
in 1994. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 80, at 252 (statement of Shel-
don Meyers, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Waste Management, DOE).
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indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing coupled with the
continuing uncertainty about the prospects of radioactive waste
disposal caused existing on-site storage capacity to fill rapidly.
The prospect arose that some power plants might have to
close for lack of sufficient on-site capacity to store spent reactor
fuel.469 A utility facing a perceived critical shortage in storage
capacity, however, could pursue several alternatives. First, it
could modify the existing storage pools at the power plant
site-primarily by installing new racks for denser storage of
spent fuel-to increase the total on-site storage capacity.47 0 Sec-
ond, it could transship spent fuel from those power plants that
had exhausted their on-site storage capacity to others owned ei-
ther by it or by another utility that had excess storage capacity.
Third, it could either look to other private firms that would pro-
vide storage away from the reactor (AFR) for spent fuel from
several power plants or join with other utilities to build or ac-
quire a private AFR storage facility. And finally, it could rely
upon the federal government to build and operate storage facii-
469. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 284 (statement of John
T. Conway, American Nuclear Energy Council) ("If the AFR capacity is not forthcoming
in a timely manner, several operating nuclear plants will be required to cease operation
beginning in 1983 because of a lack of storage capacity."); Hart Nuclear Waste Hear-
ings, part I, supra note 79, at 101 (DOE responses to questions of Senator Randolph). In
testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, however, a
senior DOE official expressed less certainty that utilities would have no alternative but
to shut down power plants for lack of adequate storage capacity- "I do not believe that
we can be sure at this time that by 1983 plants would have to shut down. However, we
are quite certain that there would be some other measures which would have to take
place if those plants were to continue to operate." Johnston Nuclear Waste Hearings,
part I, supra note 468, at 91 (testimony of John M. Deutch, Acting Assistant Secretary
for Energy Technology, DOE).
470. Under this approach, known as "reracking," the new racks are built with neu-
tron absorbing materials that permit storage of the spent fuel in arrays packed together
more closely but still would prevent criticality (a nuclear chain reaction) even during an
accident. NRC, SPENT FUEL FGEIS, at 3-5. As of December 31, 1980, the NRC had re-
ceived and approved license applications to expand existing storage capacity at all but 2
of the 67 operating nuclear power plants.
Another new technology, known as "rod compaction," could further increase the
storage capacity of existing facilities. Rod compaction requires the dismantling of spent
fuel assemblies and the placement into a canister in closer array of the individual fuel
rods that comprise the assembly. This technique could permit storage of up to twice the
amount of spent fuel in suitably designed high-density fuel storage racks. TENNESSEE
VALLEY AuTHoRrry, SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM STUDY-SuMMARY OPTION PAPER,
(May 1979) (reprinted in Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 80, at 315).
Only one utility, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., has applied for a license to use rod
compaction. This application is pending before the NRC.
1981] 753
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ties to which the utility would ship the excess spent fuel.
The Carter Administration lent viability to this last alterna-
tive by offering to take title to and store the accumulating com-
mercial spent fuel in federal AFR facilities upon payment by the
utility of a one-time fee. 1 If private firms had ever seriously
considered the possibility of providing AFR storage as a com-
mercial enterprise, they shelved those plans when they saw that
they would have to compete against the federal government.
472
Thus, the Carter Administration's "spent fuel offer" may have
effectively foreclosed the third alternative of a privately financed
and operated AFR storage program.
The Carter Administration's proposal contemplates that
DOE would purchase or lease the existing spent fuel storage fa-
cilities at one or several of the three existing commercial
reprocessing plants that are presently closed.473 Because these
471. See note 142 and accompanying text supra.
472. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL FACILITIES FOR STORING SPENT
FUEL-ARE THEY NEEDED?, 14 (EMD-79-82, June 27, 1979) [hereinafter cited as GAO,
FEDERAL SPENT FuEL FACILrTIES].
In December 1977, DOE surveyed the nuclear industry to assess its interest in pro-
viding private interim spent fuel storage services to utilities. Virtually all of the 15 firms
that responded expressed an interest in participating in a federal plan, but wanted fed-
eral guarantees to hack private financing. Johnston Nuclear Waste Hearings, part 1,
supra note 79, at 127; GAO, FEDERAL SPmr FuEL FACILITIES, supra, at 12. DOE rejected
these offers for two reasons. First, it decided that difficulty in obtaining legislation to
provide financial guarantees would delay operation of a privately financed facility be-
yond its 1983 target date. Second, a private facility would require a new design effort and
DOE already had begun the conceptual design for a storage facility and had reviewed
potential sites. Id.
These reasons for not insisting upon private AFR facilities are unpersuasive. The
DOE assumes that without AFR storage capacity available by the 1983 target date, utili-
ties will have no choice but to begin closing power plants that have exhausted their on-
site storage capacity. This assumption is open to dispute. See notes 487-496 and accom-
panying text infra. In addition, it seems strange that DOE would not share with private
industry the product of its research and development efforts on AFR storage when it
willingly shares the results of other research and development activities, such as improv-
ing safety designs for power plants. Moreover, one private firm, Stone & Webster Engi-
neering Corp., has developed a standardized design for an independent spent fuel storage
installation that could be constructed at a power plant site but also used for AFR stor-
age. The NRC approved the conceptual design, subject to additional site-specific infor-
mation. Johnston Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 469, at 125. Finally, even
if DOE believed that only a federal facility could meet the 1983 date for satisfying the
most urgent needs for AFR storage, there is no reason why private firms could not pro-
vide subsequent AFR storage capacity.
473. 1 DP'T oF ENERGY, STUDY ON SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE, at 5 (DOE/SR-
0004, March 1980) [hereinafter cited as DOE STUDY]. Each of the three commercial
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facilities would require only limited modifications, this approach
supposedly would permit DOE to store spent fuel from utilities
sooner than the five years or more DOE estimates it would take
to build and license new AFR storage facilities. 474 At the same
time, the DOE presumably would build additional AFR capacity
for storing subsequent shipments of spent fuel.
The Carter Administration sought congressional authoriza-
tion for the federal AFR storage program in legislation that was
introduced in early 1979.47  It would have authorized the Secre-
reprocessing plants has capacity originally intended to store the spent fuel that would
have been shipped to it, pending reprocessing. The General Electric reprocessing plant
(Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant at Morris, Illinois) currently has 750 metric tons of re-
racked capacity in which it now stores 315 metric tons of spent fuel shipped under
reprocessing contracts entered into before GE decided not to operate the plant. See note
132 and accompanying text supra. The Western New York Nuclear Service Center, a
reprocessing facility operated by Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. at West Valley, New York
currently stores 165 metric tons of spent fuel in a pool with 250 metric tons of capacity.
NFS has no plans to accept additional spent fuel, particularly in light of the enactment
of the West Valley Demonstration Project Act, see notes 11 & 131 and accompanying
text supra. Finally, the Allied-General Nuclear Service, Inc. (AGNS) reprocessing com-
plex at Barnwell, South Carolina, has about 400 metric tons of unused storage capacity
that could be maximized to store 1750 metric tons of spent fuel. New construction could
increase storage capacity to 5000 metric tons. AGNS estimates that it would take 30
months to modify the Barnwell plant for AFR storage and to obtain a license from the
NRC to begin accepting commercial spent fuel. See generally Johnston Nuclear Waste
Hearings, part I, supra note 469, at 120-21, 130 (NRC response to questions of Senator
Tsongas); id. part II, at 409 (statement submitted by AGNS). For a brief discussion of
the history of commercial reprocessing in the United States that explains how these fa-
cilities have become available for federal AFR storage, see notes 131-38 and accompany-
ing text supra.
If successful, DOE efforts to acquire these facilities for AFR storage could be expen-
sive. The federal government may have to acquire the entire reprocessing plant in order
to use the adjacent storage pools. See note 532 infra.
474. Johnston Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 469, at 91.
475. S. 797, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S3516 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1979).
The bill was introduced by Senator Henry M. Jackson, at the request of the Administra-
tion, and referred to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. A companion
bill, introduced on the same day, was referred to the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee. S. 798, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S3518 (daily ed. Mar.
27, 1979). It would have amended § 202(3) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. § 5842 (1976), to clarify the NRC's authority to license any DOE facility "used
primarily for the receipt and storage of high-level radioactive wastes or spent fuel" gen-
erated by NRC-licensed activities. Although that section currently refers only to "high-
level radioactive waste," the NRC has taken the position that such wastes also include
spent reactor fuel. Johnston Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra note 469, at 86.
Thus, the bill attempted to remove a troublesome ambiguity in this section. See gener-
ally notes 235-38 and accompanying text supra. Senate bill 797 was substantially incor-
porated into the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, S. 2189, supra note 10, while the National
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tary of Energy to take title to and provide interim storage for
spent fuel from both domestic and foreign reactors.78 In addi-
tion, the legislation required utilities availing themselves of fed-
eral AFR storage facilities to prepay charges assessed by the
Secretary to "defray all costs of storage and ultimate dispo-
sal. 4,77 The Secretary had the discretion, however, to provide for
a refund to user utilities for the net value of any residual materi-
als recovered in subsequent reprocessing of their spent fueL478
The legislation financed this program through a $300 million re-
volving fund composed of fees collected from user utilities and
proceeds from both the investment of fund monies and the sale
of bonds authorized by the bill.4 e
The Carter Administration proposal was the springboard for
subsequent legislative proposals for both a full-scale and a lim-
ited federal AFR storage program. These proposals embraced
the common premises that the program should require both full
recovery of its costs from those persons who ultimately would
benefit from itOO and, to the maximum extent possible, the stor-
age of spent fuel at the power plant site.48 l Opinions differed,
however, on how best to achieve "full cost recovery" and
whether maximization of on-site storage meant not only maxi-
mizing existing storage capacity but also timely construction of
additional on-site storage facilities.
Nuclear Waste Regulation and Control Act of 1980, S. 2980, supra note 10, included a
provision similar to S. 798. Identical bills were introduced in the House. H.R. 2586, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. H1055 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1979); H.R. 2611, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess, 125 CONG. Rzc. H1068 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1979).
476. S. 797, supra note 475, at § 2.
477. Id.
478. For a discussion of spent fuel reprocessing and the material it extracts, see
notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra. The "fuel resource" remaining in the spent
fuel has no value, until it is extracted and made into a form suitable for later use. Thus,
its value cannot be determined until after reprocessing, at which time the demand for
this fuel resource will establish its value.
479. Id. § 3. Although the bill generally would have immunized this program from
the scrutiny of the congressional authorization process, it expressly prohibited the use of
fund money for construction of a repository for disposal of spent fuel In addition, it
subjected the expenditures from the fund to any directives or limitations of appropria-
tions acts. Id.
480. The IRG Report states, "[T]he costs of AFR storage for the domestic utility
industry should be paid for by that industry and borne by the ratepayer." IRG REPoRT,
supra note 37, at 103.
481. Id. at 101. President's Message to Congress on Establishing a Radioactive
Waste Management Program, 16 WaxuKY COMP. OF Pans. Doc., supra note 8.
756 [Vol. 32
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An earlier DOE study of the need for AFR storage seemed
to substantiate the urgency that the Carter Administration at-
tached to implementing its program.482 Recent DOE estimates
show a need by 1986 for 120 metric tons of AFR storagese in-
creasing to 1800 metric tons by 1990.4" These estimates repre-
sented a "base case" that assumes transshipment of excess spent
fuel to other available storage capacity within a utility's sys-
tem485 and incorporates the utility's current plans for expanding
on-site storage capacity.4"
482. DOE projected a need for 560 metric tons of AFR storage capacity by 1983 and
2860 metric tons by 1988. DOE, AFR STORAGE REQUnEMENTS, supra note 467, at 8.
483. DOE, SPENT FUEL STORAGE REQUI EMENTs 2 (DOE/SR-007)(March 1981).
The DOE has noted that since it first projected spent fuel storage requirements in
1975, the maximum projected need for AFR storage has decreased each year. "This de-
crease resulted from utilities recognizing the need to solve their own storage problems
whenever possible." DOE STUDY, supra note 473, at 12. It adds, however, that it has
constantly projected that a small number of power plants will need AFR storage "despite
their best efforts." Id.
484. DOE, SPENT FUEL STORAGE REQUIRMENTS, supra note 483, at 2.
485. The Carolina Power and Light Co. already ships spent fuel from its Robinson 2
plant to the pool serving its Brunswick 1 and 2 plants, in order to maintain a full core
reserve. NUcLEAR REGULATORY COM'N, OPERATING UNITS STATUS REPORT 3-2 (Aug.
1980). Utilities fear that they will have difficulty obtaining federal and state approval for
transshipments of spent fuel, even between facilities within the same utility system. For
example, two federal agencies have primary responsibility to regulate spent fuel trans-
portation. See generally notes 324-31 and accompanying text supra.
In addition, several states and local jurisdictions have adopted regulations that re-
strict or prohibit shipments of nuclear materials. See note 121 supra. As a result, DOT
has promulgated a rule to establish uniform federal regulations for highway transporta-
tion of radioactive materials. See generally notes 332-36 and accompanying text supra.
Public hearings on applications for license amendments to transship spent fuel could
take a significant amount of time. For example, on March 9, 1978, the Duke Power Co.
applied for a license amendment to transship spent fuel from its three Oconee power
plants to a storage pool at its McGuire power plant, a facility not yet operating. Amend-
ment to Materials License SNM-1773. The application generated five petitions to inter-
vene (three of which were subsequently dismissed) and required 10 months of hearings.
On October 31, 1980, two and one-half years after the application had been filed, the
NRC denied the license amendment primarily because it did not have "reasonable assur-
ance" that the activities authorized by the license amendment "could be conducted with-
out endangering the health and safety of the public." 12 N.R.C. 459, 516 (1980). Conse-
quently, the Duke Power Co. has begun to use the full-core reserve at the Oconee plants
for additional storage.
486. DOE, AFR STORAGE REQUIMEN, supra note 467, at 6. The "base case" rests
upon the most plausible assumptions analyzed by DOE. In addition to considering cur-
rent utility plans for expanding on-site storage capacity and intrautility transshipment of
spent fuel, the base case assumed the maintenance of a full core reserve, see note 468
supra, a 70 percent reactor capacity factor, and low reactor fuel burnup. A decrease in
the reactor capacity factor, use of the full core reserve for storage, and an increase in the
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The earlier DOE study probably overestimated seriously the
actual near-term need for AFR storage. First, to develop its pro-
jections, DOE relied upon the utilities' own estimates of availa-
ble storage capacity and their announced plans for any expan-
sion of that capacity. Such reliance may have been misplaced,
however, since utilities naturally would tend to overestimate any
potential shortage in storage capacity and to forego further
plans for expanding on-site capacity in order to enhance the per-
ceived need for federal AFR storage. Moreover, the failure of
Congress to act upon the Carter Administration's AFR storage
proposal has created sufficient uncertainty so that some utilities,
acting in their self-interest, may have deferred implementing
their own spent fuel storage plans, pending the congressional
disposition of the Administration proposal.87
Second, the earlier DOE study did not consider the possibil-
ity that utilities could expand on-site capacity by building addi-
tional storage pools. No utilities except the Tennessee Valley
Authority have announced such plans. Instead, they have prefer-
red first to pursue less expensive methods for expanding existing
capacity.48 Nevertheless, if planned in advance, construction of
additional on-site storage capacity represents another alterna-
tive to federal AFR storage. It is unclear whether the per unit
costs to utilities of federal AFR storage will prove less than the
per unit costs of constructing additional on-site storage
reactor fuel burnup will each reduce the projected need for AFR storage. Conversely, an
increase in the reactor capacity factor, maintenance of full core reserve, and a decrease in
the reactor fuel burnup will each increase the projected need for AFR storage.
487. The General Accounting Office recognized this defect in DOE's study, observ-
ing that "[t]here is additional [on-site] capability to expand, but many utilities have not
yet decided to do so, preferring in some cases to wait for the details of DOE's storage
programs." GAO, FEDERAL SPENT FuEL FAcjTiEs, supra note 472, at 6. As utilities post-
pone their own possible expansion plans to await the outcome of congressional action on
their federal AFR proposal, however, they begin to foreclose the near-term options for
providing on-site storage in a sufficiently timely manner to avoid forced shutdowns of
their nuclear power plants. In effect, the delay in implementing the on-site expansion
plans leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy that federal AFR storage will be required. The
GAO report did concede, however, that "there still may be some need for such facilities
in the near term and as we progress toward the 1990's." Id. DOE intends to conduct a
plant-by-plant inspection to determine the actual capability for each utility t9 expand
on-site storage capacity.
488. DOE estimates that an expansion of existing storage capacity from 200 metric
tons to 400 metric tons by reracking would cost $16,000 per metric ton of spent fuel, 100
to 200 times less expensive than the cost of constructing either additional on-site capac-
ity or an AFR storage facility. DOE STUDy, supra note 473, at 20.
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Finally, the DOE study did not consider the near-term
availability of alternative methods of expanding on-site storage
capacity. The NRC currently licenses storage of spent fuel only
in water-filled basins. Several dry storage technologies, however,
could become licensable within the next year or two.490 Dry stor-
age offers low front end costs that make it generally more cost
effective than AFR storage, relatively short lead times for imple-
mentation, and the ability to expand incrementally as needed
rather than requiring a massive initial capital investment in un-
used capacity.
Independent analyses of spent fuel storage capacity by
other federal agencies underscore the extent to which DOE may
have originally overestimated the need for AFR storage facilties.
GAO estimated a need for only 152 metric tons of AFR storage
by 1983, assuming maintenance of full core reserves and intrau-
tility transshipments. This number increases to 1443 metric tons
in 1988.491 Even these estimates may be overstated, however,
since they reflect only those plans for expanding storage capac-
ity that the utilities considered definite.492 Based on its analysis,
the GAO concluded that utilities rather than the federal govern-
ment should provide whatever interim AFR storage may be re-
quired during the next decade.4 8 The NRC projected a shortfall
489. See note 523 infra.
490. As a part of its comprehensive analysis of radioactive waste storage and dispo-
sal technologies, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) has identified two dry stor-
age techniques that are sufficiently developed to permit a licensed demonstration per-
haps within the next two years. The first is a cast-iron cask that serves for both on-site
storage and transportation of the spent fuel to a radioactive waste repository. The sec-
ond technology, known as dry-well storage, contemplates the emplacement of fuel ele-
ments in steel canisters, which are then lowered below ground into metal sleeves sur-
rounded by concrete liners. Letter from John H. Gibbons, Director of OTA, to Senator
Gary Hart (July 21, 1980)(on file with the author). The NRC has expressed optimism
over a successful demonstration of dry storage technologies.
491. GAO, FEDERAL SPENT FuEL FAcnxrms, supra note 472, at 9.
492. Id.
493. Id. at iii. The GAO states that
[t]he responsibility for interim spent fuel storage should be a utility and nu-
clear industry concern. They have the technical capability to deal with the
problem and should have the motivation, considering their large capital invest-
ment in nuclear power. The utilities and nuclear industry cannot be expected
to act, however, under today's uncertain Federal positions on the future dispo-
sition of spent fuel. GAO believes, therefore, that instead of trying to develop
an interim spent-fuel storage program, the Department should (1) concentrate
75919811
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in spent fuel storage of 160 metric tons by 1983 increasing to 580
metric tons by 1985.& ' It estimated that twenty-four nuclear
power plants will exhaust their full core reserve capacity by
1985. Eleven of these plants, however, have license applications
pending before the NRC to provide between four and fifteen
years of additional on-site storage capacity.495 All but two of the
remaining power plants can further expand existing storage
capacity.
4"
Apparently persuaded by the Carter Administration's as-
sessment of the critical need for a full-scale federal AFR storage
program, the Senate Energy Committee incorporated substantial
portions of the Administration proposal in its Nuclear Waste
Policy Act.49 The bill stated a policy of providing for maximiz-
ing storage of spent fuel at the site of each commercial nuclear
power plant and directed the appropriate federal agencies to ex-
pedite and encourage the use of available storage capacity at the
power plant site.4"' Neither the language of the bill nor the ac-
its efforts on getting resolution as to whether commercial spent fuel will be
reprocessed and (2) commit itself to a timetable for having a method for per-
manent spent-fuel storage available. These are needed to provide some finality
to the issue of spent-fuel storage and to give the nuclear industry a basis for
planning storage requirements. For the shorter term, DOE should work with
the nuclear industry to help it determine interim spent-fuel storage needs,
meet necessary regulatory requirements, and develop a comprehensive storage
program.
Id.
494. NRC Staff, Update of AFR Spent Fuel Storage Needs (Sept. 1980)(on file with
author).
495. Id.
496. Id. If the utilities do expand the existing storage capacity at these power
plants, the need for AFR storage without construction of new on-site pools will decrease
to 200 metric tons by 1985. Id. The NRC staff concluded, "Assessment of near term
spent fuel storage capacity at operating reactors indicates that substantial actions have
been taken by utilities to increase reactor basin storage capacities, but that a need for
some AFR storage by at least 1985, or before if (full core reserve) is to be maintained,
continues to exist.'" Id.
497. S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sees., 126 CONG. REc. S10266 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1980).
498. Id. § 301(b).
Under this provision, any actions to expedite or encourage use of available on-site
storage capacity would have to accord with (1) the protection of public health and safety;,
(2) economic considerations; (3) continued operation of the power plant; (4) the sensibili-
ties of the population surrounding such power plant; and (5) otherwise applicable law.
Id. § 302. The first and fifth conditions are virtually self-evident, since the NRC already
has authority to license any expansion of on-site storage capacity. Without further expli-
cation, however, the other three conditions could be read so broadly as to render this
directive meaningless. For example, "economic considerations" would seem to require
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companying report clearly stated whether the Committee in-
tended for utilities not only to expand capacity in existing on-
site storage facilities but also to construct additional on-site fa-
cilities. The bill was amended on the Senate floor, however, to
clarify that the Committee intended to encourage only the max-
imization of available storage capacity.'9'
The bill then authorized the Secretary of Energy, consistent
with its policy of maximizing existing on-site capacity for spent
fuel storage, to take title to spent fuel at the power plant site,
transport it to a federal AFR facility, and provide storage pend-
ing its ultimate disposal or reprocessing.500 The Secretary ex-
pressly was prohibited from accepting and storing foreign spent
fuel. This prohibition would have abrogated substantially the
nonproliferation objectives of the Carter Administration's spent
fuel policy. 5
01
basing a decision whether to encourage expanded on-site storage on a strict per unit cost
comparison between providing AFR storage and additional on-site storage. Nevertheless,
other less tangible factors-such as the possibility that public interventions will delay
and perhaps prevent spent fuel shipments to an AFR facility or operation of an AFR
facility altogether-may have an equally significant effect. See notes 524-29 and accom-
panying text infra. The "continued operation of the power plant" factor probably would
come within this "economic considerations" category since that translates into the costs
of purchasing replacement power during a shutdown. This condition suggested that even
a temporary shutdown of the power plant necessary to install the additional on-site stor-
age capacity would not be acceptable. Finally, the "sensibilities of the population sur-
rounding such power plant" elude any precise definition that could give it substantive
content. If the sensibilities of the surrounding population should control in decisions on
whether to expand on-site storage capacity, arguably they should also control in deci-
sions on whether to build or acquire a federal AFR facility. More importantly, however,
the NRC under its legislative mandate to protect public health and safety, should ade-
quately consider these sensibilities by fully exercising its authority to license expansion
of on-site facilities.
499. Unprinted Amend. No. 1456, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., 126 CONG. Rac. S10065
(daily ed. July 29, 1980)(amending S. 2189, supra note 10).
500. S. 2189, supra note 10, at § 303(a).
501. Id. § 303(b). DOE has proposed to take 1000 metric tons of spent fuel from
countries located in sensitive regions with high international tensions and from other
countries where a nonproliferation benefit would result. The United States policy seeks
to delay conventional reprocessing of spent fuel until development of proliferation-resis-
tant technologies and institutional arrangements. Storage in the United States provides
an option to reprocessing for nations that have no acceptable alternative, from a non-
proliferation standpoint, for disposing of their spent fuel See generally 3 Dm'T OF EN-
ERGY, FNAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: STORAGE OF FOREIGN SPENT PowER RE-
ACTOR FuEL (DOE/EIS-0015, May 1980). For an exhaustive analysis of the international
implications of radioactive waste, see Spector & Shields, Nuclear Waste Disposal: An
International Legal Perspective, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 569 (1979).
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The contract that transferred title to the spent fuel from
the utility to the Secretary of Energy also was required to pro-
vide for the assessment of a one-time charge per unit of spent
fuel that would cover: (1) the cost of transporting the spent fuel;
(2) the proportionate costs of construction, operation, mainte-
nance, and decommissioning of the federal AFR storage facility;
and (3) the costs of disposal of the spent fuel.502 Although the
utility had relinquished title to the spent fuel, under the con-
tract it could retain a right to the net value of the remaining fuel
resource realized upon any subsequent reprocessing.503 Like the
Carter Administration proposal, the Energy Committee bill
established a $300 million fund to finance the transportation,
storage, and disposal of spent fuel and the transportation and
disposal of high-level radioactive waste. Unlike the Adminis-
tration's proposal, however, the reported version of the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act neither subjected the payments from the fund
to the directives and limitations of appropriation acts nor ex-
pressly prohibited expenditures for construction of a repository
for radioactive waste disposal unless authorized by Congress.
The bill was amended on the floor, however, to require congres-
sional approval of expenditures from the fund in annual appro-
priations acts. 0
The only other reported nuclear waste bill that addressed
the federal AFR storage program was the National Nuclear
Waste Regulation and Control Act of 1980.506 This bill ap-
502. S. 2189, supra note 10, at § 304(a).
503. Id. § 304(b).
504. Id. §§ 501, 502.
505. Unprinted Amend. No. 1655, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S10052
(daily ed. July 29, 1980)(amending S. 2189, supra note 10).
506. S. 2980, supra note 10. H.R. 6390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H511
(daily ed. Jan. 31, 1980), introduced by Representative Udall on January 31, 1980, and
referred to the House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, addressed a wide array of issues arising from the commercial nuclear
power program and the accident at Three Mile Island. The Udall bill provided for a
limited federal program for AFR spent fuel storage, consistent with the twin policies of
placing the responsibility for interim storage of spent fuel upon utilities and accepting
limited quantities of foreign spent fuel to advance the common defense and security and
to serve nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Id. § 222(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii). The bill authorized
the Secretary of Energy, until December 31, 1982, to enter into contracts under which
DOE would store spent fuel from eligible nuclear power plants, id. § 222(a), but prohib-
ited him from taking title to the spent fuel, and thereby relieving utilities of any contin-
uing responsibility for the stored spent fuel. Id. § 222(e). At the same time, it con-
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proached the problem in a way that reflected skepticism about
DOE's assessment of need for and cost effectiveness of a full-
scale federal AFR storage program in general, and, in particular,
strained the Secretary to provide not more than 700 metric tons of federal AFR storage
capacity. Id. § 222(a). This limitation presumably would have led DOE to concentrate its
efforts on acquiring the spent fuel pools at the General Electric reprocessing plant at
Morris, Illinois, which has a reracked capacity of 750 metric tons. See generally note 458.
Unwilling to grant to DOE the same expansive authority as did the Nuclear Waste Pol-
icy Act (S. 2189) to establish a federal AFR facility, the Udall bill required the Secretary
of Energy to justify to Congress each contract under which DOE takes title to the spent
fuel by explaining, in the case of spent fuel from domestic reactors, why the utility other-
wise could not provide adequate storage and, in the case of foreign spent fuel, how fed-
eral AFR storage will achieve United States nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Id. §
222(a)(2). To complement this requirement, the bill also conditioned a utility's eligibility
to ship spent fuel to the federal AFR facility upon a determination by the Secretary,
with NRC concurrence, "after taking into account appropriate technical, economic, and
regulatory considerations" that the utility could not provide its own interim storage "in a
timely manner." Id. § 222(b). Although undefined in the bill, actions done in a "timely
manner" presumably meant those actions that avoided the shutdown of a nuclear power
plant. The final eligibility requirement represented a significant departure from the pol-
icy underlying the federal AFR program proposed by the Carter Administration and by
the Senate Energy Committee. That policy would require maximization of capacity only
in existing on-site storage facilities. The provision in the Udall bill, however, would re-
quire timely construction of additional on-site storage facilities before a utility could
avail itself of federal AFR storage. For some of the policy considerations justifying such a
requirement, see notes 523-31 and accompanying text infra. Finally, the bill required the
Secretary to assess a charge per unit of spent fuel to cover the proportionate costs of
constructing or acquiring, operating, maintaining, and decommissioning an AFR facility.
Id. § 222(d). It specifically excluded, however, costs of transporting and ultimately dis-
posing of the spent fuel. Id.
House bill 6390 as reported by two House committees on September 24, 1980, con-
tained no provision for a federal AFR storage program. H.R. REP. No. 1382, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980). At the same time it included a federal AFR program in its Nuclear
Waste Policy Act (S. 2189), the Senate Energy Committee also authorized the construc-
tion or acquisition of one or several federal AFR facilities to store as much as 5000 met-
ric tons of spent fuel. S. 688, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The bill never came to the
Senate floor.
Senate bill 688 authorized $300 million for the federal AFR program, but condi-
tioned the actual appropriation of $275 million of that amount upon the passage of ge-
neric legislation providing for the transfer to DOE of title to the spent fuel, user fees,
and other program operating procedures. Id. § 505(d). The $25 million, not similarS
conditioned, would support such preliminary activities as preparation of a site-specific
environmental statement and development of site-specific designs for a facility. Id. In
addition, the provision designated $5 million of this $25 million for further study of the
need for away-from-reactor storage, including the feasibility, cost, and potential sites of a
federal AFR storage facility. Id. The report accompanying S. 688 did not explain why the
committee decided to authorize development of site-specific designs for a federal AFR
facility when it apparently felt sufficiently unsure of the need for such a facility that it
specifically required DOE to study this question further. S. REP. No. 96-232, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 139-141 (June 1979).
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its proposal to acquire one or several closed commercial
reprocessing plants to store the first shipments of spent fuel.
The bill sought to promote a three-pronged policy of (1) mini-
mizing the need for AFR storage facilities by encouraging and
assisting maximized storage of spent fuel at the power plant site,
even if by construction of additional on-site storage capacity; (2)
permitting the federal government to accept custody of spent
fuel only when there is no reasonable expectation that a utility
can provide adequate on-site storage capacity in a timely man-
ner; and (3) assuring full cost recovery by the federal govern-
ment for the construction and operation of federal AFR storage
facilities.5 07 In effect, the bill authorized a limited federal AFR
storage program only to avoid any forced suspension of power
plant operations for lack of adequate capacity to store spent
fuel, but required utilities to take all possible actions to provide
that capacity, including construction of additional storage capac-
ity at the power plant site. 08
To carry out this policy, the bill rejected the blanket au-
thorization for a federal AFR storage program, as requested by
the Carter Administration and provided in the Senate-passed
version of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Instead, it required the
President to submit to Congress a separate request for authori-
zation to construct or acquire an AFR storage facility. This re-
quest would have to include a justification by the Secretary of
Energy, with the concurrence of the NRC, of the need for fed-
eral AFR storage. In justifying this need, the Secretary was re-
quired specifically to identify those nuclear power plants for
which "there is no reasonable expectation" that the licensee can
507. S. 2980, supra note 10, at § 10(a).
508. This bill differed in several respects from the federal AFR storage provisions in
the Nuclear Waste Regulation Act of 1979, S. 1521, supra note 227, and the Hart bill,
Amend. No. 646, supra note 227.
Senate bill 1521 would have permitted the NRC to license a federal AFR facility
only if the Secretary of Energy did not take title to or responsibility for the shipped
spent fuel until a facility for the permanent disposal of the spent fuel begins to operate.
S. 1521, supra note 227, at § 7. The Hart bill prohibited the NRC from licensing a fed-
eral AFR storage facility until a facility for the permanent disposal of spent fuel had
begun to operate or for the purpose of facilitiating the reprocessing of spent fuel. Amend.
No. 646, supra note 227, at § 8. For a discussion of the relationship between an AFR
facility and commercial reprocessing of spent fuel and the potential for prejudicing the
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provide adequate capacity for on-site storage of the spent fuel.5",
Independent concurrence by the NRC in the Secretary's assess-
ment was considered essential to guard against a possible overes-
timation by DOE of the need for federal AFR capacity to justify
its own program. Moreover, the NRC, by virtue of its regulatory
mandate, has a longstanding relationship with those utilities
that would use the federal AFR facility and regularly reviews
the available spent fuel storage capacity as part of its monthly
report on the status of licensed operating nuclear power
plants.510 To prevent undue delay in the NRC's review of the
Secretary's assessment, the bill required the NRC to act within
forty-five days or waive its right to concur.511 The bill made a
utility's power plant eligible to use federal AFR storage only if
the Secretary of Energy had identified the power plant in his
formal justification for a federal AFR facility or, with the NRC's
concurrence, determined that the utility could not otherwise
provide adequate on-site storage capacity in a timely manner.
12
At the same time that it sought to minimize the use of any
federal AFR storage facility, the bill also encouraged maximum
storage of spent fuel at the power plant site. It directed the
NRC to require as a license condition that any power plant, for
which an application for a construction permit has not been filed
by June 1, 1980, provide sufficient capacity to store the spent
fuel it will generate during its useful life, or until the NRC de-
termines that a facility for disposing of the spent fuel will begin
509. S. 2980, supra note 10, at § 10.
510. See generally Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Operating Unit Status Report app.,
§ 3 (published monthly).
511. According to § 10 of S. 2980, supra note 10, the Secretary's statement accompa-
nying the President's authorization request also was required to (1) estimate the cost of
the proposed AFR facility and state the method for assuring full recovery of this cost; (2)
identify alternatives to the proposal with a cost/benefit analysis for each alternative; and
(3) justify the need to acquire an existing facility not limited to actual spent fuel storage
with an analysis of alternative proposals. This last requirement assured congressional
scrutiny of any agreement by the federal government to buy an entire commercial
reprocessing plant merely to use its adjacent storage pools for a federal AFR facility. See
notes 473-74 and accompanying text supra.
512. S. 2980, supra note 10, at § 10(d). Like the provision requiring NRC concur-
rence in the Secretary's general determination of need for federal AFR storage, see note
511 and accompanying text supra, this provision also required the NRC either to make
its assessment within 45 days of receiving the Secretary's determination or waive its au-
thority to concur, thus avoiding undue delay. Id.
7651981]
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operating. 51 3 It also established an expedited procedure for the
NRC to license the construction of additonal on-site storage
facilities.
Under this procedure a utility could petition the NRC for
authorization to begin constructing additional on-site storage ca-
pacity prior to the completion of any required hearing upon its
application for a construction permit.51 5 The NRC would have to
grant that petition if it found that (1) the utility had already
expanded on-site storage capacity to the maximum extent possi-
ble, and without the expedited procedure, there would be a rea-
sonable expectation that the utility could not provide adequate
capacity "in a timely manner"; 516 (2) there was a reasonable ex-
pectation that the application for a construction permit would
comply with all the rules and regulations of the NRC and
NEPA;517 and (3) there was a reasonable expectation that the
design, construction, and operation of the facility would present
no significant risk to the public health and safety or the environ-
ment. The utility could not store spent fuel in the facility, how-
ever, until the NRC had authorized the storage."" If the NRC
513. Id. § 10(d). Given the current dispute among experts about whether a safe,
reliable technology for radioactive waste disposal even exists, the determination may
prove difficult for the NRC to make. Nevertheless, the NRC is presently conducting a
confidence proceeding in which it will determine whether such a technology will exist by
the years 2007-09. See generally Axelrad & Bauser, supra note 2; Brown & Bergholz,
supra note 2; Sheldon, supra note 3. Presumably, that determination will satisfy the
alternative determination permitted in this section of the bill.
514. S. 2980, supra note 10, at § 10(e).
515. Id. § 10(d).
516. Id. This language left it to the NRC precisely to define "timeliness." Imminent
encroachment upon the full-core reserve might serve as a reasonable trigger for granting
the expedited procedure, particularly if the NRC should at some future date determine
that maintenance of a full-core reserve is a necessary safety condition for an operating
license. See note 468 supra.
517. See note 167 supra.
518. S. 2980, supra note 10, at § 10. To date, the NRC has not issued licenses for
facilities built solely to store spent fuel and not coupled to a nuclear power plant or to a
fuel reprocessing plant. Because it usually considers spent fuel storage as an inherent
part of reactor operation, the NRC in the past hag regulated spent fuel storage facilities
through amendments to the general facility license issued under 10 C.F.R. § 50.1-50.110
(1980) and to the license for possession of nuclear materials issued under 10 C.F.R. §
70.1-70.71 (1980). Recently, however, the growing need for power plant licensees to pro-
vide additional storage for spent fuel has led the NRC to promulgate sepate licensing
requirements for spent fuel storage in Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
(ISFSI). 45 Fed. Reg. 74,699-74,711 (1980) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. §§ 7.21-7.273
(1981)). The regulations became effective November 28, 1980. With these regulations the
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did grant a petition to begin constructing an on-site storage fa-
cility before completion of the licensing hearing, the utility
would bear the risk that an unforeseen health and safety hazard
would cause the NRC ultimately to deny an operating license
and thus render the utility's investment worthless. Such a result
seems highly unlikely, however. Indeed, the NRC has found that
additional on-site storage of spent fuel poses negligible increases
in risk to the public health and safety and the environment.619
Moreover, all but one operating nuclear power plant currently
have on-site facilities for storing spent fuel. Therefore, the NRC
necessarily has considered and found insignificant any known
health and safety risks associated with storing spent fuel at
power plant sites. Only a new health and safety risk either pecu-
liar to the proposed additional storage facility or unknown at the
time the NRC licensed the existing on-site storage of spent fuel
would cause it to deny the license for spent fuel storage in the
new facility. The NRC estimates that such an expedited proce-
dure would reduce by six months the time between the filing of
an application for a permit to construct a new on-site facility
and the issuing by the NRC of an operating license.520
NRC began to acknowledge spent fuel storage in a separate facility as an independent
activity not directly involved in reactor operations even if carried out on-site.
519. NRC SPENT FUEL FGEIS, supra note 466, at 9. The NRC also found no signifi-
cant differences between the respective health, safety, and environmental risks of on-site
and AFR storage because spent fuel, wherever stored, is not in a form that lends itself to
ready dispersal of radioactive materials into the environment. Id. at 4-13. It did note,
however, that transportation of spent fuel to a storage facility away from the power plant
"constitutes a major dose pathway to the environment." Id. (citing AToAc ENERGY
COMM'N, ENVRONMENTAL SURVEY OF TRANSPORTATION OF RArIOA^cTW MATERALS TO AND
FROM NucLEAR POWER PLANTS 40-43 (WASH-1238, Dec. 1970)).
520. Letter from NRC Chairman John F. Ahearne to Senator Jennings Randolph
(July 22, 1980)(on file with author).
With this expedited procedure, the Senate Environment and Public Works Commit-
tee sought to allay the concerns of utilities that the bill's emphasis upon construction of
additional on-site storage would give them the worst of both worlds. The utilities feared
not only that the bill would restrict their eligibility to use federal AFR storage, but that,
if they pursued the alternative of constructing additional on-site storage facilities, pro-
tracted and possibly spurious interventions from groups attempting to close nuclear
power plants would prevent the timely availability of the new facilities. Although this
concern is understandable, the history of applications for license amendments to expand
existing on-site storage capacity suggests that it is groundless. The NRC has received 55
applications license amendments to increase the capacity of existing on-site storage
pools. Requests for interventions were received in 14 applications. Of these, seven were
settled in prehearing negotiations while seven went to hearings. The median time be-
tween the beginning of the hearing to the initial decision was five months. Id. It seems,
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In addition to requiring specific justification of any proposal
for a federal AFR storage facility, the National Nuclear Waste
Regulation and Control Act of 1980 sought to assure full recov-
ery by the federal government from a user utility for the costs of
AFR storage. It prohibited the DOE from taking title to the
stored spent fuel before its ulitmate disposal and thus relieving
the utility from any subsequent financial or legal responsibil-
ity.521 This provision placed the DOE in the role of bailee for,
rather than owner of, the spent fuel and gave it discretion to
charge a periodic fee to implement alternative fee assessment
mechanisms. The periodic fee arrangement would be used in lieu
of an annually adjusted, one-time charge. Further, the provision
reserved to the DOE a right subsequently to assess user utilities
for the costs of ultimately disposing of the spent fuel when they
however, that transportation of spent fuel from one power plant site to another could
prompt protracted interventions. See note 485 supra.
521. S. 2980, supra note 10, at § 10(b). The Senate Energy Committee bill departed
from the Carter Administration proposal by requiring the Secretary of Energy to take
title to the spent fuel at the power plant site rather than upon acceptance of the spent
fuel at the federal AFR storage facility. Id. at § 304(c). This provision would have trans-
ferred to the federal government general legal and financial responsibility for accidents
during the shipment of the spent fuel to the AFR facility and would have precluded
NRC licensing of these shipments. Although the Senate-passed version retained this pro-
vision, it was amended to require NRC licensing of the spent fuel shipments to the AFR
facility. Unprinted Amend. No. 1471, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S10240 (July
30, 1980).
Although DOE preferred that title transfer when it accepts the spent fuel for stor-
age, it did not consider title transfer a sine qua non of the federal spent fuel storage
program. Rather, it viewed the ultimate purpose of the program as "to provide storage,
regardless of who maintains title. However, we see no advantage to having the utility
retain full title." Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 76 (DOE re-
sponses to questions from Senator Hart). DOE added that problems could result if the
party responsible for management and control of the spent fuel does not also own it. Id.
Although not specified, such problems may include a refusal by public utility commis-
sions to permit their utilities to relinquish possession and control over their spent fuel
while bearing a legal and financial responsibility for the spent fuel that could continue
indefinitely. It seems likely, however, that if utilities also foresee such problems they will
make more of an effort to provide on-site storage for the spent fuel and rely upon the
DOE only as a bailee of last resort.
An alternative proposal for encouraging utilities to maximize on-site storage capac-
ity would retain the requirement that the utility transfer to the federal government title
to the spent fuel but deny the utility any right to the net value of the residual material
recovered from the spent fuel as a result of subsequent reprocessing. Presumably, a util-
ity would ship its spent fuel to the federal AFR facility, thus relinquishing this poten-
tially valuable right, only after it had exhausted all other options for providing storage of
the spent fuel.
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become more certain.522
The approach in the Act not only reflected skepticism about
the DOE's projections of need for a full-scale federal AFR stor-
age program, but also recognized that even if DOE's projections
proved accurate other factors could favor a policy of maximizing
on-site storage capacity through construction of additional facili-
ties. It is less than clear that AFR storage, whether federally or
privately owned, offers greater economies of scale than addi-
tional on-site storage facilities.523 Even if the DOE succeeds in
522. DOE supported a one-time fee, assessed against a user utility per unit of spent
fuel shipped to a federal AFR facility, that would cover fully the costs of the two services
DOE intended to offer-storage and ultimate disposal of the spent fuel. 4 DEP'T OF EN-
ERGY, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT:. CHARGE FOR SPENT FUEL STORAGE
(DOE/EIS-0015)(May 1980). See also Johnston Nuclear Waste Hearings, part I, supra
note 468, at 282-83 (statement of National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissions).
DOE currently estimates that development and construction of a 2000 acre reposi-
tory in bedded salt for disposing of commercial spent fuel-still many years away-will
cost about $500 million. See 2 DEP'T OF ENERGY, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT: STORAGE OF U.S. SPENT PowER REACTOR FUEL, (DOE/EIS-0015 May 1980) at II-
17. Nevertheless, that estimate reflects a good deal of conjecture and uncertainty. To
correct for this uncertainty, S. 2189 provided for an annual adjustment of the one-time
fee for subsequent shipments of spent fuel for federal APR facilities on the assumption
that over time the true costs of spent fuel disposal will become more apparent. This fee
adjustment conceivably could impose a disproportionate share of the costs upon later fee
payers while permitting the earlier fee payers to pay less than their full share of the total
costs. In addition, if DOE does not receive a continuing flow of spent fuel up until the
time a permanent repository opens, it will not have the opportunity to adjust fees to
recover fully the most recent assessments of disposal costs. For this reason, therefore, S.
2189 was amended on the Senate floor to require at the time of permanent disposal of
the spent fuel the retroactive assessment or reimbursement for the difference between
the assessed fee and the actual storage and disposal costs. Unprinted Amend. No. 1472,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S10242 (July 30, 1980).
523. DOE estimates that construction of an AFR storage facility with a capacity to
store 5000 metric tons of spent fuel will cost $250 million in 1979 dollars or $130/kg of
spent fuel stored. 2 DFP'T OF ENERGY, APPENDICES FOR DOE STUDY ON SPENT NUCLEAR
FUEL STORAGE, B-8 (DOE/SR-0004, Mar. 1980). By comparison, a new on-site pool with a
500 metric ton storage capacity serving a single reactor would cost $40 million or $320/kg
of stored spent fuel. Id. This per unit cost would decrease to $185/kg and $137/kg as the
pool capacity increased to 1100 metric tons and 1900 metric tons respectively. Id. These
larger pools presumably could be used at sites with two or three reactors. Thus, DOE's
analysis suggests that only a new storage pool at a three-reactor site offers economies of
scale comparable to those of an AFR facility.
A review by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) suggested several difficul-
ties with DOE's analysis. See letter from John H. Gibbons, Director, Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment, to Senator Gary Hart (July 21, 1980) (on file with author). These diffi-
culties include relative costs of financing, relative costs of back-up capacity, potential
changes in demand, and potential use of dry storage on-site. Id.
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constructing or acquiring an AFR storage facility that offers
favorable economies of scale, the situs state may seek to prevent
or limit the storage of spent fuel. The same political forces that
lead a state to close low-level waste burial sites to shipments
from other states 24 or to pass legislation prohibiting or restrict-
ing the shipment, storage, or disposal of radioactive waste within
its borders525 inevitably will cause it to reject or severely circum-
scribe federal efforts to establish an AFR storage facility within
its borders. 26 It is entirely plausible, for example, that those
states viewed as potential hosts for a federal AFR facility will
demand the same rights to participate in decisions about estab-
lishing and operating that facility as those states seen as poten-
tial hosts for a radioactive waste repository.5 27 Thus, DOE's AFR
storage proposal which seeks to provide the most immediate
spent fuel storage for utilities facing critical shortages of on-site
capacity, could have the opposite result; it could lead to delay
and divisiveness as situs states exercise their legitimate rights to
participate in the decisions on a federal AFR facility.
Even with regionally located AFR storage facilities, the pro-
Although DOE based its economic comparisons on the cost of constructing an AFR,
it intends to provide initial AFR storage by purchasing one or several closed commercial
reprocessing plants and using their adjacent storage pools. See note 473 supra. The ac-
tual costs for acquiring these facilities will depend on negotiations between DOE and
their owners. DOE officials have maintained that "it is unlikely that DOE would pay
more for these facilities than it would cost for an equivalent amount of space at a new
AFR." Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 81 (DOE responses to
questions from Senator Hart).
524. See notes 546-556 and accompanying text infra.
525. See note 121 supra.
526. Indeed, a state could fear that AFR storage will become de facto disposal. For
example, the State Senate of South Carolina passed a resolution memorializing the
United States Congress to guarantee, in any legislation on spent fuel storage, the re-
moval of spent fuel stored in a federal AFR facility at the Barnwell reprocessing plant
within forty years after the spent fuel has been withdrawn from the reactor core. S.C.
Con. Res. No. S.695 (Jan. 9, 1980), reprinted in Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part 11,
supra note 3, at 410-11.
527. Senator Strom Thurmond offered an amendment to the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act that was subsequently accepted to explicitly guarantee a role for a state in decisions
on siting an AFR storage facility within its borders. Unprinted Amend. No. 1454, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. Rac. S10060 (daily ed. July 29, 1980). In addition to securing
for a state the right to be currently informed by the DOE about site investigations and
facility development and regulation, the amendment gave the governor the right to ob-
ject to the siting of an AFR facility within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the
site selection. If the President did not determine that the facility "is essential to the
National interest," work on the facility could not continue. Id. at S10061.
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posed DOE program will require two shipments of spent fuel,
one from the power plants to the AFR facility and a second from
the AFR facility to the permanent repository. Although the
NRC has found no significant health and safety hazards in ship-
ping spent fuel, 28 the transportation of spent fuel along hun-
dreds of miles of railroads or highways through many states un-
doubtedly will generate many interventions that could delay the
issuance of licenses by the NRC or the DOT."" Such a result
would further contravene the purposes of the DOE spent fuel
proposal.
Two additional considerations militate against the estab-
lishment of AFR facilities. It has been suggested that DOE's
proposal to use existing storage capacity at closed commercial
reprocessing plants for its initial AFR facilities could hasten un-
duly the resumption of commercial reprocessing without ade-
quate safeguards against sabotage or theft of weapons-grade
materials.53 0 Finally, the availability of AFR storage capacity ex-
ceeding only the most critical needs would tend to delay further
the development of a safe technology for radioactive waste dis-
posal by substituting AFR storage for a permanent solution. 531
Because Senate bill 2980 did not come to the floor under a
separate time agreement, three amendments were offered to con-
form the federal AFR program in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
to provisions in the National Nuclear Waste Regulation and
528. See note 519 supra.
529. The lengthy NRC deliberations on the application by Duke Power for a license
to tranship spent fuel from its Oconee plant to its McGuire plant is a case in point. See
note 485 supra.
530. This argument assumes that DOE or a commercial firm will find it easier and
presumably more profitable to reprocess the spent fuel stored adjacent to the plant
rather than ship it to a permanent repository. The argument is most persuasive in con-
nection with the use of the uncompleted AGNS reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South
Carolina for a federal AFR facility. It is unlikely that the other two candidates for a
federal AFR facility-the General Electric plant at Morris, Illinois, and the NFS plant at
West Valley, New York-will ever again reprocess commercial spent fuel. General Elec-
tric has conceded that serious engineering and technical flaws in the design of its plant
prevent it from ever operating. See note 132 and accompanying text supra. NFS has
relinquished ownership of its plant to DOE which has received legislative authorization
to begin decontaminating and decommissioning activities. See note 131 and accompany-
ing text supra. It should be noted, however, that resumption of commercial reprocessing
will not depend so much on the proximity of stored spent fuel as on several other factors
of greater significance: resolution of past technical difficulties, favorable economics, au-
thorization by Congress or the President, and licensing by the NRC.
531. Cf. NRC SPENT FuEL FGEIS, supra note 466, at ES-1.
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Control Act of 1980. The first two amendments, clarifying re-
lated NRC licensing authority and requiring full recovery by the
federal government of storage and disposal costs, were accepted
by voice vote. 82 The third, requiring specific DOE justification
prior to congressional authorization of any proposed AFR facil-
ity and providing an expedited licensing procedure for the con-
struction of additional on-site storage facilities, was rejected af-
ter lengthy debate.5 8
V. Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
Virtually every application of nuclear technology produces
low-level radioactive waste.5" Of the estimated three million cu-
bic feet of low-level waste produced each year, 535 the commercial
532. Unprinted Amend. No. 1471, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., 126 CONG. REC. S10241
(daily ed. July 28, 1980) (amending S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. R.C. S10266
(daily ed. July 30, 1980)) provided for NRC licensing of a federal AFR facility and licens-
ing of spent fuel shipments by DOE from a commercial power plant to that facility.
Unprinted Amend. No. 1472, 96th Cong. 2d Seass., 126 CONG. REc. S10242 (daily ed. July
29, 1980)(amending S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S10266 (daily ed. July
30, 1980)) required DOE to assess or reimburse a utility for any differences between the
one-time fee charged upon receipt of the spent fuel and its proportionate share of the
actual storage and disposal costs.
533. Unprinted Amend. No. 1474, 96th Cong., 2d Seass. 126 CONG. REc. S10244 (July
30, 1980)(amending S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Ses., 126 CONG. REC. S10266 (daily ed. July
30, 1980)). The same day, Senator Mark 0. Hatfield sparked heated debate by offering
an amendment to the Department of Energy Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981--Ci-
vilian Applications, that prohibited the appropriation of funds for the "construction or
acquisition of facilities for the interim storage of spent fuel or the disposal of spent fuel
or high-level waste," until legislation, similar to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, has been
enacted establishing "title Transfer, user fees, and other program operating procedures."
Unprinted Amend. No. 1478,96th Cong., 2d Seass., 126 CONG. REC. S10316 (daily ed. July
29, 1980). Hatfield cited two reasons for his amendment: (1) to pressure the House of
Representatives into enacting nuclear waste legislation; and (2) to avoid giving the DOE
a blank check to carry out an AFR storage program prior to enactment of guidelines for
the assessment of the costs of storage and disposal. Id., 126 CONG. REC. S10305, S10411.
Although it prohibited the acquisition or construction of a federal AFR facility ab-
sent enactment of nuclear waste legislation, the Hatfield amendment would have permit-
ted DOE to begin negotiations for a facility, to prepare any required environmental im-
pact statement, and to conduct any other activities preliminary to actual construction or
acquisition. The Senate passed the amendment, but the DOE authorization bill was
never enacted. The DOE Energy and Water Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1981, how-
ever, provided $10 million to DOE for the preliminary activities permitted under the
Hatfield amendment. H.R. REP. No. 96-1366, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., at 22-23 (Sept. 22,
1980).
534. For a description of low-level waste, see text accompanying notes 39 & 40
supra.
535. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Burial Gounds: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
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light water reactor fuel cycle accounts for forty-three percent,
medical and educational institutions account for twenty-five per-
cent, industrial activities account for twenty-four percent, and
the federal government accounts for eight percent, generated
primarily by its defense-related and research and development
activities.5a6
Since the early days of the United States atomic energy pro-
gram, the federal government has disposed of low-level wastes
primarily by shallow land burial or sea disposal. In 1960, the
United States imposed a moratorium on new licenses for sea dis-
posal.5s7 Prior to 1962, all low-level wastes scheduled for burial,
whether generated by the federal government or commercial ac-
tivities, were disposed of at AEC sites.5" When it became appar-
ent, however, that commercial activities eventually would pro-
duce significant quantities of low-level waste, the AEC, in 1960,
announced that it would continue to dispose of commercial low-
level wastes at its sites only until designation of regional dispo-
sal sites to be operated by private firms.5 e Between 1962 and
1971, six commercial burial sites were opened, subject to licens-
ing either directly by the AEC (and subsequently the NRC) or
by the situs state under the agreement states program. 0 These
on Energy Research- and Production of the House Comm. on Science and Technology,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 80 (1979)(testimony of Joseph Hendrie, NRC Chairman) [hereinaf-
ter cited as McCormack Hearings]; IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 77.
536. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFicE, THE PROBLEM OF DISPOSING OF NucLEAR Low-LEVEL
WASTE: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERB? 2 (EMD-80-68, March 31, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as GAO, DISPOSING OF Low-LEvEL NUCLEAR WASTE]. By radioactivity, the commer-
cial light water reactor fuel cycle accounts for about one-half of the low-level waste gen-
erated annually while the federal government accounts for the other half. Hospital and
university wastes contain negligible amounts of radioactivity. See also BISHOP MEMORAN-
DUM, supra note 61.
537. Letter from John M. Deutch, Under Secretary of DOE, to Senator Gary Hart
(Jan. 24, 1980)(on file with author).
538. GAO, DISPOSING OF Low-LEVL NucLERn WASTE, supra note 536, at 3.
539. Letter from John M. Deutch, Under Secretary of DOE, to Senator Gary Hart,
supra note 537.
540. The locations of the six sites and licensing dates are: Beatty, Nevada (1962);
Maxey Flats, Kentucky (1963); West Valley, New York (1963); Hanford, Washington
(1965); Sheffield, Illinois (1967); and Barnwell, South Carolina (1971). Except for the
Sheffield site, all the sites are regulated by the situs state under the agreement states
program.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorizes the NRC to license the possession or use
of byproduct material, which includes low-level waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976). With
this authority, it regulates the siting and operation of commercial low-level waste dispo-
sal sites, consistent with generally applicable environmental standards promulgated by
1981] 773
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sites provided disposal capacity for all commercially generated
low-level wastes and a significant amount of unclassified federal
low-level radioactive wastes.4 1 By 1979, only three of the six
sites continued to accept low-level wastes for disposal"' 2-the
Hanford, Washington, and Beatty, Nevada sites, both operated
by the Nuclear Engineering Company (NECO); and the Barn-
well, South Carolina site, operated by Chem-Nuclear Systems,
Inc. During 1978, more than seventy-five percent of the nation's
commercial low-level wastes produced that year were shipped to
the Barnwell site, while ten percent went to the Hanford site
and eleven percent went to the Beatty site.543 Yet, during 1978,
the three states in which these sites were located generated only
seven and seven-tenths percent of the wastes generated nation-
ally.5," Until a series of events in 1979, neither the regional im-
balance between the locations of the waste generators and the
three operating disposal sites, nor the problem of adequately
the EPA. Id. The NRC may delegate a portion of its regulatory responsibilities for low-
level waste disposal to an agreement state. Id. § 2021(b). Section 274 of the Act directs
the NRC to enter into an agreement transferring its regulatory responsibilities for cer-
tain nuclear materials to the states if: (1) the governor certifies that the state desires to
assume regulatory responsibility for the materials; and (2) the NRC finds that the state
program is "compatible" with the NRC's regulatory program and "is adequate to protect
the public health and safety." Id. Twenty-six states have entered into agreements with
the NRC. The NRC must review periodically their regulatory programs to reassess its
initial finding of adequacy and compatability. Id. § 2021(0).
The NRC currently does not have authority to regulate DOE facilities for the dispo-
sal of low-level waste. Both the IRG and the NRC, however, have recommended the
extension of NRC licensing authority to DOE facilities for the disposal of federal low-
level waste not produced by defense-related activities. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N,
supra note 253, at ix; IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 30.
541. To encourage the development of regional sites for the disposal of commercially
generated low-level waste, the AEC directed its contractors, except the Rocky Flats
plant, see note 97, to use the commercial sites for their unclassified low-level waste when
on-site burial was unavailable. Letter from John M. Deutch, Under Secretary of DOE, to
Senator Gary Hart, supra note 537.
542. The West Valley site was closed in March 1975, when radioactive water began
seeping out of the caps on two burial trenches. The Maxey Flats site closed in December
1977, when a ten cents per pound excise tax on wastes received for disposal, imposed by
the Kentucky legislature as a contingency against unforeseen problems, discouraged fur-
ther use of the site. Finally, the Sheffield site exhausted its capacity in early 1978 and
closed in March 1979, when the operator withdrew an application for a license to expand
the site. See generally GAO, DIsPOsING OF Low-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 536,
at 3.
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regulating the packaging, shipping, and disposal of low-level
waste attracted much legislative attention. Indeed, a GAO report
described low-level waste as "the forgotten stepchild of nuclear
power" and attributed recent problems surrounding its disposal
to "inaction and neglect."" 5
The problems began in July 1979, when Nevada Governor
Robert List ordered the Beatty site closed following two inci-
dents: first, a truck carrying radioactive medical waste caught
fire at the site entrance, exposing ten people to radiation; sec-
ond, a truck carrying supposedly dehydrated radioactive waste
from a Michigan power plant arrived at the site leaking contami-
nated liquids." 6 Shortly thereafter, List, along with Washington
Governor Dixie Lee Ray and South Carolina Governor Richard
W. Riley wrote NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie to protest "the
serious and repeated disregard for existing rules governing the
shipments of commercially-generated low-level nuclear wastes,
and the total lack of corrective measures by the NRC."" 7 The
letter demanded that the NRC and the DOT develop and imple-
ment aplan "to upgrade inspection and enforcement of the rules
for proper packaging and shipment of waste materials."" 8 In
particular, the governors insisted that the plan provide for regu-
lar inspection by trained personnel of both the generators and
collectors of wastes and for the consistent enforcement of sanc-
tions for violations of regulations. Perhaps most significantly,
however, the letter stressed the need for a national nuclear
waste management program "that will include a formula for re-
gional distribution of low-level nuclear waste at various waste
management sites. '' 49 Although not expressly stated, such a pro-
gram would have two beneficial results. It would distribute equi-
tably throughout all regions of the country the responsibility for
low-level waste disposal and it would minimize long-distance
shipments of low-level waste.
The NRC immediately assured the governors that it would
implement the requested plan. 50 The NRC amended its regula-
545. GAO, DIsPOSING OF Low-LEvL NucLEAR WASTE, supra note 536, at 7.
546. Id. at 4.
547. Letter from Governors Robert List, Dixie Lee Ray, and Richard W. Riley to
NRC Chairman Joseph M. Hendrie (July 10, 1979).
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Letter from Joseph M. Hendrie, NRC Chairman, to Governor Richard W. Riley
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tions to incorporate DOT packaging requirements, thus permit-
ting the NRC to enforce directly the DOT requirements when it
examined shipments before they left the waste generator or were
received at the disposal site.151 In addition, the NRC promised
to investigate ways to provide training and packaging informa-
tion to waste generators to reduce the number of shipments with
improperly packaged waste.552 Finally, the NRC reaffirmed its
efforts, begun in 1979, to develop comprehensive regulations for
the disposal of low-level wastes and thus remove an impediment
to the establishment of additional, regionally distributed dispo-
sal sites.558 As a result of the NRC's response, Governor List re-
opened the Beatty site.
Notwithstanding the augmented NRC program for regulat-
ing the packaging of low-level wastes, Governor Ray closed the
Hanford site on October 4, 1979, when she learned that several
waste shipments bound for the site violated regulations.5" Fol-
lowing Governor Ray's actions, Governor List, on October 23,
again closed the Beatty site when the United States Geologic
Survey discovered that five drums containing radioactive waste
(July 18, 1979).
551. 10 C.F.R. §§ 71.1-71.64 (1980). The NRC and DOT share jurisdiction over the
transportation of radioactive materials. See notes 328-331 and accompanying text supra.
Prior to receiving the demands of the three governors, the two agencies only mini-
mally regulated the shippers and carriers of radioactive materials. GAO, DIsPosING OF
Low-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 536, at 13. "The NRC and the DOE relied
mainly on the integrity of shippers and carriers to comply with regulations" governing
the packaging and transportation of low-level waste. Id.
552. Letter from Joseph Hendrie, NRC Chairman, to Governor Richard W. Riley,
supra note 550. The GAO, in 1978,, criticized the NRC for not reviewing systems for the
treatment of low-level wastes from nuclear power plants as carefully as it reviews the
power plant's safety systems. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NEED FOR GREATER REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT OF COMMERCIAL Low-LvE.L RADIOACTIVE WAsTn 3 (EMD-78-101, Aug. 16,
1978). "These systems, including operator training and control, receive less attention
during licensing and inspection than those systems NRC determines to be safety-re-
lated." Id. at 3. In addition, the GAO found that the NRC does not routinely monitor
the performance of existing waste treatment systems to warn future licensees not to use
systems that have proven ineffective in new power plants. Id. Although the GAO con-
ducted its investigation to ensure adequate protection of the health and safety of plant
workers, it seems reasonable to conclude that the same absence of NRC review of waste
treatment systems has resulted in a higher incidence of improperly packaged and treated
shipments of low-level wastes from power plants to disposal sites.
553. Letter from Joseph Hendrie, NRC Chairman, to Governor Richard W. Riley,
supra note 550.
554. GAO, DISPOSING OF Low-LEvEL NUCLEAR WASr, supra note 536, at 4.
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had been buried outside the fence that enclosed the site.555 Fi-
nally, Governor Riley announced not only that the Barnwell site
would not accept low-level waste denied disposal at the two
closed sites but that Barnwell would begin to reduce the
amounts of waste it accepts to one-half the current amount by
October 31, 1981.5
56
The closings and restrictions upon use of the commercial
burial sites raised the possibility that the critical shortage in dis-
posal capacity would force many waste generators to stop or cur-
tail their activities.5'5 There was particular concern, for example,
that hospitals and other medical institutions with limited capac-
ity for on-site waste storage would have to restrict their use of
nuclear materials for diignostic, therapeutic, and research pur-
poses.558 As a short-term response to the impending crisis, DOE
prepared a contingency plan for accepting commercial low-level
wastes at DOE disposal sites.559 Under this plan, DOE, upon re-
quest by the NRC, would accept low-level waste after a case-by-
case determination that lack of disposal capacity for the waste
poses an imminent threat to public health and safety.50 Other-
wise, DOE did not intend to accept commercial low-level waste
and therefore overrule the governors' objections to shipping out-
of-state commercial wastes to DOE sites for storage or dispo-
sal.561 In addition to preparing the plan, DOE announced that it
555. Id.
556. Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 398 (testimony of Gov-
ernor Richard W. Riley). Even before Governor Riley's announcement, the Barnwell site
had refused to accept shipments of liquid low-level waste for disposal.
557. See generally McCormack Hearings, supra note 535.
558. Id. Radioactive Materials May Have to be Sharply Curtailed as Dumping
Sites are Closed, CHROMNCLE HIGHM Enuc., Nov. 7, 1979, at 3-4; O'Toole, A Dumping
Closing Threatens to Halt Cancer Research, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
559. Letter from John M. Deutch, Under Secretary of DOE, to Senator Gary Hart,
supra note 537, at enclosure 1, p. 1.
560. Id.
561. DOE has 14 active sites for disposing of the low-level wastes it produces. A
DOE study assessing the capacities of its sites and the possibilities for expanding their
disposal capacity rejected 8 of the 14 sites as too small and dedicated to specialized
facilities. GAO, DisposiNq OF Low-LrvwL NUCLEAR WAsrEs, supra note 536, at 23. Three
remaining sites that the DOE identified as most feasible for accepting commercial low-
level wastes are located near the three operating commercial sites. The DOE recognized
that a strong possibility exists that the three governors, having objected already to use of
commercial sites in their states for disposal of all the nation's commercial low-level
waste, would object also to disposing of commercial wastes at the DOE sites in their
states. Indeed, Nevada Governor Robert List sent a telegram to President Carter pro-
1981]
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temporarily would stop shipping its own low-level wastes to
commercial sites for disposal.
562
The reopening of the Beatty and the Hanford sites at the
end of the year temporarily averted the crisis, but, at the same
time, underscored the need for longer term solutions to the
problem of low-level waste management. Similar to other waste
management problems, however, ensuring the availability of ad-
equate capacity to dispose of low-level waste requires a combi-
nation of technical and institutional solutions. The technical so-
lutions fall into two categories: reducing the volume of low-level
waste requiring disposal and classifying the different types of
low-level waste so that the appropriate disposal technology is
applied to a given type of low-level waste.
The NRC is preparing a plan that would require low-level
waste generators to reduce the volume of their wastes.563 The
plan may include administrative controls to prevent the intro-
duction of nonradioactive materials to a radiation area, to en-
courage the recycling of contaminated equipment, and to require
the segregation and on-site storage of rapidly decaying wastes so
that they may be disposed of as nonradioactive wastes not re-
quiring disposal.58 In addition, DOE and the NRC have begun
testing against opening the DOE sites to commercial low-level wastes. "We would view
such action as a subversion of states rights for regulation and control of our own destiny
with regard to the safety and welfare of our citizens." Letter from John M. Deutch,
Under Secretary of DOE, to Senator Gary Hart, supra note 537.
Although the location of these three DOE sites may have made them unlikely candi-
dates for disposal of commercial wastes, the GAO suggested that the DOE had not advo-
cated using its other sites for commercial wastes because of the possibility of introducing
federal regulation of defense wastes activities. GAO, DIsPosING OF Low-LavwL NuCLEAR
WASTe, supra note 536, at 24. For a general discussion of the virtual absolute rejection
by the DOE and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees of NRC regulation
of defense waste activities, see notes 181-190 & 249-257 and accompanying text supra.
The GAO found the DOE's reasons for not using the eight minor DOE sites unper-
suasive. Although the DOE cited existing limitations of the sites, such as small desig-
nated disposal areas and the lack of special equipment and operating procedures to han-
dle commercial low-level waste, it neither suggested that the sites could not be expanded
nor "provided any compelling technical or environmental reasons against using the
sites." GAO, DIsPosING OF Low-LavF.L NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 536, at 24. In addi-
tion, the DOE did not "list specific examples illustrating their point that accepting com-
mercial waste at a DOE site would threaten national security." Id. at 25.
562. Dep't of Energy Press Release, "DOE Temporarily Stops Shipments of its low-
level Nuclear Waste to Commercial Burial Grounds" (R-79-474, Oct. 26, 1979). See also
note 541 supra.
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to promote the development of technologies such as incineration
and compaction, which, by reducing the waste volume, could ex-
tend significantly the useful life of existing burial sites and limit
the need for new facilities.
56 5
Currently, the broad, imprecise definition of low-level waste
subsumes a wide variety of materials, some so minimally radio-
active that they do not require disposal by burial and others so
highly radioactive that they require greater isolation from the
biosphere than is afforded by shallow-land burial.568 Conse-
quently, the NRC is developing a system for classifying and
managing the various types of low-level wastes according to their
potential hazard to public health and safety. The NRC's pro-
posed comprehensive regulations will use the classification sys-
tem in requiring different methods of disposal depending on the
degree of hazard presented by a particular type of low-level
waste. 67 The regulations, for example, may require burial of
some low-level wastes at an intermediate depth or disposal in an
engineered facility.5e In addition, they may establish a mini-
mum level for radiation concentrations in low-level waste. Waste
with concentrations below that level would not require disposal
at burial sites.5s9
Reducing the volume of low-level wastes will not resolve the
larger institutional problem raised by the actions of the three
governors: how to distribute equitably the responsibility of low-
level waste disposal so that three states do not have to accept all
commercial low-level waste generated throughout the nation.7 0
565. See Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 95-96.
566. R. LipsCHUtrZ, supra note 13, at 34.
567. 45 Fed. Reg. 13,104 (1980) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. part 61 (1981)).
568. Id.
569. Id.; Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 98.
570. Washington state forced the issue by approving an initiave that prohibits the
importation or disposal in Washington after July 1, 1981, of nonmedical, radioactive
waste generated outside Washington unless permitted by interstate compact. Radioac-
tive Waste Storage and Transporation Act of 1980, Initiative Measure No. 383 (approved
Nov. 5, 1980). Prior to the initiative, Governor Ray had announced to the Washington
legislature that she intended to close the state to all out-of-state radioactive wastes on
December 31, 1982, if additional low-level waste disposal sites had not been established.
Rep. Manuel Lujan introduced, but failed to get House consideration on, a bill that
would have created a strong incentive for each state to provide for the disposal of low-
level waste generated within its borders. It suspended existing licenses and prohibited
the NRC from issuing new licenses for waste-generating nuclear activities within a state
that has not "taken such steps as may be necessary to assure the safe storage and dispo-
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The problem of regional imbalance between states that generate
low-level waste and states that dispose of it leads to the conclu-
sion that each state should provide for the disposal of low-level
wastes produced within its borders. 57 1 This conclusion does not
imply that each state necessarily must establish its own disposal
site, but rather that, if it chooses, a state could agree with other
states in a region to share a facility.
Because of a virtually unanimous desire to avoid a recur-
rence of the recent low-level waste management crisis and be-
cause of the similarity in the language of the low-level waste ti-
tles passed by the House and Senate,7 Congress separately
enacted a Low-Level Waste Policy Act 575 while allowing the rest
of the nuclear waste legislation to die.57 4 In the Act Congress
resolved the threshhold issue of whether the federal government
should assume responsibility for disposing of commercially gen-
erated low-level wastes. The Act charges each state with "pro-
viding the capacity, either within or without the state" to dis-
pose of low-level waste generated within its borders, except for
sal of all low-level radioactive waste generated in the State." H.R. 6212, 96th Cong. 1st
Sess. § 1 (1979).
571. See Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3 (testimony of Gover-
nor Richard W. Riley, S.C.).
572. See H. R. 8378, supra note 10; S. 2189, supra note 10.
573. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980).
574. See 126 CoNe. Rzc. H12,494-97 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980); 126 CONG. REC.
S16539-S16546 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980). Perhaps the only significant difference between
the titles as originally passed by the House and the Senate was that the House version
deferred until January 1, 1987, the effectiveness of any provision in an interstate com-
pact that excludes wastes from a state not a party to the compact. H. R. 8378, supra
note 10, at § 201(a)(2)(B). The provision sought to give "all States sufficient opportunity
to establish compacts or disposal sites before the exculsionary provisions become opera-
tive." H. R. REP. No. 1382, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., part 1, at 34. The Senate version would
not have set a date before which such a provision could not take effect.
The bill was enacted in the final hours of the 96th Congress, largely because of the
efforts of South Carolina Congressman Butler Derrick, who previously had introduced a
low-level waste bill, H. R. 8809, that was similar to the House and Senate-passed titles.
See generally Congress Passes Low-Level Waste Bill, Leaves Broader Solution for Fu-
ture, 38 CONG. Q. WEEKy Rzp. 3623-25 (Dec. 20, 1980).
Notwithstanding the broad consensus in both Houses that Congress should enact a
low-level waste bill, several Members were reluctant to enact the bill apart from legisla-
tion that also addressed interim storage and permanent disposal of high-level waste and
spent reactor fuel. They feared that enactment of the noncontroversial low-level waste
title would remove powerful interest groups concerned only about low-level waste dispo-
sal from the general radioactive waste debate and relieve Congress from the pressure to
enact a comprehensive bill.
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waste from defense-related or federal research and development
activities." 5 The legislative decision that each state should as-
sume responsibility for disposing of commercial low-level wastes
produced within its borders seems sensible. Safe, low-level waste
disposal generally does not require such sophisticated technol-
ogy to warrant federal assumption of that responsibility. In ad-
dition, since the entry of private firms into the field has shown
that low-level waste disposal can survive as a commercially via-
ble enterprise, federal intervention would seem an unnecessary
usurpation of commercial interest in this area. Finally, the pol-
icy of requiring states to provide for disposal of their commer-
cially generated low-level wastes has received support from
DOE, the NRC, and the State Planning Council, as well as other
state officials.
57 6
To carry out its policy, the Act authorizes states to compact
with each other to establish regional facilities for disposing of
low-level wastes generated by states within the region. Consis-
tent with the Constitution, the Act requires Congress, by law, to
consent to a compact before it takes effect.5 "7 The compacts,
however, may not restrict until January 1, 1986, the use of re-
gional facilities under the compact to the disposal of low-level
575. Pub. L. No. 96-573, supra note 573, at § 4(a)(1)(A).
576. See GAO, DIsPOSING OF LOW-LEiEL NucLEAR WASTE, supra note 536, at 22.
Hart Nuclear Waste Hearings, part II, supra note 3, at 90. Letter from John M. Deutch,
Under Secretary of DOE, to Senator Gary Hart, supra note 537, at 2:
We see no institutional or other reasons why the federal government should
take the responsibility for the management or disposal of low-level wastes
away from the States or from the private sector, if properly licensed. The haz-
ard of low-level wastes is so small compared with that of other nuclear waste,
of hazardous chemical wastes,. . . that there appears to be no technical reason
for federal responsibility ....
This position departs from an earlier DOE recommendation that it own all low-level
waste disposal sites and contract with private firms for their operation. DOE REvzw,
supra note 126, at 619. State Planning Council Resolution No. 2-2 (Apr. 19, 1980):
The State Planning Council recommends that the national policy of the United
States on low-level radioactive wastes shall be that every state is responsible
for the disposal of the low-level radioactive waste generated by non-defense
related activities within its boundaries, and that states are authorized to enter
into interstate compacts, as necessary, for the purpose of carrying out this
responsibility.
577. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10. The provision of this Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, supra
note 10, at § 4(a)(2)(B), directs a state to satisfy the constitutional requirements that
both the interstate compact and any restrictions in the compact upon transporting radio-
active waste into a state receive the consent of Congress. See Jaksetic, supra note 5, at
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wastes generated within the region. In addition, each compact
shall provide that every five years after the compact has taken
effect Congress may withdraw its consent.
5
78
The Act also gives legislative effect to the IRG recommen-
dation, endorsed by President Carter, that DOE prepare a na-
tional plan for low-level waste management.579 The Act requires
the plan to identify, on a regional basis, present and future
needs for disposal capacity; to analyze the status of each com-
mercial low-level waste disposal site, evaluate the adequacy of
the disposal technology used to contain the wastes, and recom-
mend appropriate measures to assure protection of public health
and safety from wastes disposed of at the sites; to evaluate on a
regional basis, transportation requirements for each type of
waste and the ability of generators, shippers, and carriers to
meet the requirements; and to assess the capability of DOE dis-
posal facilities to provide interim storage for commercial low-
level wastes. 580 GAO has recommended that the NRC not license
additional shallow land burial sites until the DOE plan has been
presentpd.581
The Act does not alter the existing authority of an agree-
ment state or of the NRC in the case of a site in a nonagreement
state to regulate disposal of low-level waste generated by com-
mercial activities. 582 At the same time, however, the Act does not
make clear whether the NRC or the relevant agreement states
have jurisdiction over a regional site established under a com-
pact entered into by agreement and nonagreement states. Pre-
sumably, if the disposal site were located in a nonagreement
state, the NRC would retain licensing authority over the site.
This result, however, would seem to abrogate the regulatory au-
thority delegated by the NRC to the agreement states partici-
pating in the compact.
The enactment of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
578. Pub. L. No. 96-573, supra note 11, at § 4(a)(2)(B). This provision seems unnec-
essary since Congress presumably would always have authority at any time to withdraw
its consent to a compact.
579. IRG REPORT, supra note 37, at 106.
580. Pub. L. No. 96-573, supra note 11, at § 4(b)(1).
581. GAO, DIsPosING OF Low-LsvL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 536, at 29.
582. 126 CONG. REc. H12495 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980) (statement of Rep. John
Dingell). For a discussion of the NRC's authority to regulate low-level waste and of the
agreement states program, see note 540, supra.
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Act represents a major accomplishment for a Congress that
failed to enact a comprehensive bill because of the unresolved
controversy over the proper treatment of defense-related
wastes.583 The low-level waste bill, however, did not entirely es-
cape that controversy. Section 3 of the Act explicitly exempts
from the scope of a state compact the "transportation, manage-
ment and disposal of low-level radioactive wastes from DOE
atomic energy defense activities or Federal research and devel-
opment activities." In addition, it exempts "any facility estab-
lished or operated exclusively for the disposal" of the exempted
wastes.5 " The inclusion of this exemption in the Act portends
renewed debate in the Ninety-Seventh Congress of whether nu-
clear waste legislation ihould distinguish between defense-re-
lated and civilian wastes.
583. For an analysis of the controversy over distinguishing between defense-related
and civilian radioactive wastes, see notes 181-190 & 249-257 and accompanying text
supra.
584. Pub. L. No. 96-573, supra note 10, at § 3(b).
These two portions of section 3 seem inherently inconsistent. If the section was in-
tended to exempt from state compacting authority any disposal of defense-related or
federal research and development low-level wastes, then the subsequent provision re-
stricting that exemption only to disposal in a facility operated exclusively for the dispo-
sal of defense-related or federal research and development low-level wastes is meaning-
less. The exemption already would apply to the disposal of these wastes in any facility
regardless of the other types of waste it also may contain. Giving effect to the broader
exemption would mean that DOE could dispose of the exempted wastes in a facility not
exculsively dedicated to the disposal of the exempted wastes without regard to the appli-
cable terms in the state compact. To preserve internal consistency, this section arguably
should be read as exempting from the requirements of state compacts the disposal of
defense-related and federal research and development low-level waste to the extent that
the disposal occurs in a facility established or operated exclusively for the disposal of
such wastes.
The legislative history of the Act sheds little light on the apparent inconsistency. In
explaining the Act to the Senate, Senator James McClure said that both low-level wastes
from atomic energy defense activities and from federal research and development activi-
ties and facilities "are legally exempt under this bill. Consequently, no State compacts
can apply to such waste and such facilities as a matter of law and no actions pursuant to
a state compact can apply to them as a matter of law." 126 CONG. REC. S16544 (daily ed.
Dec. 13, 1980).
This explanation indicates that the exemption should apply to all disposal of de-
fense related and federal research and development wastes, whether or not in an exclu-
sively dedicated facility. Representatives Morris Udall and John Dingell, however, read
the section merely as making it clear that the states need not bear responsibility or pro-
vide for the disposal of defense-related or federal research and development low-level
wastes. 126 CONG. REc. H12495 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980). These statements seem to sup-
port the statutory construction propounded above.
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Senator James McClure interpreted section 3 as establish-
ing a precedent for similar distinctions in any future legislation
addressing the management and disposal of high-level waste.5 85
Congressional approval of the exemption for defense-related
wastes under this Act, however, does not necessarily compel a
similar distinction for other types of wastes. First, the Act
merely attempts to assign equitably the responsibility for dis-
posing of commercially generated low-level wastes, a responsibil-
ity that the federal government traditionally has left to states
and private enterprise under regulatory authority of the NRC or
an agreement state. It was not intended to address the role that
the states, the public, or the NRC should have in decisions on
managing and disposing of defense-related low-level wastes, a
responsibility that the federal government has retained. Second,
the Act does not preclude the DOE from shipping its low-level,
wastes to a commercial burial site established under a compact.
Thus, it does not rigidly segregate defense-related from other
wastes as did, for example, the Jackson amendment to the Nu-
clear Waste Policy Act.586 That amendment not only exempted
DOE defense waste facilities from the requirements of the Act,
but also prohibited the DOE from introducing defense-related
wastes into any facility subject to those requirements. Finally,
because low-level waste, whether from civilian or defense-related
activities, generally poses less long-term hazard than high-level
waste, future plans for its disposal probably will not raise the
same degree of public concern as proposals to dispose of high-
level waste. Shallow-land burial for low-level waste is a proven
technology that has been used for more than twenty years. By
contrast, the federal government has yet to demonstrate an inte-
grated solution for disposing of high-level waste. Consequently,
state and local officials and the public may not demand the same
extensive participatory role in the DOE program for the disposal
of defense low-level waste as they require in a DOE program for
the disposal of high-level wastes. The inability of the federal
government to gain the confidence of the residents and officials
of a state selected to host a repository for high-level waste,
whether from civilian or defense-related activities, could doom
the entire program to failure. Unlike high-level wastes, however,
585. 126 CONG. REC. S16544 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980).
586. Amend. No. 1732, supra note 185.
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low-level waste can be disposed of at sites located in most areas
of the country. Therefore, a disruption in plans for disposing of
defense-related low-level waste would not doom the program en-
tirely but merely require the DOE to search for alternative dis-
posal sites. Thus, the rigid exemption of defense high-level waste
from the participatory mechanisms established for disposal of ci-
vilian high-level waste could have potentially graver conse-
quences than the exemption of defense low-level waste from
similar mechanisms, including the state compacting authority
under the Low-Level Waste Policy Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the Ninety-Sixth Congress failed to enact compre-
hensive radioactive waste legislation, the overarching policy that
should drive the federal government's radioactive waste manage-
ment program remains uncertain. Moreover, it is unclear
whether the Reagan Administration will adhere to some or all of
the proposals put forth by the IRG or in the Carter Administra-
tion policy. To the extent that the current Congress also fails to
enact comprehensive legislation, it will have given DOE a blank
check to pursue whatever radioactive waste management strat-
egy it deems appropriate at the moment, subject to the vagaries
of budgetary expedience and bureaucratic whim.
To avoid such a result, the current Congress should again
attempt to resolve at least the more fundamental issues underly-
ing radioactive waste management. These include: (1) whether
to establish separate programs and procedural mechanisms for
managing defense and civilian waste; (2) what, if any, role to
give affected states, localities, Indian tribes, and the public in
decisionmaking on radioactive waste management; (3) whether
to establish a federal program to provide away-from-reactor
storage for commercial spent fuel; (4) what financing mechanism
to establish to insure adequate resources for radioactive waste
disposal and full recovery by the federal government of the cost
of those activities from the uses of nuclear-generated electricity;
and (5) whether to pursue a waste management strategy that
will lead to permanent, unmonitored disposal of high-level waste
either in mined geologic repositories or by some other method,
or a strategy that will preserve retrievability through indefinite
storage of the waste in monitored engineered facilities.
If Congress succeeds in enacting comprehensive legislation
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that addresses these questions, it will have resolved, at least
temporarily, one of the thorniest issues in the energy field and
will have eliminated an Achilles' heel of the commercial nuclear
power program.
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U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE INVENTORY AND FORECAST
Volume of Waste (April 1979)
















Inactive sites 25 0
Active sites 0 125
(1) Volume not available (approx. 125 kgs.)
(2) As of January 1, 1978
Source: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Annual Addition Major Sites
DOE Commercial DOE Commerical
3 0 Hanford, WA West Valley,
Idaho Falls, ID NY
Savannah River,
SC
6 .3 Hanford, WA Beatty, NV
Idaho Falls, ID Hanford WA
Los Alamos, NM Maxey Flats, KY
Oak Ridge TN Sheffield, IL
Savannah River SC West Valley, NY



















0 Piles are located in AZ, CO,
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